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1. INTRODUCTION 
 The focus of this paper is the influence of metaphor and metonymy on English 
nominalizations.  Nominalizations provide rich soil for research because of their complex 
morpho-syntactic and lexical nature. Since there are different types of nominalizations and to 
study them all would be too complex a task, we will base our research on nominalizations 
derived by the means of sufffixes -hood and -ness. 
 
 Cognitive Linguistics provides a theoretical basis for this analysis. The focus will be 
on the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy and we will try to establish the influence 
they have on the production of these nominalizations. 
 
 
 
2. THE AIM OF THE STUDY 
The above mentioned suffixes are very productive. They can easily be attached to 
adjectives, nouns and even adverbs. They are also highly polysemous and show various 
meanings, some more central than the others. We will try to show that these other, non-central 
meanings of these suffixes can be explained through various metonymic and metaphorical 
means. Our aim is also to determine the placement of metaphorical and metonymic 
operations, that is, to investigate whether they operate on the base word prior to suffixation, or 
on the output. The possibility for metaphor and metonymy to work simultaneously with the 
process of suffixation is also left open.  
 
 
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
1. Metaphorical and metonymic processes considerably influence grammatical forms and 
behaviour of nominalizations. 
2. The polysemy of -hood and -ness formations can be explained by means of metaphors and 
metonymies. 
 
 
 
 
2 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 Every linguistic theory needs a suitable methodology adequate for its description. Due 
to the specificity of the subject matter, the focus of the study and the guiding assumptions, 
cognitive linguistics uses methods different from the ones used in previous linguistic 
description. Langacker (1987: 34-55) proposes methodological principles each linguist should 
be guided by in his analysis and these are factuality, economy, explicitness, generality and 
predictiveness. Factuality is a basic requirement because every theory should be in 
concordance with available facts. Facts are, however, problematic since they are derived from 
the assumptions characteristic for a certain theory. For example, a fact about syntax in 
contemporary linguistics is that it is a discrete component of the language, distinct from 
lexicon and semantics and therefore subject to its own tools of description. In cognitive 
grammar, on the other hand, it is a fact that syntax is an integral part of language, together 
with lexicon and semantics and cannot be described autonomously. Economy is another 
requirement that enables a great amount of data being captured with less theoretical apparatus. 
Simplicity in description should also be sought for. Explicitness implies precision of linguistic 
description and appropriateness of formal methods. Generality as a principle supposes seeking 
of general rules and universal principles. Regularities should be stated, but since cognitive 
grammar is usage-based and therefore irregular, nonobvious generalizations should also be 
captured. Cognitive linguistics analysis should be guided by predictiveness: analysis should 
be able to predict the data, that is, evidence, either supporting or disconfirming, should be 
apparent.  
 The methodology we will apply in our analysis is introspection supplemented by 
corpus analysis.  
 The main methodology used by cognitive linguists is the one of introspection. 
Although cognitive linguists rely a great deal on their knowledge and perception of the world 
(therefore this methodology has often been labeled as 'subjective', intuitive and lacking 
objectivity), we believe it to be fundamental in any linguistic research: “Linguistic 
introspection is conscious attention directed by a language user to particular aspects of 
language as manifest in her own cognition.” (Talmy 2007: XII). 
Talmy (2007) differentiates between two levels of consciousness in which aspects of language 
can manifest themselves. The first one is so-called 'first-level consciousness': language 
patterns appear here whether through evocation or spontaneously. The 'second-level 
consciousness' or attention is usually volitional and targeted at a certain language aspect. 
Some aspects of language are more 'ready' to appear as the object of introspection than the 
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others and if they appear in the first-level, they differ in their amenability to occur in the 
second-level consciousness. Meaning is one of the most accessible categories- meaning of an 
expression, a word or an idiom. The grammaticality of a phrase and appropriateness of an 
expression in a certain context is also easily accessible. Whereas the meaning of an open-class 
morpheme also belongs here, the meaning of closed-class morphemes, either free or bound, 
belongs to the group of medium accessibility to introspection (such as are the suffixes under 
study here). The same is true of synonyms of a word or some different senses of a word. Their 
analysis requires corpus research using tools such as dictionaries. Semantic components 
within a morpheme's meaning are, according to Talmy, not easily accessible, just as all senses 
of a polysemous words, as well as certain syntactic patterns and principles. They cannot be 
analyzed via introspection alone, but require other methodologies, such as the ones of 
comparative semantics, corpus analysis or syntactic analysis.  
 
 In our research we will use corpus analysis and examples that should provide us with 
enough working material to support the starting assumptions. We will use the bottom-up 
approach, meaning we will start with the real occurrences of language and try to define what 
motivates them.  
  
 When using corpus-based research method, one can deal with the corpus qualitatively 
and quantitatively. Qualitative research concentrates on analyzing the features of the targeted 
language occurrences. Quantitative approaches focus on prevalence of the feature in question 
in the corpora, that is, its frequency. In both cases, the linguist deals with real life data, 
occurrences of language that are not made-up. We will start our analysis using the quantitative 
method, with the criterion of frequency as the factor crucial in deciding which 
nominalizations to include in our study. After collecting the data, the examples will be 
analyzed accordingly.  
 
 When it comes to extracting language patterns in corpus researches, one can choose 
from variety of available corpora, such as BNC (The British National Corpus), COCA (The 
Corpus of Contemporary American English) or ANC (American National Corpus), but such 
corpora are not the only ones that can be used. One can use dictionaries and simple internet 
searches, which was also done in our research. 
 The main source of examples in our study is the British National Corpus. It contains 
over 10 million words from a variety of genres (spoken language, fiction, magazines, 
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newspapers, and academic genre). It was created by Oxford University Press in the 1980s and 
due to its representativeness, is most widely used in cognitive linguistics. In gaining our 
corpora, we took the following steps: 
1. We gained the frequency lists provided by BNC, that is the wordlist with the words ending 
in -hood and -ness. In the column 'search' we entered *hood and got a list of a 100 most 
frequent words ending in -hood. The same was done for the suffix -ness.  
2. After finding the one hundred most frequently used words, we started the research focusing 
on those nominalizations that have greater frequency, that is, that appear in the BNC more 
than once (for the suffix -hood at least). Also, we were aware of the fact that many examples 
will be excluded due to the lack of space or simply, after having completed the analysis, 
realizing that the only meaning of the nominalization is the prototypical meaning, so no 
important contribution to the research is added.  
3. For each nominalization different senses needed to be established. For that purpose, we 
used definitions given in the following dictionaries and grammars: Webster's New World 
College Dictionary, Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, Longman Dictionary of 
Contemporary English, Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English, Collins 
COBUILD English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, Dictionary.com and The Free 
Dictionary.  
4. We needed to provide example sentences that reflect different senses. In the cases where 
BNC did not come up with a satisfying solution, that is, the one needed to show a specific 
sense, we used other sources, corpora and dictionaries, that is the above mentioned 
dictionaries complemented by other online dictionaries (such as Vocabulary.com1 and 
Wordnik etc.) and Internet sources. The sources are added after each example.  
 
 Having found different senses of the nominalizations and corresponding examples, we 
will 
1. try to establish the central sense and other, less prototypical senses following the 
assumptions of prototype theory, 
 
2. try to explain the motivation for those other, non-central senses through metaphorical and 
metonymyic processes and  
 
                                                 
1  https://www.vocabulary.com/ offers access to numerous literary works and online magazines which were 
used as sources for our analysis.  
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3. finish the analysis by trying to determine the placement of metaphorical and metonymic 
processes, that is, to see whether they operate before or after suffixation or simultaneously 
with the process of  suffixation.  
 
 For each suffix we were aimed at finding the prototypical sense and in doing so we 
followed the criteria proposed by Tyler and Evans (2003): 
1. earliest attested meaning (historically),  
2. predominance in the semantic network (for the sense to be central, it is needed to be most 
frequently involved or related to other senses), 
3. relations to other prepositions (senses that participate in contrast sets are central senses) 
4. ease of predicting sense extensions (the central sense is the one from which other senses are 
derived and if that sense is easy to predict, it has more probability of being a central one). 
 Other senses that are extended form the prototypical one are given and motivation for 
these extensions is provided. 
 
 
 
5. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 The thesis  is organized as follows: The first part of the thesis will be theoretical and 
will shed some light on word formation processes in general, polysemy, metaphor and 
metonymy. The second part, the analytical one, will try to check the assumptions of the 
theoretical framework and confirm the hypotheses. The theoretical part is organized in the 
following sections: Section 6 will give an overview of word formation as part of linguistic 
study in English. We will start with the history of research, differences between certain 
linguistic approaches and different word formation models. Section 7 will focus on word 
formation within cognitive linguistics framework. Section 8 will deal with specific word 
formation processes in English such as prefixation, suffixation, compounding and others. 
Section 9 deals with nominalization, word formation process of creating nouns. We will give 
the brief description of linguistic approaches to nominalization. Section 10 deals with 
polysemy in general. We claim that the suffixes in question are polysemous, so it is necessary 
to define polysemy and describe it from a cognitive point of view. We will also show how 
polysemy also appears in word formation. Section 11 deals with basic assumptions of 
cognitive linguistics which serves as a theoretical basis for this thesis. A brief history, 
influences, main figures and the most important notions of it will be presented. Then we will 
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define the notion of 'grammar' and how it can be interpreted from cognitive linguistics' 
perspective. We will describe metaphor and metonymy as cognitive processes and show what 
makes them so fundamental. The similarities and differences between them will be described, 
as well as the way they interact. Their influence on grammatical phenomena will also be 
discussed. In this section we will also tackle the blending theory, since it is often closely 
related to the theory of conceptual metaphor and metonymy. Section 12 gives the overview of 
suffixes -hood and -ness, their meanings (central and non-central) and descriptions available 
in the literature. Analytical part starts with the section 13, where we will, based on the corpus, 
try to see whether the suffixes display more meanings, determine them and try to establish 
what motivates them. Section 14 will deal with the position of metaphorical and metonymic 
operations. Section 15 gives an overview of metaphorical and metonymic extensions from the 
prototypical sense. We will conclude our investigation with the section 16.  
 
 
 
6. WORD FORMATION IN ENGLISH 
6.1. General notions 
 Word formation is, broadly speaking, the study of language concerned with creation of 
new words. If we want to define a word, we can say that it is a unit of sounds or written 
representation that bears certain meaning. Plag (2003) gives the following properties of 
words: 
 
- words are entities having a part of speech specification 
- words are syntactic atoms 
- words (usually) have one main stress 
- words (usually) are indivisible units (no intervening material possible). 
 
Words consist of smaller units called morphemes, which will be defined below. 
 
It has often been debated whether word formation as a discipline is an autonomous one, or if 
it should be studied as part of morphology, phonology and syntax on one side and semantics 
and pragmatics on the other. It is however agreed on that it is “an interdisciplinary 
phenomenon situated between lexicon and grammar” and that it is “the study and description 
of the processes and regularities that form new words on the basis of the existing 
vocabulary.” (Müller et al. 2015: VII).  
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6.2. Approaches to word-formation      
 Schmid (2015: 3) mentions three types of approaches in the word-formation field: 
word-based, root-based and morpheme-based, depending on what is taken as a basis. In the 
word-based approach (word-based hypothesis) words are the bases of complex lexemes. 
Compounds are made up of more than one word, and word plus an affix form derivatives with 
the help of word formation rules. In the second approach roots or stems are the starting points. 
Root or stem is sometimes defined as an element to which we add more material when 
forming new words, or an element that remains unchanged before inflectional endings are 
added. The morpheme-based approach views morpheme as the basis for complex words. 
Morpheme is the smallest meaningful unit. The term was coined by Baudouin de Courtenay in 
1972 (1972: 151), who talks about “the unification of the concepts of root, affix, prefix, 
ending, and the like under the common term, morpheme.” He defines it “as that part of a word 
which is endowed with psychological autonomy and is for the very same reason not further 
divisible.” (in Carstairs-McCarthy 2005: 6). 
 Morphemes can be divided into bound and free. Free morphemes can occur on their 
own while bound ones cannot. They can also be lexical or grammatical. Lexical morphemes 
carry some semantic context, whereas grammatical ones convey grammatical information. 
Free morphemes correspond to simple lexemes (hand), whereas bound grammatical 
morphemes usually indicate number, tense or case (eat-s). Lexical morphemes can also be 
bound (affixes), in the same fashion that grammatical ones can be free (function words such 
as the or of). In the example of nationalized, nation is a free lexical morpheme and a root, -al 
is also a lexical morpheme, but a bound one (derivational suffix). National is the base for 
nationalize where -ize is again a bound lexical morpheme (derivational suffix). To the base 
nationalize one can add a bound grammatical morpheme -d.  
 There are two approaches to study word-formation: onomasiological and 
semasiological (Štekauer 2005). The semasiological (from Greek séma ‘sign’) approach is 
based on a form→ meaning direction, in the sense that it investigates which meanings are 
associated with a certain morphological structure (word-formation pattern) in a particular 
language and it analyses the already existing word-stock. In this kind of approach linguists try 
to discover what certain word patterns have in common and therefore try to make some 
general remarks on that. The onomasiological (from Greek ónoma ‘name’) approach is based 
on a concept/meaning→form direction, that is it investigates which word-formation patterns 
can be used to express certain meanings, which is a meaning-oriented approach. The concept 
and how it is expressed is in the center of this kind of investigation. Here the speaker's ability 
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to coin new words is of great importance. The onomasiological research can be diachronic 
and synchronic, the former one dealing with change in language of time, the latter with the 
current language processes. It can also be empirical and theoretical and they can also be 
combined with already mentioned ones: “Empirical onomasiology studies the different ways 
of expressing (empirical aspect) a given concept in various languages (synchronic aspect) 
and/or the etymology of these expressions and their changes over time (diachronic aspect)”. 
(Štekauer 2005: 208). Both semasiological and onomasiological approaches can be included 
in language description.  
 
Štekauer (2000) follows onomasiological approach and claims that each naming act is 
a way of responding to a demand created by a speech community. Word formation is an 
independent component of linguistics, contrasted with a lexical and syntactic component: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Word-Formation Component and its relation to other components  
(Štekauer 2005: 213) 
 
When assigning a name to the object, members of the speech community scan the 
lexical component and if they found the unit they need, Lexical component can serve as basis 
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for semantic formation (semantic change). If not, a completely new naming unit is made by 
the Word-formation component. 
 Thus Lexical and Word-formation components 'co-operate': in the Lexicon all naming 
units (monemes and complex words, borrowed words, clippings and acronyms) as well as 
affixes are stored and lexicon feeds Word-formation component with it. On the other hand, 
what is being coined in the Word-formation component, will later be stored in the Lexicon. 
This model shows that for giving names to objects, language users are of great importance. In 
doing so, they rely on their knowledge, cognitive abilities and experiences and imagination so 
it is not a purely linguistic act, but rather a cognitive phenomenon. 
  There are several levels in the Word-formation component:  
1. on the conceptual level the object that is selected by the speech community as the one that 
needs to be named is analysed and conceptually categorized in the most general way (place, 
time, manner). 
2. on the semantic level semantic features or semes are added ([+Material] [+Animate] 
[+Human] [Adult] [+Profession] [+Agent]). 
3. on the onomasiological level one seme is selected to represent the onomasiological base 
denoting a class to which the object belongs (agent, object, instrument) and another one is 
selected to function as a mark of the base. The mark can be divided into determining 
constituent and the determined constituent. 
The determined constituent is always the category of Action (Action proper, Process and 
State). Onomasiological structure is formed on this level and it represents the relationship 
between the base and the marks. It is “a conceptual-semantic basis for the act of naming.” 
(Štekauer 2005: 216). 
4. on the onomatological level morphemes are selected and assigned to semes. 
5. on the phonological level the new naming unit is phonologically shaped according to 
relevant phonological rules. 
All naming units that are formed in the Word-formation component are coined by 
productive and regular Word-Formation rules. In the onomasiological theory, word-formation 
can be defined as following (Štekauer 2000: 7):  
 
 Word-formation deals with productive, regular and predictable onomasiological and 
word-formation types producing motivated naming units in response to the naming needs of a 
speech community, by making use of word-formation bases of bilateral naming units and 
affixes stored in the Lexicon.  
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6.3. Historical overview of word formation        
 Historically looking, the interest in word-formation began to increase in the early 20th 
century. Adams (1973: 5) sees the reason for this in the fact that at that time de Saussure made 
distinction between synchrony and diachrony. Synchronic study is concentrated on the current 
state of language and a diachronic one is interested in the language change. De Saussure gave 
priority to synchrony. The correct study of the word formation could only be done by 
managing these two approaches. Before the midfifties and Chomsky, linguists were mostly 
interested in phonology and morphology. It is Chomsky who changed that course when he 
took more interest in syntax, but again words-formation was discussed only as a part of either 
a morpheme analysis or a sentence analysis.  
One of the first scholars to give a comprehensive overview of English word formation 
was Hans Marchand in 1969. He followed semasiological approach in his description and 
included processes such as compounding, affixation (derivation), conversion, abbreviation, 
and blending. His description is important because it is a synchronic one, relying on 
diachronic facts about the history of language. According to Marchand word formation deals 
with composites only, which can be formally and semantically analyzed. He distinguishes 
between two types of words: 
1. words formed as combinations of full linguistic signs by means of compounding, 
suffixation, prefixation, derivation by zero morpheme, and back derivation and 
2. words not formed as combinations of full linguistic signs such as blending, clipping, rime, 
expressive symbolism and word manufacturing.  
Both groups are similar in the way that words in them are formed by syntagmatic relation 
between morphemes. If a form is not analyzable into morphemes, it is called a moneme 
(Monday, conceive).  
 Any word-formation syntagma consists of a determinant (specifier or modifier) and a 
determinatum (head). Determinatum can stand in all positions, whereas determinant cannot. 
Since all word combinations need to have this determinant/ determinatum relationship, he 
introduced 'zero-morpheme' in the word-formation processes such as conversion (father as a 
verb is conversed from the noun father). Here zero-morpheme takes over the role of a suffix 
in the function of determinatum.  
There are two ways of forming new words (Marchand 1967), namely expansion and 
derivation. Expansion is based on the formula AB = B (a steamboat is a boat) and here both 
determinant and determinatum belong to the same word class and determinant just modifies 
the determinatum. There are, however, cases where one word is used in another function, that 
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is transposed, and this is called transposition. In the example stone wall, the noun stone 
functions as an adjective. Derivation is a subgroup of transposition: a suffix transposes the 
base into a different category. This is true of suffixation only, prefixation would be viewed as 
expansion. In his later works (as given in Kastovsky 2005), Marchand emphases that word-
formation analyses should include morphological, semantic and grammatical aspects. His 
approach is a structuralist one. Structuralism brought many important contributions to the 
word-formation. It is 'responsible' for the concepts such as stem morpheme, derivational and 
inflectional morpheme, discontinuous morpheme, and free and bound morpheme, concepts 
needed for analyzing the word structure.  
 In generative grammar, word-formation was treated as either part of syntax or 
phonology. It was concerned with native speaker's mental representation of grammar and how 
it can produce rules for formation of correct utterances. Sentence and its transformations were 
studied at large, so different word-formations (nominal compounds) were seen as being 
transformed from sentences. In 1960 Lees (1960: 156, in Lieber 2015) observed that all 
implicit grammatical relation of the sentence (subject, object) are retained in the derived 
compound explicitly: 
1. The sheep has a horn. The horn is like a prong. → 
2. The sheep has a horn which is like a prong. → 
3. The sheep has a horn like a prong. → 
4. … sheep with a horn like a prong … → 
 5. … sheep with a pronghorn … → 
6. … pronghorn… 
 
 However there were cases that required deletion of some material, like verb, in 
transformations, so ten years later Chomsky gave another account of word-formation. To him, 
all sentences can be transformed into gerunds (refusing, criticizing), but derived nominals 
(refusal, criticism) are part of the lexicon. This lexicalist approach was totally different view 
on word formation processes, since it treated deverbal adjectives and deadjectival nouns as 
part of lexicon.  
  
 In 1976 Aronoff published the first monograph on generative morphology, Word-
formation in generative grammar, claiming that word-formation investigation should not be 
concentrated on morphemes, since the notion of a morpheme is rather problematic, but rather 
on a word itself, so he suggests word-based hypothesis: “All regular word-formation 
12 
processes are word-based. A new word is formed by applying a regular rule to a single already 
existing word. Both the new word and the existing one are members of major lexical 
categories.” (Aronoff 1976: 21). The reason for this approach is the fact that some English 
words like cranberry could not be analyzed as cran + berry, since cran has no meaning and 
therefore cannot be counted as a morpheme, but rather words like these exist as such in 
lexicon. They are not formed by regular morphological processes, but by word-formation 
rules in the lexicon. To him, affixes do not belong to lexicon, they are part of rules. Meanings 
of complex words can be seen as the sum of meanings of their parts (happiness: the state of 
being happy). Some word formation rules can be totally productive, which is case with 
formation of -ly adverbs, and less productive, which is the case with nouns ending in -dom. 
There are also some syntactic and semantic restrictions of the rules. For example, new words 
are formed from major syntactic categories such as nouns, verbs or adjectives, and never from 
articles or prepositions. Semantically, affixes 'select' the base they attach to, which is also the 
case with phonology (stress). Generative research on word formation was mostly concentrated 
on principles and rules, since word formation must be rule-governed. Language in general is 
depicted “as a very rigid and inflexible system consisting of discrete elements that can be 
combined according to certain mechanisms.” (Onysko and Michel 2010: 3). 
  At that time there was a strong distinction between syntax and lexicon: words are 
formed presyntactically in the lexicon and syntactic rules cannot affect or operate on words 
(this is called The Strong Lexicalist Hypothesis). There is also the Weak Lexicalist Hypothesis 
according to which derivational morphology belongs to the lexicon and inflectional 
morphology to syntax. In the nineties principles of syntax were applied to word-formation, 
especially in the works of Rochelle Lieber who examined phrasal compounds (a [[floor of a 
birdcage] taste]) and possessive case ([a friend of mine]’s book) and saw that phrasal 
compounds function as words and that the 's marking in English is not applied to words only, 
but to noun phrases as well. This means that the principles of morphology and syntax are 
actually the same. There must be some interaction between syntax and morphology, since 
phrasal categories can indeed serve as bases for construction of words. Lieber puts all 
morphological processes under syntax, which shows the significant change in the 
understanding of word-formation in lexicalist approaches.  
 In line with generative assumptions, Lipka includes cognitive operations in his study, 
claiming that “both semantic transfer and word-formation provide productive patterns for 
creating new lexical units.” (1992: 120). To him, semantic transfer includes metaphor and 
metonymy, which have long been neglected since they belong to extralinguistic phenomena. 
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Word formation and semantic transfer are similar in being characterized by productivity, 
degrees of acceptability and the possibility of institutionalization.  
 
 
 
6.4. Models in word formation  
 Sometimes the focus of the study of the word formation can be formal properties, 
which is the case with generative grammar. On the other hand, some linguistic approaches are 
more focused on the functional properties in word-formation, as cognitive grammar and 
construction grammar. Based on the focus of the study, Schmid (2015: 11) posits four 
theoretical models: 
-rule-based models 
-schema-based models 
 -exemplar-based model and 
-exemplar-cum-schema-based models. 
 Generative approaches are given as an example of the rule-based model due to the fact 
that they are aimed at finding general rules that could be applied in word-formation, as well as 
type-specific rules that could be applied to new phenomena. They are more focused on the 
structure than on the functional aspects and in them there is a clear distinction between 
grammar and lexicon.  
 Schema-based models also try to reach generalizations about word-formation patterns, 
but not in the form of rules. Schemas are responsible for productivity and creativity in 
language. Schemas are pairings of meaning and form. In schema-based approaches, the more 
holistic view is applied, since “linguistic knowledge emerges from the experience of concrete 
usage-events in social situations and is subject to the frequencies of occurrence of certain 
elements.” (Schmid 2015: 12). Cognitive approaches belong here.  
 In exemplar-based models linguistic knowledge is not formed in schemas, but in more 
complex representations of individual exemplars connected by similarity: new words are 
created in analogy to already exiting examples stored in our memory.  
 
 Exemplar-cum-schema-based models try to connect the last two models by 
acknowledging both schemas and exemplar-based knowledge. Thus new lexemes can be 
formed on the basis of schemas, but also by means of formations that appear due to 
similarities between stored exemplars.  
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7. COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO WORD FORMATION 
 What differentiates cognitive approaches from the previously mentioned approaches to 
word formation is the notion of language and “how language is encapsulated in the mind” 
(Onysko and Michel 2010: 5). Language is non-autonoumous, embodied, usage based and 
symbolic and this also applies to word formation. One of the premises in cognitive linguistics 
is that language is a unification of sound and meaning. “A language enables speakers to 
represent their thoughts and intentions by making available to them an inventory of symbolic 
associations between units of form (phonological structures) and units of meaning (semantic 
structures).” (Taylor 2015: 145). In a cognitive approach to word formation  
 
 a word can be described as a symbolic label of mental categories referring to 
(in)animate objects, to states, actions, conditions and qualities as they are perceived by and 
conventionally construed in the human mind in interaction with the social and natural 
environment. According to this definition, words can also label complex mental categories. 
(Onysko and Michel 2010: 2).  
 
 Words are symbolic units which are bipolar, that is, they consist of a semantic pole (its 
meaning) and a phonological pole (its sound). Grammatical units (constructions and 
morphemes) are therefore symbolic and basic grammatical categories such as nouns, verbs, 
adjectives and adverbs are “maximally schematic at both the semantic and the phonological 
poles” (Langacker 2006: 46). For example, a noun is represented by the schema 
[[THING]/[X]], or a concept ANIMAL is a schema with different elaborations, such as MAMMAL 
or INSECT. What is needed for the description of languages are only these three types of units. 
Language, that is both grammar and lexicon which form a continuum, is comprised of and 
describable by these three types of units. This assumption is in a clear opposition to the 
generative grammar view of autonomy of linguistic levels such as syntax, morphology and 
lexicon. In many linguistic descriptions language consists of grammar, producing rules, and 
lexicon, providing grammar with elements to use. This is known as a 'building block' model 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 202-203, Langacker 1987: 452-457) of language: elements of 
lexicon are stored in our memory and they act as bricks, whereas grammar is what builds 
larger constructions of these bricks. In cognitive linguistics, however, both grammar (syntax, 
morphology and phonology) and lexicon are all comprised of symbolic elements with 
different levels of symbolic complexity and phonological and semantic schematicity. For 
example, traditionally 'grammatical' elements, such as prepositions (of) are also meaningful. 
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Langacker (1999: 74) claims that the meaning of 'of ' is to profile a relationship between two 
entities, so it cannot be marked as 'empty' (a man of integrity). 
 Therefore we can talk about three types of constructions: phonological, semantic and 
symbolic. A phonological form ['b:d] is a construction which can be decomposed into ['b] 
[:] and [d]. A semantic construction [BLACK BIRD] can be analyzed as [BLACK] and [BIRD]. 
The expression black bird is a symbolic construction made by unification of phonological 
structure [blæk 'b:d] and semantic structure [BLACK BIRD]. Here the notion of symbol is 
adopted from Ferdinand de Saussure (1966) and his description of a language as a symbolic 
system of signs: linguistic expression (sign) is a mapping between a concept (signified) and 
an acoustic signal (signifier), which corresponds to semantic pole and phonological pole. To 
Langacker, grammar is a “structured inventory of conventional linguistic units.” (1987: 57). A 
unit is a structure that a speaker uses automatically and it is always accessed as a whole. It 
becomes entrenched or established due to the frequency of use: if speakers are exposed to the 
units repeatedly, the units will become more entrenched and conventionalized. 
Conventionality or a characteristic of a unit to be shared by the whole community is a matter 
of degree: some units are more conventional than the others, which means, shared by the 
greater number of speakers. When forming new words, speaker relies on these entrenched 
units. Sometimes these well-entrenched units can block the potentially new structures. For 
example, the verb to steal does not have the corresponding noun a stealer since it is blocked 
by the already existing and well entrenched a thief. When semantic and phonological pole are 
united, we get a symbolic unit. A morpheme is therefore the simplex symbolic unit and when 
combined with other morphemes, it produces larger structures. It is simplex because it does 
not contain other, smaller subparts.  
 
 
 
7.1. On motivation 
  Whether the production of these larger structures is motivated or not is also of interest 
to cognitive linguistics. Motivation in language is something that already Saussure talked 
about. His name is often connected to the term 'arbitrariness of a linguistic sign', which means 
that there is not direct connection between the sign and the signifier. That is in the direct 
opposition to the notion of motivation, which implies notions such as “non-arbitrary 
relationships between form and meaning (as opposed to arbitrary relationships), iconicity (as 
one type of motivation), and explanation ('making sense' through motivation.”). (Radden and 
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Panther 2004: 2). Radden and Panther however claim that Saussure was aware of the 
limitations this implication has: “motivation, in his view, is a cognitive principle that makes 
language meaningful to its speakers and is necessary as a counterbalance to arbitrariness.” 
(2004: 1). In traditional word formation theory compositionality principle is applied:  
 
 Simple linguistic items (signs, morphemes) are in principle arbitrary/unmotivated with 
regard to the relationship between form and meaning (with the exception of onomatopoeia), 
while complex linguistic constructions (at whichever level) are in principle relatively 
motivated, because they can be interpreted semantically on the basis of the knowledge of the 
meanings of their constituents and some general underlying pattern. (Kastovsky 2005: 101).  
 
 This was taken from Marchand who viewed morpheme as a combination of meaning 
and form. Ullmann (1962, in Lipka 1992) distinguishes between three types of motivation: 
phonetic, morphological and semantic. The phonetic one is onomatopoeia, which can be 
primary and secondary. A primary one is the case when the word imitates the sound (crack or 
plop); a secondary one appears when the referent is nonacoustic and the sounds imitate 
dimensions such as size, weight, color or speed. Morphological motivation concerns word 
formation and the semantic one includes figures of speech such as metaphor and metonymy.  
  
 In 1987 Lakoff claimed that the meanings of compounds are not always the sum of 
meanings of the parts, that is, the meaning of the compound cannot always be predicted from 
its parts. Here he introduces the term ICM (Idealized Cognitive Model) as a mental 
representation of the world based on our knowledge and experience. Each part of a compound 
somehow fits into its ICM. In cognitive linguistics, motivation is influenced by cognition. 
Radden and Panther (2004: 4) define motivation as follows: “A linguistic sign (target) is 
motivated to the extent that some of its properties are shaped by a linguistic or non-linguistic 
source and language-independent factors.” 
 What is meant by target is the form and/or a concept of a linguistic sign, whereas 
source is something linguistic or non-linguistic. Cognitive motivation is often exemplified in 
compound sentences where we see temporal sequence of events: 
 
 She came into the house and locked the door. 
Here the cognitive principle of iconicity places events that happened earlier in the first 
part of the sentence. The source for the example of bedroom is a linguistic one (from Panther 
and Radden 2011), namely bed and room, although this is not enough to conclude that a 
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bedroom is a room where people sleep. More non-linguistic factors, such as our knowledge of 
the world, need to be included here. We can say that in the case of bedroom, its meaning is not 
predictable from its parts, but it is motivated. Non-linguistic factors are language independent, 
and they involve general cognitive faculties, such as “inferential abilities, or metaphoric and 
metonymic mappings, that are not restricted to language.” (Radden and Panther 2004: 10). 
The example for this is a screwdriver, coded differently across languages.2 All these names 
evoke the same ICM as their meaning: most of them have the screw in it, namely the object 
the screwdriver operates on, because it is the salient element of the whole frame and 
metonymycally stands for the whole object. Most of them also include the type of action that 
is completed by it and suffix -er designating an instrument.  
 Langacker's view (1987) on compositionality is the same: compositionality can only 
be partial since the meanings of components do not totally describe the meaning of the whole, 
but rather only motivate the whole.  
 Going back to units, it is important to emphasize that linguistic units are not randomly 
organized, but rather related to each other in three ways (Langacker 1987: 73-75): 
symbolization, categorization and composition. Symbolization is a correspondence between a 
semantic and phonological pole. A lexical item cat is represented as [[CAT]/[kæt]], where 
[CAT] is semantic pole and [kæt] a phonological pole. The symbolic relation is marked by '/'. 
Categorization is the next relationship by which units can be connected. Langacker (1987: 
370-373) talks about categorization by prototype and categorization by schema. 
Categorization by schema is also known as elaboration, that is a relation between a schema 
and its instances. Elaboration is represented as A→B, where “B is fully compatible with A’s 
specifications but is characterized with greater precision and detail.” (Langacker 2013: 17). 
Schema is a general category containing more specific instances, as in CIRCULAR ENTITY 
→CIRCULAR ARENA. This is called full schematicity since all the features of A are preserved in 
B. 
 Categorization by prototype is known as extension and is represented as A ---> B. This 
means that B is connected to A “on the basis of an association or perceived similarity.” 
(Langacker 2013: 18). A is a prototype and B is an extension from it (CIRCULAR ARENA ---> 
RECTANGULAR ARENA). Categorizing units form a schematic network and define a schematic 
                                                 
2 The expressions for ‘screwdriver’ are: French tournevis, Korean nasadolige (both ‘turn- screw’), Polish 
śrubokręt (‘screw-turn’), Dutch schroevendraaier (‘screw-turn-er’), Japanese nejimawashi (screw-turn-
NOM), German Schraubenzieher, Danish skruetrækker, Hungarian csavarhúzó (all of them ‘screw-pull-er’), 
Spanish destornillador (‘de/out-screw-er’), Italian cacciavite (‘stick-in/take-out-screw’), Swedish 
skruvmejsel, Finnishruuvimeisseli, ruuvitaltta (all of them ‘screw-chisel’), Chinese luósīdāo (‘screw-knife’), 
Brazilian Portuguese chave de fenda (‘key of cut). (Panther and Radden 2011: 12). 
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plane of relationships. Units can also stand in the relationship of composition or integration. 
Two or more semantic, phonological or symbolic structures form structures of greater size. 
The symbolic units [[CAT]/[kæt]] and [[PL]/[z]] (plural morpheme) are joined in the plural 
cats, [[CAT]/[kæt]]-[[PL]/[z]]. It is marked by a dash or a line. This kind of integration is a 
syntagmatic one (syntagmatic plane). 
 In cognitive linguistics, all aspects of word formation are meaningful and the 
distinction between lexical and grammatical units is not acknowledged.  All word formation 
'items' can be seen as “encoding extensions, based on category judgments, from a profiled 
linguistic unit.” (Ungerer 2007: 652). The constructional schema is the base for all the 
processes of word formation and different instantations are extracted from it. Deverbal nouns 
in English are formed by the schema [[x]v er]N. Plural noun suffix in English denoting 'a 
group of replicate things' is represented by the schema [NOUN-s]. As Tuggy (2005: 235) puts 
it, “A schema is a pattern, a rough outline, a coarse-grained, less-fully-specified version of a 
concept which the elaborations render, each in a different way, in finer, more elaborate detail.” 
When speakers repeat this pairing of a schema with its elaborations often enough, it becomes 
entrenched in their mind or 'mental grammar' and conventionalized by usage. We can say that 
schemas differ in degree of entrenchment: the symbolic units that are more frequently 
encountered are  more likely to become entrenched. They also differ in degree of specificity. 
Semantic and phonetic units participating in word formation can be either autonomous or 
dependent, so that suffixes are phonologically dependent and prefixes are autonomous. They 
can be schematic or contentful. Suffixes and prefixes are schematic and express general 
notions for their bases (process, agent) which are more contentful.  
 
 
 
8. WORD FORMATION PROCESSES IN ENGLISH 
 We will now give a brief overview of processes for word formation in English 
according to Plag (2003). These are: 
-derivation  
          -affixation 
                    -prefixation    
                    -suffixation     
                    - infixation           
          -non-affixation 
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                    -conversion 
                    -truncation 
                    -blending 
                    - abbreviation 
-compounding 
 
 
 
8.1. Affixation 
 In the process of affixation an affix (a bound morpheme) is added to the base. If it 
precedes the base it is called prefixation (reorganize, premodify, postmodern). It can also 
follow the base, in which case we talk about suffixes (employee, selectivity, adventurousness). 
It can sometimes appear within another morpheme, such as bloody in abso-bloody-lutely, 
where bloody interrupts the morpheme absolute. Affixes can be of native or non-native origin 
(Latin, French, Greek), they can be very or moderately productive, they can attach to native 
and non-native bases.  
 Prefixes can be subdivided into negative, locational, temporal and quantifying (Plag 
2003, Lieber 2005, Adams 2014). Negative prefixes are a- (asymmetrical), anti- (anti-war), 
un- (uncertain),  in- (inability), non- (nonviolent),  de- (decontaminate), dis- (dislocate), mis- 
(mispronounce). They usually express notions such as 'wrong', 'evil', 'badly' or 'lack of'. The 
suffix un- can also have reversative function (undo). Locational prefixes are over- (overcoat), 
under- (underarm), out- (outrun), back- (backstroke), down- (downcast), up- (upgrade), off- 
(offshoot), fore- (foresee), inter- (intermission), intra- (intramuscular), sub- (submarine), 
supra- (supracouncil), trans- (transpolar), circum- (circumnavigate). Apart from their 
locative usage, they usually show different senses such as excess (overcharge) or exclusion 
(outparty). Temporal suffixes usually mean 'before', 'after' or 'new': pre- (preschool), post- 
(postmodern), ex- (ex-president), retro- (retroact), neo- (neoclassical). Quantitative prefixes 
quantify over their base words meaning: uni- (unilateral), bi- (bilateral), multi- 
(multipurpose), micro- (microwave), macro- (macrobiotic), poly- (polysyllabic), semi- 
(semifinal), hyper- (hyperactive). 
 Suffixes attach to nouns, verbs and adjectives and are often class-changing, so nominal 
suffixes are used to form nouns from adjectives or verbs (coverage), verbal ones are used to 
form verbs (activate), and so on. Nominal suffixes can produce abstract nouns or personal 
nouns. Suffixes which are used to produce abstract nouns denoting actions, results of actions, 
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properties or qualities are -al (refusal), -age (leakage), -ance/ -ence (absorbance), -ation 
(specialization), -ment (entertainment), -ure (exposure), -cy/ -ce (intimacy), -dom (kingdom), -
ery (bakery), -ful (bootful), -hood (childhood), -ness (happiness), -ing (building), -ism 
(conservatism), -ity (curiosity), -ment (involvement) and -ship (membership). They can have 
other meanings as well, such as collectivity (brotherhood), theory (Marxism) or area 
(neighbourhood).  
 Personal noun suffixes are -ant (applicant), -ee (employee), -eer (mountaineer), -er 
(teacher), -ess (princess), -an (historian), -ist (fantasist) and -ite (Stalinite). Many of them 
again exhibit polysemy, so -ant/ -ent can denote agent (servant), instrument (irritant), 
experiencer (dependent) or patient (insurant). (Lieber 2005: 404).  
 Verb-forming suffixes are -ize (legalize), -ate (activate), -en (shorten) and -ify 
(personify). They are usually attached to nouns and adjectives.  
 Adjectives can be formed from nouns by means of the following suffixes: -able 
(fashionable), -al (cultural), -ary (legendary), -ed (empty-headed) -esque (picturesque), -ful 
(beautiful), -ic (heroic), -ish (childish), -ive (instinctive), -less (homeless), -ly (friendly), -ous 
(famous), -some (awesome), and -y (sandy). Verbs can also be used to form adjectives. 
Suffixes that participate here are -able (washable), -ive (decorative), -ory (contradictory), -ful 
(resentful) and -ing (boring). 
 Adverbial suffixes are -ly (hardly) and -wise (clockwise). 
 
 
 
8.2. Non-affixation 
 Conversion is a process that changes word class without adding affixes to the base and 
is often called zero-derivation.  
Nouns can be converted from verbs:  
to walk to take a walk 
to hug             to give a hug 
Nouns can be converted into verbs: 
the hammer to hammer 
the skin to skin 
 
Adjectives can become verbs: 
open   to open 
empty   to empty 
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Adjectives can become nouns: 
poor  the poor 
rich  the rich 
 
 It is sometimes difficult to determine the directionality of conversion, i.e. whether a 
verb is converted from a noun or vice versa. Plag suggests (2003: 106) four criteria for this: 
1. historical background - the history of language can often show which category came first. 
2. semantic complexity - the converted word is semantically more complex than the word 
from which it is derived. 
3. inflectional behaviour of converted verbs - if there is irregularly inflected verb form (as in 
the verb drink- drank) nouns are derived from verbs (a drink). 
4. the frequency of occurrence - base words are used more frequently than the derived words.  
     
  In truncation (Liz from Elisabeth, lab from laboratory) there is a lack of phonological 
or orthographic material in the derived word. Names are usually truncated to express 
familiarity or closeness with the person involved. Clipping is a sub-group of truncation and 
includes shortening of words (phone from telephone).  
 
 In blending two or more words are combined into one, with prior deletion of material 
from source word(s), such as science+ fiction = sci-fi, breakfast + lunch = brunch. Blending is 
usually found in the language of science and technology. Plag (2003: 155-156) divides blends 
into two subgoups. In the first group are shortened compounds, such as motel (motor + hotel). 
The first element modifies the second (a motel is a kind of hotel). The second group includes 
cases such as Spanglish (Spanish + English, the combination of the two). So the first element 
does not describe the whole blend, but rather shares the meanings of both elements.  
 
 A process similar to blending is the one of abbreviation, that is taking initial letters of 
multi-word sequences to make up a new word such DC for District of Columbia, or non-
initial letters as in kHz for kilohertz. They are sometimes pronounced as individual letters 
(FBA), in which case the form is called initialism, and sometimes as a regular word (NATO, 
UNESCO), called acronym. They need not be spelled in capital letters (e.g.). 
 
 In the non-affixation group Schmid (2015) adds reduplication, in which a word, a 
word-like element or a part of a word are repeated. Sometimes the repeated words are the 
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same (hush-hush), sometimes a vowel is changed (hip-hop) and sometimes a consonant 
(boogie-woogie).  
 
 
 
8.3. Compounding 
 In compounding two or more words are combined to produce new units, such as 
pickpocket (verb + noun), afterbirth (preposition + noun) or stone-deaf (noun + adjective). 
Lieber (2005: 375) distinguishes between synthetic compounds and root compounds. 
Synthetic compounds are often called verbal or deverbal compounds because the second part 
is derived from a verb (truck driver, waste disposal). Root or primary compounds are the ones 
in which the second part is not deverbal (dog bowl, blackboard). Since they are complex in 
nature, they have a unit which is the most important and it is called the head. The head 
determines semantic and syntactic properties of the whole compound. For example, if the 
head is a noun, the whole compound is a noun (shop assistant). If the head is of a feminine 
gender, so the whole compound is (head waitress) and if the compound appears in plural, it is 
the head that is pluralized (refugee camps). This is called right-headedness. The first part is 
called the modifier since it modifies the referent of the head (a tree house is a house built on a 
tree). The above-mentioned compounds are endocentric or hyponyms of their second stem (a 
refugee camp is a kind of a camp for refugees). There are also cases of copulative compounds 
in which stems have the equal status (producer-director). In exocentric compounds like 
redhead the head does not determine the properties of the compound, it is simply a metonymy 
for a person with red hair. These types of 'creative compounds' were long neglected in 
linguistic descriptions because of their nature as being exceptional and unanalyzable, but 
cognitive research have shown “that such constructions are not only used relatively frequently 
in language but can in fact be analyzed remarkably well within a cognitive linguistic 
framework, with the help of blending, constructional schemas and construal.” (Benczes 2010: 
219). Benczes continues to notice that the difference between endocentric compounds and 
metaphor-metonymy based compounds lies in the amount of creativity, since the latter ones 
are created by employing a more associative and creative word process. These compounds are 
often called bahuvrihi compounds and Barcelona (2011b: 152) gives the following definition: 
“Bahuvrihi compounds jointly denote a type of entity via one of the characteristic properties 
of that entity.” In these types of compounds metonymy CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY FOR 
CATEGORY is involved, as in fathead. They are called 'possessive' compounds since the entity 
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in question possesses the denoted property (either physical or mental) and can be paraphrased 
as such: He has got a fat head. Barcelona further notices that they typically denote people 
with body parts as bases (paleface), but can also denote animals (redbreast), plants (longleaf) 
and inanimates (greenback). The example of a fathead also contains metaphor-metonymy 
interaction: the head metonymically stands for the brain, that is, for intelligence of the whole 
person. Fatness is metonymically connected to slow functioning, and so is stupidity. Stupidity 
and fatness are therefore metaphorically linked since one belongs to abstract and the other to a 
concrete domain, namely via STUPIDITY IS FATNESS metaphor (a metonymy-based one). 
 What distinguishes compounds from phrases is their inseparability: it is not possible to 
add a modifier between the parts of a compound: *truck fast driver.  
 
 Lieber (2005: 378) lists following patterns of root compounds: 
 
N N  file cabinet, towel rack, catfood, steelmill 
N A   sky blue, leaf green, stone cold, rock hard 
A A   icy cold, red hot, green-blue, wide awake 
A N   hard hat, bluebird, blackboard, poorhouse 
A V   dry farm, wet sand, double coat, sweet talk 
N V   handmake, babysit, spoonfeed, machine wash 
V N   drawbridge, cutpurse, pickpocket, pull toy 
V V   stir-fry, blow-dry, jump shoot, jump start 
with noun + noun combination being the most productive.  
 
 Synthetic compounds, on the other hand, can be formed in two ways: compounding 
can take place inside derivation so the suffix is attached to already existing compound as in [[ 
book sell ] -er ] or derivation appears inside compounding as in [ book [ sell-er ]. 
 
 Szymanek (2005) and Adams (2014) add another process of word-formation called 
back-formation, exemplified by air-condition (from air-conditioning) and brain-wash (from 
brain-washing). They are usually formed form action nominalizations by dropping the suffix -
ing.  
 
 What is of interest for this study are nominalizations, that is, nouns derived from other 
nouns, adjectives and adverbs by adding suffixes -hood and -ness. We will show that they are 
highly polysemous and the notion of polysemy will be dealt with later in the thesis. 
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9. ON NOMINALIZATION 
  Nominalizations have long been the topics of various linguistic studies. The interest in 
describing them began to increase along with the interest for word formation. It had different 
statuses in different linguistic approaches and we will give a brief account on nominalizations 
ranging from transformational-generative linguistics, cognitive grammar, systemic-functional 
approaches and cognitive-functional approach.  
 
 In transformational-generative linguistics, nominalizations were explained as result of 
transformations and were not treated as a part of lexicon. Lees gives an extensive description 
in his book The Grammar of English nominalizations from 1960 where he states that noun 
phrases are derived from verbs by applying transformations. Scalise and Guevara (2005: 150) 
sum up the reasons for this kind of analysis: 
1. Nominal compounds are transformed from sentences in which the grammatical relations, 
such as subject or object, are implicit in the elements of the compound, are expressed 
explicitly. 
2. In the cases where the meaning of a compound is ambiguous, it is possible to show that this 
ambiguity can be explained by different underlying sentences corresponding to the different 
meanings. For instance, the ambiguity of a compound such as snake poison can be explained 
in 'grammatical' terms by deriving this different meanings from (at least) three different 
sentences 
1. X extracts poison from the snake. 
2. The snake has the poison. 
3. The poison is for the snake.  
3. Transformations can explain different grammatical relations in the 'similar ' (N + N 
compounds) such as windmill and flour mill: they are derived from different deep structures: 
1. Wind powers the mill. 
2. The mill grinds the flour.  
 As already noted above, this theory requires a great deal of deletion. In the example a 
car thief it is necessary to delete the verb steal, assuming the underlying sentence is The thief 
steals the car.  
      
 Chomsky (1970) takes lexicalist position and claims that only gerundive nominals can 
be derived by transformations, whereas derived nominals are part of the lexicon: 
1. John criticized the book. 
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2. John's criticizing the book. (gerundive nominal) 
3. John's criticism of the book. (derived nominal) 
 He claims that all sentences can be transformed into the corresponding gerundive 
nominals and they receive properties of the verb, but cannot have the internal structure of a 
noun phrase. They are also semantically regular. On the other hand, derived nominals are 
formed in a number of ways without having possibility of predicting their suffix and they 
have the internal structure of the noun phrase (determiners, plurals).  
 
 A special investigation into nominalizations was made by Langacker (1987, 1991). 
Before giving a brief account on nominalizations in his view, it is important to note that 
linguistic expressions in cognitive linguistics are divided into nominal predications and 
relational predications. Nouns are nominal predications and they designate things, whereas 
relational predications are divided into temporal and atemporal relations. Verbs designate 
temporal relation (a process). Atemporal relations (states) are static and symbolised by 
adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, infinitives and participles. 
 
 
Figure 2. Word classes in cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987: 249) 
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 Nominal predications profile a region in some domain and are conceptually 
autonomous, relational ones always profile relations between those entities upon which they 
are conceptually dependent. “One of the basic conceptual distinctions between predicates 
(prototypically verbs) and arguments or modifiers (nouns and adjectives), according to 
Langacker, is the mode of scanning of the scene.” (Croft and Cruise 2004: 53). Examples 
taken from Dirven and Radden exemplify this (2007: 26):  
 
a) The couple next door have adopted a baby. 
b) Another couple down the road want to adopt a baby, too. 
c) Adopting a baby can be a joyful experience. 
d) Older couples cannot apply for the adoption of a baby. 
 
 In the example a) we can scan the whole process of adopting a baby in successive 
phases and this is called sequential scanning. According to Langacker, in a language all finite 
verbs forms are viewed sequentially. 
Figure 3. Sequential scanning (Langacker 1987: 144) 
   
 Examples b, c, and d involve summary scanning: all phases of a situation are activated 
simultaneously and situations are seen as timeless.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Summary scanning (Langacker 1987: 144) 
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 So when the verb (adopt) becomes nominalized (adoption) our mode of scanning 
changes. To him, nominalizations are conceptual reifications built with the help of morphemes 
that are meaningful. “The conceptual impact of reification is in giving relational concepts the 
kind of stable existence that we typically associate with things.” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 
79). They give conceptual difference between a thing, a relation, a situation and a reified thing 
in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 5. Things, relation, situation (state) and reified thing (Radden and Dirven 2007: 80) 
 
  Langacker also states that in cognitive grammar it is irrelevant whether we should 
investigate nominalizations as part of lexicon or as part of grammar since such boundaries are 
arbitrary.  He (1991) analysed nominalizations from three aspects: 
-kinds 
-periphrasis and 
-predictability. 
 Kinds of nominalizations that are included in his study are: 
a) Alternate profiling is the simplest type that shifts the profile of a verb to some nominal 
entity that is part of its inherent structure, such as the trajector 3 (dancer, cook...), the 
landmark (draftee, choice...), an instrument (walker, probe...), a product (painting, mark...) 
and setting or location (diner, lounge...). 
 
b) In episodic nominalizations a single episode of the process is profiled by a perfective verb; 
take a walk, make a throw, do an imitation, have an argument... All these expressions can 
appear as verbs: to walk, to throw, to imitate, to argue, but with verbs there is sequential 
scanning of events, while a nominalization gives a summary scanning of the same event. 
                                                 
3  Trajector and landmark are Langacker's terms used in relational predications for an initiator or a mover 
of an action (trajector) and other salient participants (landmark). 
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Episodic nominalizations are count nouns since they profile a region containing the states of a 
perfective, inherently bounded, process. However, perfective verbs can create mass nouns as 
well. In the example 
 
 Walking is very good for your health. 
 
no determiner is necessary for the noun walking, it cannot be pluralised and can be used with 
quantifiers typically used with mass nouns (a lot of complaining). Langacker also argues that -
ing nominalizations such as walking and complaining are regarded as an 'abstract substances' 
because of their “qualitative uniformity, each consisting of representative internal states 
extracted from the same type of process.” (1991: 27). Nouns naming emotive sensations (fear, 
anger, hope) and color sensation (yellow) can also be analyzed this way: 
 
 There certainly is a lot of yellow in this painting. 
 I've noticed a lot of fear and anxiety around here. 
 
Here the focus is not on the qualitative domain, but rather on the distribution of the substance 
in time and space or across participants involved.  
 
c) Action or type nominalizations are exemplified in  
 
 Zelda's signing of the contract. 
 
Here the preposition 'of' occurs between the nominalized verb and the object, they can have 
adjectives as modifiers (Zelda's reluctant signing of the contract.), but cannot be used with an 
auxiliary verb. They can also be used with definite article (the signing of the contract). They 
apply to a verb stem (e.g. sign) and the derived noun can act as any other noun as a nominal 
head. Their focus is on the event as a physical activity.  
 
d) Factive or gerundive nominalization is used without the preposition 'of': 
 
 Zelda's signing the contract.  
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They appear with adverbs, rather than adjectives (Zelda's reluctantly signing the contract), 
with non-modal auxiliaries, but not with the definite article. Unlike action nominalizations, 
they have an internal structure of a clause and apply to more complex stems such as sign the 
contract, reluctantly sign the contract or have signed the contract. Not only the verb, but the 
whole structure is nominalized.  
 
 Langacker proposes an analysis which he bases on functional properties of the 
nominalized structure. He first argues that, based on the semantic function, nominals and 
finite clauses show parallels, that is the relationship between a simple noun and a full nominal 
is analogous to the one between the verb stem and a finite clause. Just as the simple noun 
specifies a type, verb stem specifies a process type. Full nominal designates a grounded 
instance of that type, which in turn is expressed by finite clause for the verb stem. There are at 
least three levels of organization of a finite clause: verb stem, finite clause as a whole and an 
intermediate level which profiles an ungrounded instance. Each level indicates a process and 
can be nominalized. Action nominalization is derived from the process type (when only verb 
stem is nominalized),  factive nominalization from the ungrounded instance of the type (it is 
semantically and structurally between a simple verb stem and a finite clause) and a that-clause 
nominal from the grounded type. This last is a complex noun that can function as a subject or 
an object of another clause: 
 
 That Zelda signed the contract is simple false.  
 
 As far as the periphrasis goes, he compared a finite clause to the corresponding action 
nominalization, turning down previously established accounts made by generative 
grammarians, and these are ones of syntactic transformations. In the example 
 
 Zelda's signing of the contract. 
  
morphemes 's and of have a special meaning and their function is periphrastic: in the process 
of nominalization, subject and object of the verb can no longer be specified as such, but are 
specified indirectly as complements of the relational predications 's and of.  
 
 Productivity and regularity of nominalizations were long thought to belong to the area 
of lexicon, but the distinction between syntax and lexicon is meaningless in cognitive 
grammar.  
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 Systematic-functional approach to nominalizations in English was carried out by 
Halliday (1994: 343-353). According to Halliday (1994: 352), nominalization is “the single 
most powerful resource for creating grammatical metaphor.” Grammatical metaphor here 
implies that processes (verbs) and properties (adjectives) are metaphorically seen as nouns. A 
nominalized structure like the cast's brilliant acting is a metaphorical way of expressing the 
clause The cast acted brilliantly. (Halliday and Matthiessen 1999: 229). 
 
 Grammatical metaphor can thus create “the expansion of the meaning potential” 
(Halliday and Mathiessen 2014: 699). Nominalization is a clause that is rankshifted to a 
phrase level. When mentioning the term 'grammatical metaphor' it is important to note that 
this term differs form the term 'metaphor' as used in Cognitive Linguistics' theory of metaphor 
and metonymy. The examples 
 
 John must have left. 
 I think John has already left. 
are considered grammatical metaphor in systematic-functional approach because “the modal 
meaning is realized outside the clause.” (Taverniers 2004: 9). In cognitive linguistics, 
metaphors need to have correspondences between a target and a source domain and therefore, 
the above sentences would not be treated as metaphors.  
 
 In functional grammar, where grammar is not seen as a set of rules for the production 
of grammatically correct sentences, but rather as a set of strategies used to produce coherent 
communication, nominalization can be either a syntactic or a lexical process. A syntactic one  
“is the process via which a prototypical verbal clause, either a complete one (including the 
subject) or a verb phrase (excluding the subject), is converted into a noun phrase.” (Givón 
1993: 287). A lexical one, one the other hand, is “a process whereby a verb or adjective is 
converted into a noun.” (Givón 1993: 287). 
 In the process of nominalization, it is necessary to adjust clause elements from the 
finite clause to the non-finite or less finite one. The adjustments are: 
-verb becomes the head noun of the nominalization, 
-verb no longer has its inflections such as tense-aspect-modality, but rather acquires 
determiners and modifiers like nouns do, 
-case marking of the subject and direct object is modified toward genitive case and 
-adverbs of the finite clause are converted into adjectives. 
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 Givón discusses the finiteness scale for nominal forms of English verbs. At the top of 
the scale is the finite verb form (She knew him), followed by the perfect participle and 
progressive participle (Having known him, Knowing him). After that infinitives follow: to 
infinitive (To know him) and -ing infinitive (Her knowing him). Lexical nominalizations are at 
the bottom of the scale (Her knowledge of him). 
 
 Heyvaert (2003a) is a discussion of nominalizations from a cognitive-functional point 
of view. She focuses on deverbal -er nominalization, that-clauses and -ing clauses and claims 
that nominalization processes are functional in nature: they adopt not only external nominal 
functions, but internal as well. For example, a teacher (as an example of -er nominalization) 
corresponds to the external argument of the verb teach (a person who teaches).  This is not the 
case with nominalizations such as a stroller (a small chair on wheels used to push babies) or a 
walker (a device that helps babies learn to walk), since they do not profile the agent (external 
argument of the verb), but rather some kind of a participant (instruments in the given cases) or 
a location connected to the base verb. To her “Each nominalization should be viewed as the 
metaphorical counterpart of not one congruent agnate, but of a network of agnate structures, 
clausal and other.” (2003b: 67). The term 'agnate' refers to constructions with the same 
content, but of different lexical realizations. For example, nominalizations  
 
 Sam's washing of the windows. 
and  
 Sam's washing the windows. 
  
are said to agnate with the same full clause Sam washed the windows., but their grammatico-
semantic features differ. The analysis of nominalizations should be focused on the way they 
integrate both nominal and clausal categories.  
 
  Comrie and Thomson (2007) categorize nominalization into two groups: 
1. name of the activity or state designated by the verb or adjective. These nominalizations 
retain properties of their bases. The examples are create →creation, quiet →quietness. They 
can denote the fact, the act, the quality or occurrence of the verb or an adjective.  
 
2. name of an argument. They can be further divided into agentive (sing →singer), 
instrumental (mow →mower), manner (walk →walking), locative (examples from other 
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languages), objective (to drink → drink) and reason nouns (examples from other languages). 
They retain only morphological and semantic relations to their bases. 
 They also claim that English, in comparison to other languages, does show some 
degree of predictability of nominalization processes. For example, any polysyllabic verb that 
ends in -ate will form nominalization with the suffix -ion (create → creation) and any 
adjective ending in -able or -ible will take -ity to form nouns (respectable →respectability). 
But still there is a great deal of irregularity in processes of creating new nouns.  
 
 Dixon (2005: 6) in his Semantic Approach to English Grammar emphases that the 
importance of investigating meaning: 
 
 As language is used, meaning is both the beginning and the end point. A speaker has 
some message in mind, and then chooses words with suitable meanings and puts them 
together in appropriate grammatical constructions; all these have established phonetic forms, 
which motivate how one speaks. A listener will receive the sound waves, decode them, and-if 
the act of communication is successful-understand the speaker’s message.  
 
 He investigated the relationship between nominalizations and possession as in  
 
 John laughed noisily.                 John’s noisy laugh. 
 
since possession can denote anything from ownership, kin relation, inalienable part or an 
attribute of a possessor to merely something associated with the possessor.  
 The focus of his study are deverbal nominalizations (2005: 322-323) and they can 
describe: 
1. a unit of activity, as shout in Mary’s loud shout frightened the sheep. 
2. an activity, as shouting in Mary’s loud shouting wakened me up. 
3. a state, as dislike in John’s active dislike of porridge puzzled Aunt Maud. 
4. a property, as resemblance in Mary’s close resemblance to her grandmother was 
commented on. 
5. a result, as arrangement in The arrangement of flowers adorned the coffee table. 
6. an object, as converts (those who are converted), payment (that which is paid). 
7. the locus of an activity, as trap, entry. 
8. a volitional agent, as killer, organizer. 
33 
9. an instrument or material used in the activity, as mower (machine used to mow with), 
swimmers (garment to wear when swimming). 
 
 It is evident from these few analyses of nominalizations that their description as either 
a lexical or syntactic phenomena depends mostly on the concept of language that one adopts. 
 
 
 
10. POLYSEMY 
 Polysemy is a property of words to have more than one meaning and it is phenomenon 
that has been of interest to many linguists and psychologists. The term polysemy has been 
introduced to modern linguistics by Michel Bréal (1924 [1897]) who used the term 
‘polysémie’ to describe single word forms with several different meanings (in Nerlich and 
Clarke 2003: 4). For Bréal, words can change their meanings through use, but the new 
meanings do not automatically delete the old ones: both meanings are parallel in usage, so 
polysemy is the result of the semantic innovation. He observed that, synchronically, polysemy 
is not an issue, since different contexts determine different meanings. We are able to 
understand a polysemous word because words are always used in a certain context that 
eliminates all the other meanings not relevant at a certain point.  
 It is also necessary to distinguish between homonymy and polysemy, the former being 
the property of words to have unrelated meanings, as in bank of a river or a bank as financial 
institution. These two meanings are not connected and are stored in our memory as two 
separated lexemes.  In polysemy, however, different meanings of the same word forms are 
related and the problem of relatedness has been a main concern of many linguistic studies. 
There is usually a prototypical or salient meaning and other meanings that are the 
manifestation of the central meaning and are conceptually connected with it, such as nose 
('facial organ', 'sense of smell' and 'attribute of a wine'). Dictionaries also make this distinction 
by giving homonymous senses separate main headings, that is, they are treated as separate 
words that have the same spelling. Related senses of a polysemic word are given under the 
same heading and are treated as different meanings of the same word. Lipka (1992) mentions 
three criteria usually employed in linguistic researches:  
1. etymology 
2. formal identity or distinctness and 
3. close semantic relatedness. 
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 Lipka does not consider etymology as a valid criterion in a synchronic study since 
speakers do not own this kind of knowledge and because many words that have the same 
origin are different today. The criterion of formal identity includes words with meanings that 
are not related, as in a bat (an animal or a stick used in baseball). Close semantic relatedness 
includes cases of 1) semantic inclusion or hyponymy and 2) semantic transfer, that is, 
metaphor and metonymy. Terms like lexical units and lexemes also need to be understood 
here and Lipka uses Cruse's definitions (1986: 76-77): a lexeme is a family of lexical units 
whereas a lexical unit is the union of a lexical form and a single sense. Thus a lexeme fox is a 
polysemous one with following lexical units as meanings: a wild animal, a person as crafty as 
a fox and fur of fox.  
 Tuggy (2006: 168) uses the terms ambiguity and vagueness to explain distinct 
meanings on the one hand and united subcases of a more general meaning on the other. He 
uses the example of a bank for ambiguity and an aunt for vagueness: an aunt can be both 
mother's and father's sister, but the common meaning is a parent's sister. Vagueness exists as  
‘indeterminacy of meaning', where the same lexical item can express different senses in 
describing different things, but also in describing the same thing. The adjective good is used 
here to as an example of being able to express different senses for different things (as in a 
good knife/football player/ weather) but also different senses for describing the same thing 
(e.g. good in a good job could explain that someone's salary is good, that the job is 
interesting, or provides one with respectable position in society.) There are also examples of 
vagueness due to 'lack of specification': the terms such as teacher, cousin, neighbor, are vague 
or unspecified when it comes to their gender. (Kempson 1977: 125). 
  
 Tuggy mentions several tests discussed in literature to distinguish between vagueness 
and ambiguity:  
1. a 'logical' test proposed by Quine in 1960 (2013), according to which an item is ambiguous 
if it can be both true and false at the same time (X and not X). The sentence I have an aunt 
can be true for someone whose father has a sister, but at the same time whose mother hasn't 
got one. 
2. a 'definitional' test (adopted from Aristoteles) decides on ambiguity of a lexical item if it 
has more meanings in its definition. 
3. a 'linguistic test' is based on the formula “X does/did Z and so does/did Y”. If Z as done by 
X and Z as done by Y can be given “crossed” readings without the semantic oddness known 
as zeugma, the meaning of Z is taken to be vague; if zeugma results, Z is ambiguous. When 
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we say I have an aunt [father’s sister] and so does Bill [have an aunt (mother’s sister)] and if 
it  indicates that the meanings are taken to be the same, then aunt is vague. 
 He agrees with Geeraerts (1993) in claiming that these three tests do not always 
succeed in giving a true criterion for distinguishing ambiguity from vagueness, but rather that 
boundaries between these categories are often blurred. To Tuggy polysemy is somewhere in 
between and to decide whether the senses of a word are related or not, it is necessary to take 
context and diachronic change into consideration.  
 Similar tests are also mentioned in Lipka (1992) and taken from Kastovsky (1982, in 
Lipka 1992): words are  homonyms if 1) their meaning belong to different lexical fields, 2) 
they belong to different word formation families and 3) their coordination is impossible. This 
again goes to show that the boundaries between polysemy and homonymy are not as firm as it 
has long been considered and that we should treat them as “two end-points of a scale with a 
continuum in between.” (Lipka 1992: 139). 
 
 Weinreich (1964) makes a distinction between contrastive and complementary 
ambiguity. A contrastive ambiguity is traditionally known as homonymy, whereas 
complementary one is what has been called polysemy. What has been problematic in 
linguistic theory is the notion of relatedness between meanings and how this relatedness can 
be explained.  
 
 Polysemy itself has been neglected among the generative-transformational linguistics 
since the focus was mainly on syntax, but it has become a widely discussed phenomenon in 
cognitive linguistics where it has gained the status of not only linguistic, but cognitive 
phenomenon, too. Cognitive linguists are particularly interested in why and how polysemy 
occurs and what cognitive mechanisms are responsible for it. Words in cognitive linguistics 
are seen as conceptual categories that resemble non-linguistic categories in many ways. They 
are a category with a prototype and other members. Different cognitive operations we use 
every day are also responsible for the multiple meanings of words.  
  
 In recent years there have been many successful attempts to show that polysemy of the 
words is metonymyically and metaphorically motivated. So in order to understand polysemy, 
it is important to understand how metonymy and metaphor work. 
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10.1.  Polysemy in cognitive linguistics 
  In cognitive linguistics, the word itself with its network of polysemous senses came to 
be regarded as a category in which the senses of the word (i.e. the members of the category) 
are related to each other by means of general cognitive principles such as metaphor, 
metonymy, generalization, specialization, and image-schema transformations. (Nerlich and 
Clarke 2003: 5).  
 
 The development of cognitive linguistics brought many interesting investigations into 
polysemy. Brugman and Lakoff studied the prepositional polysemy of over (1988; first 
discussed by Brugman alone) the central meaning of which is above. Here are only some of 
the examples:  
a. The bird flew over the house. (‘above and across’)  
b. The painting is over the couch. (‘above’) 
c. The truck ran over the rabbit. (‘across’) 
d. Sarah lives over the hill. (‘on the other side’) 
e. Mary nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling. (‘covering’) 
f. I will read the papers over the weekend. (‘temporal’) 
g. John has a strange power over Mary. (‘control’) 
 They claim that different senses of over (covering, repetition, control) are all related 
and organized around a central sense or a prototypical sense and thus form a radial category. 
They also show typicality effects: some are closer to the central meaning which means they 
are more similar to it and some are on the periphery. Those that are peripheral are arrived at 
by the means of cognitive principles for meaning extension, namely metaphor and metonymy. 
For example, the control sense is explained by metaphor CONTROL IS UP, LACK OF CONTROL 
IS DOWN.  
 The central claim of their investigation is that radial categories are stored as such in 
the long-term semantic memory of speakers and that different senses of a polysemous words 
are conventionalized, rather than generated from the central sense. The approach that the full 
range of senses is stored in our memory is termed full-specification approach (Evans and 
Green 2006: 333). This this kind of systematic polysemy is persuasive in language.  What has 
been criticized about this approach is the inability to distinguish which senses are part of the 
word's meaning and which of them are arrived at 'on-line', that is a result of the context. Thus 
polysemy can be defined as a semantic network of a single lexical item that has multiple 
related senses.  
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 Tyler and Evans (2003) accept the view that many senses of over constitute a 
motivated semantic network that is organized around a central sense or a protoscene, but they 
also try to establish whether a particular sense of a word can be accounted as a distinct sense, 
but also to establish the central sense, since semanticists have not always agreed about the 
central senses of categories. They also investigate prepositional polysemy on the example of 
over. The term they use is principled polysemy approach to lexical semantics, the goal of 
which is to establish which meanings are stored in the memory and which are construed 'on-
line', that is in a given situation. The reason why prepositions are often studied in cognitive 
linguistics researches is that they are clear examples of embodiment: meaning is grounded in 
our bodily experience. Since prepositions express spatial relations they are also often used to 
express abstract senses.  In determining whether a particular sense of a preposition counts as a 
distinct, they propose two criteria (summarized by Evans and Green 2006: 343):  
 A sense is distinct if (i) it involves non-spatial meaning and/or a spatial configuration 
between the trajector (TR) and the landmark (LM) which is distinct from that found in the 
word’s protoscene (i.e. the primary sense of the word, represented in terms of an idealized 
spatio-functional configuration); and (ii) there are instances of  the sense that are context-
independent, that is, which cannot be inferred from another sense and the context in which it 
occurs.  
In the examples  
 
 The hummingbird is hovering over the flower.  
 The helicopter is hovering over the city. 
 
over designated a spatial relation in which a trajector (TR (the hummingbird or the 
helicopter)) is higher than the landmark (LM (the flower or the city) so it is not polysemous 
according to the first criterion since it does not express any other non-spatial relations. In the 
example  
 
 Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling. 
 
there is a non-spatial aspect and that is the one of 'covering' or 'obscuring' since the TR (the 
board) obscures the LM (the ceiling). This could be a case of polysemy based on the first 
criterion. When it comes to the second criterion of context-dependency, they claim that the 
obscuring sense of over cannot be derived from the context, that is, our knowledge of over 
having the above sense does not allow us to infer the covering sense. In the last example the 
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spatial relationship between the TR and the LM is one that would normally be expressed by 
below (The board is below the hole in the ceiling.) and therefore the 'covering' meaning must 
be stored as a conventional sense, which means it is an instance of polysemy.  
 Tyler and Evans (2003: 45-50) also suggest criteria for establishing the central sense of 
prepositions and these are: 
1. earliest attested meaning (to them, the central sense of over is ABOVE, which is historically 
attested),  
2. predominance in the semantic network (for the sense to be central, it is needed to be most 
frequently involved or related to other senses), 
3. relations to other prepositions (senses that participate in contrast sets are central senses, 
such as ABOVE, OVER, UNDER and BELOW), 
4. ease of predicting sense extensions (the central sense is the one from which other senses are 
derived and if that sense is easy to predict, it has more probability of being a central one). 
 Based on these criteria, they identify the ABOVE sense (a spatial relation in which the 
TR is higher than but within potential contact of the LM) as central or proto-scene and they 
add 14 more senses that are based on the protoscene. They are contextually specified and 
depend on our experience and knowledge of the world. They are created 'on-line' at the 
moment of speaking and listening. 
 We have stated above that polysemy can be explained through metaphor and 
metonymy, and this is not only the case with prepositions. For example, Booij (2005) uses the 
simple example of the noun head as a polysemous noun with systematically related meanings 
derived by means of metaphor (head as a leader- head governs the body in the literal sense 
just as it can govern the organization or a country in the metaphorical sense) and metonymy 
(head stands for the person, as in dinner at 20 dollars a head). 
 In this chapter we have tried to show that polysemy is a phenomenon present in all 
areas of language production. Our next focus will be the polysemy found among English 
suffixes. 
 
 
 
10.2.  Polysemy of (English) suffixes  
 We have already stated that in cognitive linguistics the boundaries between grammar 
and lexicon are pretty unstable and blurred, which leads to the conclusion that word-formation 
cannot be studied from either grammatical or lexical point of view alone. Phenomena of 
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word-formation are, as Brdar and Brdar-Szabó put it, “in grammar with one foot, but in 
lexicon with the other.” (2013: 42). Many word-formation processes exhibit polysemy, which 
can be explained through various cognitive processes. The focus here is the polysemy in 
derivation, more precisely, suffixation and how it can be explained.  
English suffixes are highly polysemous and exhibit different senses. We will start with 
a brief overview of the polysemy of the word sleeper to show how many different meanings 
this suffix can create when combined with the base sleep: 
 
1. a person who sleeps in a particular way (usually used with adjectives):  I'm a very light 
sleeper and I can hardly get any sleep at all. (CCED) 
2. a person who is asleep: Only the snores of the sleepers broke the silence of the house. 
(OED) 
3. a sleeping car: Luxury for first class travellers: a sleeping car attendant delivers hot water 
bottles on the London-to-Inverness Express, January 1935. (BNC) 
4. a train with beds for its passengers: The overnight sleeper to Edinburgh, popular with 
honeymoon couples, was a sedate and leisurely way to travel.  (BNC) 
5. a tie supporting a railroad track: What is the usual length of a standard gauge wooden 
sleeper? (BNC)  
6. an unexpected achiever of success (as a book, a film, a horse in a race etc): The winner was 
a true sleeper- no one expected him to get it. (VCB) 
7. a piece of furniture that can be opened up into a bed: The comfortable Couch Sleeper is a 
product that has a very playful character, but also refers to the human need of warmness and 
feeling of security. (http://www.annelorenz.com/index.php?/produkte/dress-2/) 
8. a spy: If its group in the Maghreb has sleeper cells in France, now is the time they may be 
activated. (DCT) 
9. a kind of pajamas for infants and young children that enclose the feet: We have a lot more 
sleepers than "outfits" and I'm trying to figure out if the sleepers are more like baby pajamas 
or if they end up wearing them all day. (http://boards.hellobee.com) 
10. a bed for babies and small children, usually portable: Designed to be easily portable for 
on-the-go convenience, you can also use the sleeper in the crib to help ease baby's transition 
from your bed when hes ready to leave your nest. (https://www.toysrus.com) 
 
 Suffixes have been discussed from the generative point of view, as well as from the 
cognitive and functionalist one. When dealing with affix polysemy, it is necessary to approach 
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two problems, as Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014) put it. One of them is the 'basicness' of 
affixes, if we assume that there is a concrete meaning from which other meanings are derived 
at or extended from. The second problem is the motivation of these extensions and how they 
can be explained. That is exactly what we are going to try establish here and hope to come to 
a conclusion in favor of metaphor and metonymy.  
 
 One of the most frequently described suffixes in literature is the suffix -er. Lieber and 
Booij (2004) have summarized the following meanings of -er nominalizations:  
a) subject oriented 
base          theta-role of subject          derived noun 
write          agent                                writer 
open          instrument                        opener 
hear           experiencer                      hearer 
please        stimulus                           pleaser 
 
b) object-oriented 
base          thematic role                      derived noun 
fry            patient/ theme                     fryer 
dine          location                               diner 
stroll        means                                  stroller 
 The base can also be non-verbal: 
base          base category                        derived noun 
London        noun                                  Londoner 
five              measure                             fiver 
first grade    phrase                                first grader 
 
 These different meanings of the given suffix are usually given in other descriptions, 
where the authors try to explain the motivation for polysemy.  
  
 Lieber (2005) mentions two studies of this suffix, namely the one from 1992 made by 
Rappaport Hovav and Levin and a similar one made by Booij in 1986 (analysis of Dutch 
facts). She claims that the mentioned authors explain the behaviour of this suffix by the 
argument structure of the verb: the suffix takes on the thematic role an external argument can 
carry. “-er nominals are only derived from verbs that have external arguments, and they 
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always refer to the external argument.” (Levin and Rappaport 1988: 1068). This means that -
er nominals can also denote instruments, but only if the instrument can occupy the position of 
the external argument of the verb (Doug opened the can with the new gadget / The new gadget 
opened the can / the opener). Some -er forms are derived from middle constructions, namely 
the patient roles (sinker- This ship sinks easily.). 
  
 Booij (2005: 221) uses the term 'the domain shift' to explain the polysemy: “one may 
go from one semantic domain to another, related one, and thus derive new interpretations”. 
Domain shifts can be either metaphorical (where the notion of AGENT is transferred into 
immaterial things that can perform a particular task since they are perceived of as agents, as in 
mower) or metonymic (where the domain of person is shifted into domain of location, as in 
diner). He further claims that these domain shifts appear cross-linguistically, due to the fact 
that these domain shift chains are cognitive in nature. He gives here the example of the Dutch 
sender (zender) with three meanings: a personal agent, a radio or a TV channel and a 
transmitter. It is possible to activate an agentive reading, if the established one is the 
instrumental meaning (as in opener, 2005: 222). 
  
 Ryder (1999) also describes this suffix, but her account is a semantic one. She follows 
the assumptions of cognitive grammar and proposes an event schema that is provided by the 
base: “An event schema is a cognitive knowledge structure made up of components with 
specified relations to each other.” (Ryder 1999: 277). In an event schema, not only verbs, but 
nouns and other parts of speech can be participants in an event. She suggest that -er suffixes 
most likely produce agent nouns, less likely instruments and agents, due to pragmatic 
constraints: salience (“the degree to which something is noticeable in comparison with its 
surroundings”) and its identifiability (“the extent to which a participant is readily identifiable 
by mention of the event alone”) (1999: 285), therefore agents are more salient than patients, 
patients are more salient than instruments etc.  
  
 There are also restrictions on the base concepts of -er derivatives (in Ungerer 2007: 
663):  
1. Bases must have few, preferably only a single event schema (a condition most easily met 
by action verbs). 
2. Event schemas must be capable of being applied to durative and habitual actions. 
3. Events schemas must be specific (e.g., supported by verbs describing specific actions or 
nouns and adjectives providing a specific context). 
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4. Event schemas must be highly entrenched. 
 Barker's 1998 study of -ee nominals is also semantically oriented. Syntactically 
looking, nouns ending in -ee can denote the direct object associated with the verb (employee), 
the indirect object (addressee), the object of a governed preposition (laughee), the subject 
(escapee), a referent with no argument relation to the verb (amputee), and in a small group the 
base can be even nominal (festschriftee). Barker gives semantic unification of these meanings 
with three semantic restrictions: 1) the referent of the -ee noun must be sentient, 2) the 
referent must have participated in an event of the type corresponding to the base, and  3) the 
referent must lack volitional control over the event. 
 
 Lieber (2004) investigated the polysemy of suffixes -er, -ee, -ant/ -ent and -ist. She 
wanted to test why -er and -ant/ -ist suffixes most frequently denote either agents (writer, 
servant) or instruments (opener, irritant) and almost never patient or process. Her hypothesis 
(following Booij and Lieber 2004) is that suffixes always carry certain unitary meanings since 
many of the derivatives do not necessarily have verbal base to be used as an explanation for 
the meaning of the suffix (Londoner). In order to properly explain the meaning of suffixes, 
she uses the notion of 'skeleton' of semantic features for each suffix:  
 
 ...affixes, like simplex lexical items, can have skeletons, and the semantic part of 
derivation involves adding the affixal skeleton as an outer layer to the skeleton of the base, 
thereby subordinating that skeleton. Affixal skeletons will consist of functions and arguments, 
just as simplex lexical skeletons do, and indeed of exactly the same atomic material that 
makes up simplex lexical skeletons. I assume, in other words, that affixes have actual 
semantic content. (Lieber 2004: 36). 
 
  She makes a list of basic semantic categories for derivational affixes: 
Basic categories for derivational affixes: 
[+dynamic]  creating SIMPLE ACTIVITIES 
[−dynamic]  creating STATES 
[+dynamic, +IEPS]4 creating UNACCUSATIVES/INCHOATIVES 
[+dynamic, −IEPS] creating MANNER OF MOTION 
bipartite  creating CAUSATIVES 
                                                 
4 +/-IEPS stands for 'Inferable Eventual Position or State' designating PLACE or STATE. 
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[+material]  creating simple, concrete SUBSTANCES/THINGS/ESSENCES 
[−material]  creating simple, abstract SUBSTANCES/THINGS/ESSENCES 
[+material, dynamic]  creating concrete processual SUBSTANCES/THINGS/ESSENCES 
[−material, dynamic]  creating abstract processual SUBSTANCES/THINGS/ESSENCES 
 
 Lieber further claims that the suffixes in question all contribute to their basis the same 
way: they all produce dynamic, material, concrete processual nouns. It is not sufficient to 
claim that they produce instruments or agents or patient, but having the difference of their 
bases in mind, they all add certain semantic contents that instruments, agents or patients have 
in common. This affixal skeleton is, of course, applicable to other suffixes, as well. The 
suffixes we investigate, -hood and -ness, produce abstract [-material] nouns. She also 
mentions meaning extension found in the -ery and -age nouns. These nouns typically denote 
collectives (jewelry, baggage), place (brewery, orphanage) but nouns in -ery can also denote 
behaviour characteristic of (snobbery), meaning that this affix can produce both concrete and 
abstract nouns at the same time. Moreover, she claims that these affixes have central meaning, 
the one of 'collectivity' whereas the 'place meaning' is a result of paradigmatic extension. This 
is a phenomenon that appears under pragmatic pressure, when there is no existing affix 
available in language to express what is intended. If that is the case, speakers usually use an 
explanation of the word or apply semantically closest productive affix. Paradigmatic 
extension was first proposed in Booij and Lieber (2004) to explain cases such as loaner or 
keeper since there is no affix in English to capture the meaning ‘thing which one Xes’. 
 Lieber (2004: 149) emphasises the collective reading of -ery and -age and adding them 
to the bases like jewel or peasant they change the quantificational class of these nouns. Nouns 
meaning 'behaviour' or 'condition' (snobbery, brigandage)  
 are formed on a particular type of nominal base – names for types of people, often 
derogatory ones – and if we assume further that those base nouns come to be construed 
metonymically.  In other words, the “behaviour” reading is a natural sense extension from the 
“collective” reading.  
 
 Here the base snob metonymically stands for the type of behaviour typical of snobs 
and adding -ery to the base adds the collective meaning of 'all the things that snobs do'. She 
notices that the sense extension commonly goes from the place meaning to collective meaning 
(Lieber 2004, 2005), where names of places usually stand for collectivity of people living 
there (in Seattle voted Democratic the place name Seattle means all the people in Seattle who 
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voted) but that this extension can go in opposite direction: a piggery is a place where a 
collectivity of pigs is gathered. This is the extension from collective meaning to place 
meaning.  
 
 In dealing with semantic change in word-formation, Rainer (2005b) investigates -itis 
suffix, claiming that the literal use of the suffix is found in the language of medicine, such as 
appendicitis (inflammation of appendix) where it designates a disease connected to N. There 
is, however, a figurative use of the suffix in telephonitis, meaning excessive fondness for 
telephoning, where fondness is a kind of a figurative disease. This is enabled by the use of a 
metaphor EXCESSIVE TENDENCY IS A DISEASE that is applied on the whole pattern: base + 
suffix (2005b: 432). The word formation process that is influenced by metaphor and 
metonymy is labeled 'approximation' by Rainer (2005b: 431): “a process of word formation 
where the relation between a pattern of word formation and a neologism formed according to 
it is not one to one, but mediated by metaphor and metonymy”. He distinguishes between 
approximation at the base level and approximation at the pattern level, which depends on 
whether metaphors and metonymies operate on the base only or on the whole pattern.  
Approximation at the pattern level was exemplified by -itis formations and for approximation 
at the base level he gives Spanish examples for metonymies on the base (tabaquera, 'tobacco 
tin', the base designated the thing contained in it), but for metaphors as well. Suffix -uno was 
used in Spanish to form adjectives from animal nouns (caballuno, 'horse like', from caballo 
'horse'), but can also be found with human nouns in derogatory sense (frailuno, 'monkish', 
from fraile 'monk') via HUMANS ARE ANIMALS metaphor.   
 
 The investigation into English suffixes in cognitive linguistics was also made by 
Panther and Thornburg (2003, 2004), who investigated -er nominalizations, Heyvaert (2003a) 
who included the same suffix into her study from the functionalist view, Imamović (2006a, 
2006b, 2011), who studied -ion nominalizations, Radden (2005), who described the suffix -
able and many more.   
 Panther and Thornburg claim that the polysemy of the suffix -er can be explained 
through personification and reification metaphor and many metonymic mappings. Following 
prototype theory, sufffix -er has a central sense of “a human Agent who performs an action or 
engages in an activity to the degree that doing so defines a primary occupation” (2003: 285) 
such as a teacher, a baker, a manager. They need not have verbal base, as in hatter or Wall 
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Streeter, the base of which has to be metonymically interpreted via PARTICIPANT FOR ACTION 
/ACTIVITY metonymy:  
 
 
Figure 6. Metonymic extension of the base in Wall Streeter (Panther and Thornburg 2003: 
288)  
 
 Personification metaphor NON-HUMANS ARE HUMANS is found in the examples 
containing animals and plants (retriever, late bloomer) and innanimate objects (skyscraper). 
EVENTS ARE OBJECTS metaphors help us view events as Agents (thriller) or Causers 
(laughter). All this shows that suffixes are able to “metaphorically and metonymically extend 
their meanings”. (Panther and  Thornburg 2003: 315). 
      
 Heyvaert (2003a) points out that -er nominalizations started as agentive nouns, but can 
no longer be studied as such, since there is an increase in number of those that are non-
agentive (e.g. bestseller) and now profile subjects (The book sells well.).  
  
 Imamović claims that the central meaning of -ion nominalization is the action of V + 
ing, other senses are metonymically and metaphorically derived and can denote people 
(administration), physical objects (declaration), countries (confederation), events 
(justification), settings (reception) and others. She concludes her study by claiming that “the 
polysemy of nominalizations is not arbitrary, but largely motivated by metaphorical and 
metonymic processes.” (Imamović 2006b: 239). 
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 Radden (2005) claims that the central meaning of the suffix -able is 'can be VERB-ed' 
as in a movable piano (a piano that can be moved). Movability is thus an inherent property. 
There are extensions from this prototypical sense in the example of drinkable water, which is 
water that is safe for humans to drink. The inherent property (of an object) is extended to 
more specialized meaning of 'inherent property (of an object) for humans' via GENERIC FOR 
SPECIFIC metonymy. Other metonymies that operate on this suffix are EFFECT FOR CAUSE in 
the lovable child (a certain, inherent property of a child makes people love it), remarkable 
woman (an inherent property makes people react in a certain way towards the woman) and 
considerable (an inherent property makes it worth considering it), EXPRESSION OF 
EVALUATION FOR EVALUATION (also in remarkable), OUTSTANDING PROPERTY FOR LARGE 
AMOUNT (in considerable meaning 'a large amount') and SCALE FOR UPPER END OF THE 
SCALE (sizable meaning 'fairly large').  
 
 Polysemy of English agent nouns was already investigated by Dressler (1986) within 
the framework  of Natural Morphology. It is a theory in which the main function of word 
formation is to enrich the lexicon. Inflectional morphology, on the other hand, has the role of 
fulfilling syntactic functions. Together they need to motivate derived words. To Dressler, 
agent nouns are motivated if they are coined by means of word formation. They are also 
polysemous, expressing of course agent, but also instrument, locative, source, animal and 
plant names, impersonal agents and recipients, and “the conceptual basis of this polysemy 
seems to lie in metonymy.” (1986: 526). 
 
 Semantic extension based on conceptual contiguity from an agentive to instrumental 
or locative uses of -er, as the previously mentioned investigations show, is strongly opposed 
by Rainer (2011, 2014) in the study of the usages of Latin -tor in Romance languages such as 
French, Spanish and Italian, and Luschützky and Rainer (2013), who concentrated on 
instrument and place nouns. The authors want to challenge the above mentioned studies in 
arguing against meaning extensions. Rainer claims that “the main factors involved were again 
borrowing, phonological merger, ellipsis and, above all, the concretization of action nouns. 
No evidence for a direct sense extension from agent to instrument or instrument to place has 
been found.” (2014: 352). 
 
 Janda's 2011 article Metonymy in word formation aims at giving a cognitive 
description of word classes. She focuses on semantic relationships between the source word 
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as a vehicle and a derived word as a target with a suffix bearing “the context for the 
metonymy”. (2011: 388). For example, Russian parkoviště ‘parking-lot’ is derived from  
parkovat ‘park’ via ACTION FOR LOCATION metonymy.   
  
 Metonymy in word-formation was also studied by Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2013, 
2014) who are very critical of Janda's claims about metonymy in word formation, claiming 
that it leads to metonymy being “theoretically and descriptively useless: if every contiguous 
or associative relationship in grammar is a priori metonymic, it is trivial to qualify anything as 
metonymic as it does not add anything to our knowledge, i.e. our understanding of language.” 
(2014: 323). The authors are interested in the placement of metonymic shift, that it, whether it 
precedes or follows word-formation, since it does not arise in the course of derivation. As an 
evidence of metonymic shift that operates on the output of word-formation process, the 
authors give the examples where Croatian suffixes such as -ina, -etina and -evina/-ovina, 
denoting 'meat of X' are, produce nouns that serve as metonymies: 
 
 ... da, naručio sam puretinu,... i uživao u svakom zalogaju... 
 ...yes, I ordered turkey... and loved every single bite... 
 
Here, puretina as 'the turkey meat' metonymically stands for the dish prepared by this same 
kind of meat.  
 Not only sufffixations, but compounds can also include metonymic shift. Thus the 
compound blood-pressure can mean 'the pressure on the walls of blood vessels', but also 'the 
process of measuring one' as well as 'readings of blood pressure' (which can therefore be 
pluralized).  
  
 Sometimes metonymy operates on the base of a word-formation process, as the 
previously mentioned example of -er suffixation in Wall Streeter and compound nouns with 
camp (concentration camp)5 show, to name just a few examples, but also on the element that 
precedes the base, as in English intensifying compound adjectives such as steaming mad, 
chilling cold or dripping wet. All these -ing elements somehow show symptoms or qualities of 
the base, or to be precise, they are connected by EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy. Brdar and 
Brdar-Szabó (2013: 53-54) address another issue here, and that is the fact that many of these -
                                                 
5 The base camp already has the meaning ‘quarters for the accommodation of detained or interned persons’, so 
the meaning of the whole compound 'concentration camp' is not metonymically derived in the course of 
compounding. 
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ing adjectives already denote within themselves what is denoted by the base, so that -ing 
adjective raving denotes the same as the combination raving mad, the result of which is a 
kind of a reduplication. Authors suggest two metonymies here: the first one operates on the 
modifying adjective before composition and another one creates intensifying effect, namely 
THE WHOLE SCALE FOR THE UPPER END OF THE SCALE, a metonymy commonly found in 
reduplications. 
  
 In studying the polysemy of Brazilian Portugese agent nouns, Basilio (2009) 
emphasizes the importance of ICMs in giving 'metonymic' explanations for polysemy. It is 
insufficient to describe the formation NOUN (X) + SUFFIX as merely someone or something 
characterized by X, but in order to have something that serves as a reference point to 
something else, we need to have a context. Thus the word pintor 'painter' can have two ICMs: 
one of house maintenance and the other of artistic work.  
 
 Metaphor and metonymy are therefore cognitive processes that can be used to explain 
polysemy. As Croft puts it, “Metaphor and metonymy are two types of extensions of word 
meaning; they represent different uses of a particular word.” (2006: 277). 
  
 Lakoff and Johnson state that “the conceptual metaphor explains the systematicity of 
the polysemy, and correspondingly, the systematic polysemy provides evidence for the 
existence of the metaphor. ” (2003: 247).  
  
 Metaphor and metonymy allow us to give the existing language units new meanings in 
two ways: “...there is a meaningful difference between metaphor and metonymy as two ways 
of construing new concepts from old concepts, being based on similarity, ...being based on 
contiguity” (Bartsch 2003: 73). We will deal with the notions of similaritiy and contiguity 
later in the paper. 
 To conclude, affixes in general are very similar to 'regular' lexical items since they can 
exhibit polysemy. Each affix has a central meaning, and other meanings are arrived at by the 
means of metaphor and metonymy.  
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11. COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS IN GENERAL 
 Cognitive Linguistics as the study of language originates from the 1970s due to the 
dissatisfaction with the formal approaches to language. Language was long described as 
autonomous ability, totally independent from other abilities and determined by a set of innate 
rules or 'universal grammar'. One of major objections to this is that language is not an 
autonomous cognitive faculty, but rather connected with our other abilities, both cognitive and 
non-cognitive ones, and therefore has to be studied as such.  This means that  
 
 the representation of linguistic knowledge is essentially the same as the representation 
of other conceptual structures, and that the processes in which that knowledge is used are not 
fundamentally different from cognitive abilities that human beings use outside the domain of 
language. (Croft and Cruse 2004: 2).  
 
 The structure of language is tightly connected to how we conceptualize the world, that 
is, it is determined by our basic cognitive processes. This is true for grammar as well. The 
formulation Grammar is conceptualization was coined by one of the most prominent figures 
in Cognitive Linguistics, Ronald Langacker and means that grammatical structures of 
language are directly associated with the way people conceptualize the world. 
 
 Another important proposition is that language reflects our experience as human 
beings. Human beings, or speakers, are at the center of communication and it is our 
perception that determines the choice of certain utterances. We can 'frame' situations in 
different ways, according to our viewpoint: 
 
 a. Timmy is in front of the tree. 
 b. Timmy is behind the tree. 
 The differences between these sentences lie in the position of the speaker: how he 
perceives the reality is of the importance for the correct interpretation of the sentence. On this 
example it is evident that conceptual structure is embodied: the nature of conceptual 
organization is the outcome of our bodily functioning and experience.  
 Cognitive linguistics also stresses that knowledge of a language emerges from 
language use, that is, we learn a language just as we learn anything else. This is a direct 
opposition to Chomskyan view of language learning where children are equipped with certain 
rules that help them learn a language properly. Grammar is described as usage-based: 
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language acquisition is connected with language use and there is no clear division between 
competence and performance. When a child learns a language, it does not simply activate the 
rules from Universal Grammar, but rather relies on already established and used 
constructions. Usage-based models of grammar will be approached later in the thesis.  
 In their study cognitive linguists apply two commitments: the ‘Generalization 
Commitment’ and the ‘Cognitive Commitment' (Lakoff 1990). The ‘Generalization 
Commitment’ is a commitment of cognitive linguists to search for general principles that are 
responsible for all aspects of human language. It is the task of the linguists to search for these 
general principles in all areas of linguistic description: phonology, semantics, pragmatics, 
morphology and syntax. In cognitive approaches to languages these aspects of language are 
not distinct, since they all share the same cognitive principles. 
The 'Cognitive Commitment' represents the view that language and linguistic organization 
should reflect general cognitive principles found not only in language, but general ones found 
in other cognitive sciences. All human beings share some common cognitive abilities used to 
construe meaning.  We will turn to them a bit later.  
 Cognitive Linguistics is, however, not a unitary language theory, but rather comprised 
of many approaches that complement one another and each of these has something specific as 
its focus. There are 12 general streams in the CL enterprise (Geeraerts 2006: 2) and these are 
Cognitive Grammar, grammatical construal, radial network, prototype theory, schematic 
network, conceptual metaphor, image schema, metonymy, mental spaces, frame semantics, 
construction grammar, and usage-based linguistics. They are all, however, led by the three 
general principles mentioned above. What all these approaches have in common is their study 
of not just the language, but of the human mind, too, since language reflects cognitive 
processes. They are all interested in how human mind conceptualizes the reality, that is, how 
it construes the meaning.  
 Meaning is the focus in all these approaches and it is embodied and encyclopedic - we 
arrive at constructing and understanding it through our interaction with the world and by 
applying what we already know about the world around us. Lakoff (1987: 12) explains 
conceptual embodiment as  
 
 The idea that the properties of certain categories are a consequence of the nature of 
human biological capacities and of the experience of functioning in a physical and social 
environment. It is contrasted with the idea that concepts exist independent of the bodily nature 
of any thinking beings and independent of their experience. 
51 
 Our construal of reality is closely connected with our bodily functioning. When saying 
that meaning is embodied, it means that it reflects our experiences as human beings, or as 
Rohrer (2007: 27) puts it: “Human physical, cognitive, and social embodiment ground our 
conceptual and linguistic systems.” It also means that meaning is encyclopedic, since we 
humans are not merely biological beings, but also have social and cultural identity, which we 
apply to meaning construction. In constructing and decoding the meaning we apply what we 
already know about the world around us. That is why meaning in non-autonomous, but rather 
rooted in our experience.  
 Our knowledge of the world is not just 'out-there' but rather organized in certain 
domains and frames, which are based on our experience and rooted in our culture. The 
organization of our knowledge is guided by some general cognitive processes, which shows 
that language is a cognitive ability. Croft and Cruse (2004: 46) have made a list of construal 
operations used for construing meaning. These are attention/ salience, judgement/ 
comparison, perspective/ situatedness and constitution/ gestalt. Attention and salience are 
connected to human ability to focus on some parts that are relevant in a given situation and to 
ignore the ones that are not so important. In language this is called profiling (Langacker 1987: 
183-189). Every concept, semantic structure or predication has a profile and a base. The 
profile of a predication is the concept it designates. The base (or scope of predication) is the 
whole cognitive scenario evoked by a term. Judgment and comparison are processes through 
which we bring certain things together to compare them. To Langacker (1987: 101) 
“Fundamental to cognitive processing and the structuring of experience is our ability to 
compare events and register any contrast or discrepancy between them.” Croft and Cruse 
include categorization, metaphor and figure/ ground here since these are the processes where 
we compare new experiences to already present ones. Categorization and metaphor will be 
dealt with later since they are of a greater importance to this thesis. Perspective and 
situatedness enable speaker to place himself in a given speech situation based on viewpoint, 
deixis and subjectivity. In communication, we as human beings are always in a particular 
location and based on our position, we judge the situation. As speakers, we use elements that 
are dependent on us spatially (here, there) and temporally (today, tomorrow). Subjectivity 
refers to how one construes a scene that includes himself/ herself. Constitution and gestalt 
“represent the conceptualization of the very structure of the entities in a scene.” (Croft and 
Cruse 2006: 63). Gestalt psychologists were the first to notice that there are certain principles 
that enable us to view bounded objects in an unbounded mass of sensations. They include 
image schemas (representations of embodied experience) such as containers or surfaces. 
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Cognitive linguists try to show that all these 'psychological' phenomena are reflected in 
language as well.  
 We will now briefly outline basic assumptions shared by the previously mentioned 
approaches in Cognitive Linguistics, with the special focus on the Theory of conceptual 
metaphor and metonymy and Cognitive Grammar since they are of the great importance for 
this work. 
 
 
 
11.1. Prototype theory 
 We classify concepts into categories according to their similarities or purposes. 
Cognitive linguistics states that, unlike in the Aristotelian view, these categories are not 
clearly bounded, but rather they have blurry edges: some members of the category share 
commonalities with members of the different category, their meanings overlap, there are 
degrees of membership, some members are better representatives of the category than others. 
Categories have their internal structure with a central member or a prototype and extensions 
from the prototype or radial categories. The origins of prototype theory can be found in the 
works of Wittgenstein (1958), who was one of the first to challenge what is known about 
categories until then. In his research he asked his subjects to give the necessary conditions for 
the category GAME and concluded that neither suggestion (having rules, has winners and 
losers, involves some kid of a physical activity) can be said to be exclusive or necessary, that 
means not all features can be found in all games. He proposed the notion of family 
resemblance: members of a family belong to one because they have some similarities they 
share, but not all members of the family share all the properties. Prototype theory was further 
developed by Eleonor Rosch and her associates and it later influenced many other cognitive 
scientists. It is important because it has brought new insights into how humans structure the 
world. Most concepts are structured in terms of 'prototypes'. For some concepts to belong to a 
certain category there are some conditions that have to be fulfilled. Let us take the example 
usually given in cognitive linguistics theory: a robin is a member of the category BIRD 
because it satisfies a large number of the features needed to belong to this category, e.g. ‘has 
wings’, ‘flies’, ‘nests in trees’, ‘sings’, etc. (and hence is a typical instance of the category or 
a 'better' example of it). A peacock is a less typical instance of this category, but having 
enough features, still belongs to it. So category membership is a matter of degree. Rosch and 
her coworkers have seen that categories can occur at different levels of inclusiveness (as 
discussed in Croft and Cruse 2004: 83): 
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 animal- dog- retriever 
 furniture- chair- rocking chair. 
 
 What is in bold is a basic or generic level and this level has a special status and 
importance. Two further levels are superordinate level (animal, furniture) and subordinate 
level (retriever, rocking chair).  Their researches have shown that the basic level: 
-is the most inclusive level at which there are characteristic patterns of behavioural 
interaction. For example, if one was asked to mime how they behave with an animal or what 
they do with furniture, it would not be as simple as to mime how they behave with a dog, a cat 
(you can pet them, feed them...), or a chair (you can sit on it, move it). 
-is the most inclusive level for which a clear visual image can be formed (a single mental 
image can represent the whole category). It is easier to image a dog than an animal. 
-is the level used for everyday reference, as in answers to the questions: What is this? 
-is the level that is first named and understood by children and it is the first level to enter the 
lexicon of a language. Names of basic level categories are morphologically simple. Most of 
our knowledge is organized at this level around part-whole division. 
 Prototype theory was further developed in Lakoff's works (1980, 1987). He uses the 
term 'a radial category' for a conceptual category in which the range of concepts is organized 
relative to a central or prototypical concept: more prototypical senses are closer to the center, 
while less prototypical are further form the prototype. Members of linguistic categories show 
prototype effects or asymmetries within categories on all levels of linguistic description: 
phonological, morphological, syntactic and semantic. Words and their meanings are therefore 
conceptual categories and they are organized in the same way as other, non-linguistic 
categories. 
 To Lakoff, categorization is “a matter of both human experience and imagination- of 
perception, motor activity, and culture on the one hand, and of metaphor, metonymy, and 
mental imagery on the other.” (Lakoff 1987: 8) and language makes use of categorization 
mechanisms. Categorization is the way we perceive the world around us and “There is 
nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action, and speech.” 
(Lakoff 1987: 5). Categorization is what makes us human because we use it for all our 
activities: we categorize both concrete and abstract things (relationships, actions, events and 
emotions) and we do it automatically and unconsciously. Lakoff states that categories relate to 
idealized cognitive models or ICMs. They are mental representations of the world. “They are 
‘idealized’ because they abstract across a range of experiences rather than representing 
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specific instances of a given experience.” (Evans and Green 2006: 270). ICMs provide us with 
background knowledge we use when decoding the meaning, we use it for understanding and 
reasoning.   
 Each ICM structures a mental space, “a small conceptual packet constructed as we 
think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action.” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 
40). “A mental space is a medium for conceptualization and thought. Thus any fixed or 
ongoing state of affairs as we conceptualize it is represented by a mental space.” (Lakoff 
1987: 281). They include our immediate reality, past or future situations, hypothetical 
situations and fictional situations.   
 ICMs are conceptualizations of experience that often does not match the reality. The 
most cited example in cognitive linguistics literature is the one of 'a bachelor'. When defining 
the word 'bachelor' we use an ICM in which there is a society with marriage and marriable 
age. A bachelor is an unmarried adult man. This works in most cases, but there are some cases 
in which we simply cannot describe a bachelor as an unmarried adult male, e.g. Is a Pope a 
bachelor? He is male, adult and unmarried but nobody thinks of him as one. Or an adult man 
that lives with his girlfriend or boyfriend? The answer again is no. The thing is that the 
concept of BACHELOR can be profiled against a frame (explained below) that cannot fit all 
real-life situations. The ICMs for ADULT, UNMARRIED and MALE need to include much more 
information than is usually associated with those labels, such as living arrangements, 
relationships to parents, occupational activity, a life history sequence and sexual orientation.  
 Lakoff describes the ICM for 'mother' as having a cluster of several different ICMs or 
a cluster of models (Lakoff 1987: 74–76):  
BIRTH MODEL: the person giving birth is the mother 
GENETIC MODEL: the female who contributed the genetic material is the mother 
NURTURANCE MODEL: the female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the mother of that 
child 
MARITAL MODEL: the wife of the father is the mother 
GENEALOGICAL MODEL: the closest female ancestor is the mother. 
 Mother is a concept based on a more complex model or the combination of different 
models.   
 Prototypically all models are applied, but not always: a stepmother fits a nurturance 
and marital model, but not the others; a birth mother fits only the birth model; an unwed 
mother fits all of them except a marital model. Fillmore's example is 'breakfast' (in Croft and 
Cruse 2004: 31), the frame of which is a cycle of meals. A breakfast is a meal eaten early in 
55 
the day, after waking up and usually has a unique content. We are all familiar with the cases 
where you can eat early in the morning after a sleepless night or being in a restaurant that 
serves breakfast all day. So ICMs are connected to prototype effects in a way that they enable 
us to see a member of a category as a better or not so good example of it. If we go back to the 
example of mother we know that there are many woman who have decided (or it happened 
spontaneously) not to pursue a career or give up on one to stay at home and take care of the 
kids, house, family. These housewife-mothers are still considered (at least in our culture) as 
better examples of mothers than working mothers, which yields stereotypes. Social 
stereotypes may change over time and are usually conscious. This protoype effects are not due 
to the clustering of models, but are based on metonymy: a subcategory a housewife-mother 
stands for the whole category. So 'mother' can have two kinds of models: 
-a cluster model  
-a stereotypical or metonymic model in which the house-wife mother stands for the category 
as a whole with regard to social expectations. The category 'mother' is a radial category or 
structure because it is organized in a such a way to have a central case and variations or 
extensions.  
 Apart from housewife-mother stereotypes, there are other metonymic models that can 
create protoype effects and these are typical examples, ideals, paragons, generators, 
submodels and salient examples (Lakoff 1987: 86-90). Typical examples are common 
examples of the category, as in Robins and sparows are typical birds. Based on them we make 
inferences about non-typical examples. Ideals are comprised of good qualities, so we can have 
successful, good and strong marriages as ideals. Paragons are usages of personal names to 
stand for certain qualities (another Babe Ruth). Generators appear within a generative 
category as its central members. This category has one generator plus some general rules 
(natural numbers). Members of submodels serve as reference points in reasoning, especially 
when it comes to sizes and distances. Salient examples emerge when we use something 
familiar and close to us to make inferences about more general or not so familiar instances.   
 There are four types of different ICMs (Ruiz de Mendoza 1997: 281): propositional 
(sets of predicate-argument relationships or 'frames'), metaphoric (mappings or sets of 
correspondences across conceptual domains), metonymic (mappings within a single domain) 
and image-schematic (abstract spatial concepts). Lakoff (1987) describes five of them 
(propositional, image-schematic, metaphoric, metonymic and symbolic). The notion of 
propositional ICM is something that Fillmore terms 'a frame'. Charles Fillmore is the father of 
frame semantics, an approach we will describe in the next section. 
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11.2. Frame semantics 
 By the term ‘frame’ I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that 
to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; 
when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all 
of the others are automatically made available. (Fillmore 2006: 373).  
 
 It is represented at the conceptual level and stored in our long term memory. 
According to Fillmore, the meaning associated with a particular word cannot be understood 
unless the associated frames are taken into account. He claims that frames always appear in a 
certain motivating context and explains it by the example of weekend. This word means what 
it means if we have a seven-day cycle in mind, with working days from Monday to Friday. 
Fillmore bases his theory in Gestalt psychology and adopts the terms figure and ground to 
differentiate between the concept and the background frame. The specific meaning of a lexical 
item is represented by the figure and complex knowledge structure that helps us understand it 
is designated by the ground. Figure/ ground distinction correlates with profile/ base. So in 
order to understand a concept, we need to understand it against a certain frame. Frame 
semantics describes, like other cognitive approaches to language, meaning as encyclopedic 
since we cannot understand concept without understanding their underlying knowledge 
structures. Langacker uses the term 'domain' to describe this knowledge structures and that is 
the topic of the next section.  
 
 
 
11.3. Theory of domains and image-schemas 
 “Domains are necessarily cognitive entities: mental experiences, representational 
spaces, concepts, or conceptual complexes.” (Langacker 1987: 147). Langacker also bases his 
theory of domains on the assumption that meaning is encyclopedic and that it cannot be 
understood without taking into account the encyclopedic knowledge associated with it. For 
example, in order to understand the 'sunny' in It is sunny, one needs to place this word in the 
domain of TEMPERATURE. Langacker distinguishes between basic domains and abstract 
domains. Basic domains are rooted in directly embodied human experience. These are SPACE, 
MATERIAL, TIME, FORCE, COLOR, HARDNESS, LOUDNESS, HUNGER, PAIN, etc. Nonbasic domains 
are abstract domains, that is “any concept or conceptual complex that functions as a domain 
for the definition of a higher-order concept ”(Langacker 1987: 150), is called an abstract 
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domain. Abstract domains are the ones, according to Lakoff and Turner (1989: 94) that lack 
'images', like death, thought, living etc.  
 Image schemas are presented by Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Turner (1989) and Johnson 
(1990). They are representations of specific, embodied experiences. They are schematic since 
they represent schematic patterns that arise from our everyday bodily experience. They are 
also inherently meaningful because they derive from our interaction with the world, that is, 
our sensory-perceptual experience. Some of the most important ones are BALANCE, 
VERTICALITY, CENTER/ PERIPHERY, RESISTANCE,  LINKAGE AND CONTAINER.  For example, our 
daily experience with containers helps us use expressions with in or out, such as to be in love, 
to get in trouble or get out of one. We are normally not aware of them since they are created 
early in life, before the emergence of language. 
 One concept can be profiled in several different domains, the combination of which is 
called domain matrix. Domains are any sorts of conceptualizations needed to characterize 
semantic structures or predications in Langacker's terms. Domains also defer in the degree of 
dimensionality. Time and temperature have one dimension, space contains two and three 
dimensions. Domains can also be bounded or unbounded with respect to their dimensions. 
TEMPERATURE is bounded since we can perceive only one range of it; TIME on the other hand 
is unbounded, and so is SPACE. Further division of domains is into configurational and 
locational. TEMPERATURE, for example, is a locational domain since they it occupies a 
location on a one-dimensional scale. Configurational domain is for example SPACE. “All of 
the above cognitive semantic structures – encyclopedic definitions, central vs. peripheral 
knowledge, profile and base, basic and abstract domains – are necessary for the definition of a 
single meaning of a word.” (Langacker 1987: 164, fn. 12, in Croft 2006: 277). 
 
 
 
11.4. Cognitive approaches to grammar 
 What differs cognitive linguistics from previously established approaches to language 
is the way it treats grammar. Grammar is to cognitive linguists also part of human cognition 
and “it reflects and presents generalizations about phenomena in the world as its speakers 
experience them.” (Radden and Dirven 2007: XI). The grammar of a language does not only 
imply all the grammatical rules needed to convey the message correctly, it also includes the 
lexical categories. According to the founder of the cognitive studies of grammar, Ronald 
Langacker,  
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 lexicon, morphology, and syntax form a continuum of symbolic units, divided only 
arbitrarily into separate components; it is ultimately as pointless to analyze grammatical units 
without reference to their semantic value as to write a dictionary which omits the meanings of 
its lexical items. (2006: 29). 
 
  There is no distinction between syntax and lexicon, since grammatical units are 
inherently meaningful and therefore lexicon and grammar form a continuum.  
 In cognitive grammar, meaning is associated with conceptualization, that is, our ability 
to construe the same situation in alternate ways (Langacker 2009: 6). Langacker uses the term 
'focal adjustment' (1987) because the speaker adjusts the focus on a particular aspect of a 
scene and thus uses certain expressions to construe it. These are similar to construal 
operations mentioned above, with some differences. He distinguishes three parameters to 
describe focal adjustments and these are (1) selection; (2) perspective; and (3) abstraction. 
 
 Selection is speaker's ability to choose some aspects of a scene and ignore the others. 
In order to understand what a word profiles or designates, one must understand its base, that is 
all the background knowledge associated with it. For example, the expression elbow is 
profiled within the larger structure ARM, which is its base. The base represents the full scope 
of predication, from which a certain structure within the base is selected. Scope of predication 
is that what is of the importance in the base to identify the profile. For example, to understand 
the concept 'niece' one needs to have in mind kinship system, but not all of it. In the examples  
 
 a. I live close to school. 
 b. Easter is close. 
 c. Me and my brother are very close. 
different domains are activated, namely those of space, time and emotion. Within the same 
domain, expressions can defer in scale. Langacker (1987: 118) exemplifies this in the 
following sentences that are of the domain of SPACE: 
 
 a. The two galaxies are very close to one another. 
 b. San Jose is close to Berkeley. 
 c. The sulphur and oxygen atoms are quite close to one another in this type of 
 molecule. 
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The expression close can mean different distances: from the one between galaxies or the 
distance between the subparts of a single molecule.  
 
 Perspective is the position from which a situation is viewed. Here Langacker (1987: 
120) distinguishes between figure/ ground alignment, viewpoint, deixis and subjectivity/ 
objectivity. To Langacker, and in cognitive linguistics in general, figure/ ground organization 
is one of the most prevalent ones in language, so that grammatical functions subject and 
object are also results of perspective. The specific meaning of a lexical item is represented by 
the figure and complex knowledge structure that helps us understand it is designated by the 
ground. Langacker uses the terms trajector (TR), which corresponds to the figure and 
landmark (LM), corresponding to the ground: a trajector is primary focal participant, the one 
that stands out, or the subject; a landmark is a secondary focal participant or other salient 
entities. Trajector is typically capable of motion (but need not be) and landmark is usually the 
entity trajector moves across. Sometimes expressions have the same conceptual base and 
designate the same relation, as in before and after (temporal relation). 
Figure 7. The same relationship with the semantic contrast (Langacker 2008: 72) 
 
 
They defer in the fact that event 1 can be seen either as trajector or landmark, that is if it 
happens before or after the second event: 
 
 1. The other guests all left before we arrived. 
 2. We arrived after the other guests all left. 
 
 Under viewpoint Langacker mentions vantage point and orientation. Vantage point is a 
position from which a situation is viewed illustrated by 
 
 Come up into the attic! 
 Go up into the attic! 
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which means speaker has different locations. Orientation is defined by humans' upright 
position and therefore relates to vertical dimension. Deixis is the usage of certain elements to 
put the speaker into certain space and time dimensions (here, there, now, tomorrow). Vantage 
point is closely related to subjectivity or objectivity and that is connected to how a speaker 
views a scene that includes himself/ herself: 
 
 Don't lie to your mother! [said by mother to a child] 
  
means that the speaker views the scene more objectively than in 
 
 Don't lie to me! 
 
 Abstraction, as Langacker sees it, is connected to schematicity or 'level of specificity' 
found in both lexical and grammatical structures. “By specificity (or conversely, schematicity) 
I mean the level of precision and detail at which a situation is characterized.” (Langacker 
2009: 6). According to the context, the same predication can be expressed with less or more 
details. Human ability to generalize or extract schemas is one of the most fundamental. 
Schemas are always connected to their elaborations, which provide more information than 
contained in the schema.  
 
 Along with the symbolic thesis of the language, there is another important assumption 
of cognitive linguistics and that is the usage-based model of language. The knowledge of a 
language (or mental grammar) is usage-based: the knowledge of a language emerges from 
language use. A speaker can choose from different constructions to say what he intends. This 
usage-based approach links language competence and performance. Usage-based also means 
that language acquisition is enabled by the actual language use, not Universal Grammar. Since 
units of language are shared by a community of people, they are conventionalized. Some units 
are more entrenched than the others, that is, used more frequently and by the greater amount 
of speakers and the most entrenched linguistic units shape the language system.  
 
 Cognitive grammar belongs to the construction models of grammar because of its 
emphasis of the symbolic character of a linguistic sign and the emphasis on constructions. 
Construction grammars (lower case) branch into several directions, each of them retaining the 
common assumption of construction as pairing of a meaning and sound. These are Cognitive 
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Grammar, Construction Grammar and Radical Construction Grammar (in capitals). Langacker 
(2005: 102) sums up the basic ideas behind all three frameworks as follows: 
(i) Constructions (rather than 'rules') are the primary objects of description. 
(ii) The frameworks are non-derivational ('monostratal').  
(iii) Lexicon and grammar are not distinct components, but form a continuum of 
constructions.  
(iv) Constructions are form-meaning pairings ('assemblies of symbolic structures').  
(v) Information structure is recognized as one facet of constructional meanings.  
(vi) Constructions are linked in networks of inheritance ('categorization').  
(vii) Regularities (rules, patterns) take the form of constructions that are schematic relative to 
instantiating expressions.  
(viii) Apart from degree of specificity/schematicity, expressions and the patterns they 
instantiate have the same basic character.  
(ix) Linguistic knowledge comprises vast numbers of constructions, a large proportion of 
which are 'idiosyncratic' in relation to 'normal', productive grammatical patterns.  
(x) A framework that accommodates idiosyncratic constructions will easily accommodate 
'regular' patterns as a special case (but not conversely).  
(xi) Well- formedness is a matter of simultaneous constraint satisfaction.  
(xii) Composition is effected by 'unification” (“integration'). 
 
 Monostratal models of grammar involve only one level of syntactic representation in 
which words are not combined into phrases and sentences with the help of rules, as it is the 
case with transformational grammars, where a speaker's knowledge of grammar is organized 
into separately divided modules: phonological, semantic and syntactic. All these components 
are connected by linking rules: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Organization of grammatical knowledge in the sorts of syntactic theories prevalent 
from the 1960s to the 1980s ( Croft and Cruise 2004: 227) 
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 In constructional approaches syntactic patterns are represented as constructions that 
contain not only 'grammatical' information, but also also information about morphology, 
semantics and pragmatics. This means that grammatical constructions can be meaningful 
regardless of the words they are made up of: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Organization of grammatical knowledge in construction grammars (Croft and Cruise 
2004: 247) 
 
 Evans and Green (2006) put cognitive grammar and constructional approaches to 
grammar under the broader notion, namely Inventory based approaches to grammar. They 
classify it separately due to many differences between them, one of the most important being 
the emphasis of cognitive grammar on cognitive mechanisms and construal factors that are at 
play in grammar. 
Figure 10.  Inventory-based approaches to grammar (Evans and Green 2006: 482) 
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 Cognitive Grammar differs, however, from Construction and Radical Construction 
Grammar in many ways. Grammar is symbolic in nature and incorporated in semantic-
phonological pairings (in Cognitive Grammar). Construction Grammar as developed by 
Fillmore and Kay, takes Chomsky's Universal Grammar as basis and aims at developing a set 
of statements, represented as constructions, that determine speakers' language knowledge. In 
Cognitive Grammar, being usage-based, knowledge of language emerges from language use. 
Fillmore and Kay concentrated mostly on what is 'irregular' in language, they studied 
idiomatic expressions and idiomatic grammatical constructions let alone (1988, together with 
O'Connor) and what’s X doing Y construction (Kay and Fillmore 1999). These constructions 
have both some regular grammatical properties, but also some that cannot be predicted from 
their subparts. Their theory is a reductionist one, meaning that the elements of a construction 
can be broken down into a set of primitive atomic units which are combined to create more 
complex units.  
 
 Their work was further elaborated by Goldberg (1995) who focused on verb argument 
structures. She notices that in the 'regular' sentence-level constructions the meaning of the 
whole cannot be explained as the sum of the meanings of individual parts and that “that 
constructions themselves carry meaning, independently of the words in the sentence.” 
(Goldberg 1995: 1). To her, a construction is the basic unit of language in which one or more 
of its properties cannot be predictable from knowledge of other structures in grammar: “A 
construction is posited in the grammar if it can be shown that its meaning and/or its form is 
not compositionally derived from other constructions existing in the language.” (1995: 5). 
 Her approach is also usage-based, like cognitive linguistics' one, and acknowledges 
lexicon-grammar continuum. Language knowledge is knowledge, like other knowledge of any 
other human experience and “linguistic constructions display prototype structure and form 
networks of associations. Hierarchies of inheritance and semantic networks, long found useful 
for organizing other sorts of knowledge, are adopted for explicating our linguistic 
knowledge.” (1995: 5). Speakers are able to store certain syntactic patterns because they have 
heard them being produced.  
 Other construction grammar mentioned above is Croft's Radical Construction 
Grammar (2001). His theory also assumes lexicon-grammar continuum, a grammar as a 
structured inventory and usage-based approach, as Cognitive Grammar does. His definition of 
a construction is somehow different from Goldberg's. It also assumes a pairing of form and 
meaning, but it is broader in the sense that everything, from a morpheme to a sentence, is a 
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construction. This approach is a non-reductionist because the whole construction is a 
primitive and parts emerge from that whole.  
 
 Cognitive grammar is a functionalist approach to language, as opposition to the 
formalist one: functional characteristics of language are crucial in language description, with 
the main functions being a symbolic and communicative/ interractive one (as stated by 
Langacker 2007). Cognitive grammar allows only symbolic symbolic structures for the 
description of lexicon, morphology, and syntax. Communicative/ interractive function is in 
line with the usage-based notion of language: all linguistic units are abstracted from actual 
usage events. 
 
 
 
11.5. Theory of metaphor and metonymy 
 
11.5.1. Metaphor 
 Metaphor has long been seen as a figure of speech used for comparing two things that 
are usually different or contradictory, but have some things in common. Cognitive linguists, in 
their wide studies on metaphor, have all agreed that it is much more than that and that many 
old beliefs and assumptions about metaphor have to be questioned and altered. One of these is 
that metaphor is only a figure of speech used for comparing and rhetorical purposes. Its usage 
was assumed to be conscious and deliberate and not witnessed in every day communication 
(Kövecses 2010). One of the first works that challenged these assumptions was George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson's seminal study Metaphors We Live By from 1980. They claim that 
metaphor is not merely a stylistic feature of language, but that thought is itself metaphorically 
structured. Metaphor is a matter of cognition, because we humans tend to use some concepts 
to talk about or understand other concepts. Our conceptual structure is organized in such a 
way that there are mappings between conceptual domains: one domain, called the source or 
donor domain, is ‘mapped’, i.e. projected, onto a different domain called the target or 
recipient domain. The source domain is usually less abstract than the target domain and 
therefore easier to comprehend. We can understand arguments, love, time and ideas as war, 
journeys, war, money, food:  
 ARGUMENT IS WAR 
 You disagree? Ok, shoot! 
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 LOVE IS A JOURNEY 
 Look how far we've come. 
 
 TIME IS MONEY 
 You're wasting my time. 
 
 IDEAS ARE FOOD 
 Let me chew on that for a bit longer. 
 
 It is easier for us to understand concepts such as money or food because we experience 
them through our body: we can see them, take them into our hands, interact with them. They 
help us understand concepts which are abstract. Source domains are therefore grounded in our 
bodily experience. Kövecses (2010: 18-29) lists the following common source domains: 
human body, health and illness, animals, plants, buildings and construction, machines and 
tools, games and sport, money and economic transactions, cooking and food, heat and cold, 
light and darkness, forces, movement and direction. Common corresponding target domains 
are: emotion, desire, morality, thought, society/ nation, politics, economy, human relations, 
communication, time, life and death, religion, events and actions. He groups target domains 
into psychological and mental states and events, social groups and processes, and personal 
experiences. 
 Metaphors work on the formula A is B where the target domain is comprehended as if 
it were a source domain (Kövecses 2015). This is possible due to the mappings or 
correspondences between them. 
 Ruiz de Mendoza (1997) claims that there are one-correspondence and many-
correspondence metaphors. In the metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS animal behaviour is 
mapped onto human behaviour. In the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, on the other hand, there 
is more than one correspondence: the travellers are the lovers, the vehicle is the love 
relationship, the distance covered is the progress made and so on.  
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Figure 11. One-correspondence and many-correspondence metaphors (Herrero 2002: 75) 
 
ANGER IS HEAT metaphor is the most general metaphor for heat. This metaphor has two 
versions, one is ANGER IS THE HEAT OF FLUID IN A CONTAINER (You make my blood boil) and 
the other is ANGER IS FIRE (He was breathing fire) (Lakoff 1987: 386). The correspondences 
that help us understand anger are: 
 
source : FIRE           target: ANGER 
 
The thing burning is the angry person. 
The cause of the fire is the cause of the anger. 
The intensity of the fire is the intensity of the anger. 
The physical damage to the thing burning is mental damage to the angry person. 
The capacity of the thing burning to serve its normal function is the capacity of the angry 
person to function normally. 
An object at the point of being consumed by fire corresponds to a person whose anger is at the 
limit. 
The danger of the fire to things nearby is danger of anger to other people. 
 
These metaphorical entailments are part of our conceptual system, they carry what we know 
about source domains onto the target domain.  
 Lakoff and Johnson differentiate between structural, orientational and ontological 
metaphors.  
In structural metaphors, “one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another.” 
(Lakoff and  Johnson 1980: 14):  
  
 Your arguments are indefensible. 
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Here we understand the concept of an argument in terms of war. 
 
 Orientational metaphors organize a whole system of concepts in terms of physical 
orientation. For example, HAPPINESS IS UP: 
 You're in high spirits.,  
 
while SADNESS IS DOWN: 
 My spirits sank.  
 
 Similarly, health, consciousness, having control, more, good, virtue, and rational are 
all up, while sickness, unconsciousness, being controlled, less, bad, depravity, and emotional 
thinking are all generally down. They are based and dependent on our cultural and physical 
experience. Not all orientational metaphors are up-down, some are ahead-behind, as in 
FORESEEABLE FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP: 
 What's coming up this week? 
 “Our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) provide the basis 
for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological metaphors, that is, ways of viewing events, 
activities, emotions ideas, etc., as entities and substances.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 25). 
Some of the most cited examples are THE MIND IS A MACHINE (I'm a little rusty today) and 
INFLATION IS AN ENTITY (Inflation makes me sick.). Container metaphors appear when we 
project our in-out orientation onto other physical objects that have bounded surfaces. We 
conceptualize states as containers (He is in love.).  
 
 Most of the above mentioned metaphors are based on our knowledge, i.e. on our 
experience and interaction with the world.  Basic knowledge structures are mapped from a 
source to a target. There are also so called image-schema metaphors in which we do not map 
elements of knowledge from source to target, but conceptual elements of image schemas. 
Different image schemas structure concepts metaphorically (Kövecses 2010: 43): 
 
Image-Schema   metaphorical extension 
in-out     I'm out of money. 
front-back    He's an up-front kind of guy. 
up-down    I'm feeling low. 
contact    Hold on, please. ('Wait')    
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motion     He just went crazy. 
force     You're driving me insane. 
 
 An important observation made by the theorists of conceptual metaphor is its 
unidirectionality: metaphoric mapping go from source to target domain, not vice versa, that is 
the mapping is asymmetrical.  
 
 Metaphorical mappings obey the Invariance Principle: “Metaphorical mappings 
preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in 
a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain.” (Lakoff 2006: 199). For 
example, in the metaphor PEOPLE ARE PLANTS we map the top of the tree on the person's 
head, the trunk onto to body and so on. This principle guarantees that the image schematic 
organization of the source domain will be preserved by the mapping in a way consistent with 
the target domain.  
 
 Ruiz de Mendoza (1998) expands this into all kinds of generic-level structure, not only 
image- schematic ones, which he calls Extended Invariance Principle. (In Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Usón 2007: 37). For example, mapping animal behaviour onto human behaviour in 
Achilles is a lion, we simply state that he behaves bravely, here image-schemas play no role.  
 In 2003 Ruiz de Mendoza and Santibáñez Sáenz have formulated the Correlation 
Principle, which ensures that source and target elements in a metaphor share the relevant 
implicational structure. In the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor a heated debate is compared to a 
serious war, not just some minor conflict between the opponents:  
 
 He shot down all of my arguments. 
 
 There is another principle, namely the Mapping Enforcement Principle, which ensures 
that “no item in the target will be discarded from a mapping system if there is a way to find a 
corresponding item in the source.” (Ruiz de Mendoza and Usón 2007: 38). In the example  
  
 He gave John a kick. 
  
the target elements have their corresponding elements in the source: we map a giver onto a 
kicker and  giving onto kicking, but the possession element seem to have no corresponding 
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element in the target. The person receives the kick, but does not have it later. What he does 
have is the effect of kicking which is led to by the activation of ACTION FOR EFFECT OF THE 
ACTION metonymy.  Possession of the object of the source domain is mapped onto the effects 
of kicking in the target domain.  
 
 Conceptual metaphor theory proposes the idea that metaphors work on the basis of 
highlighting and hiding: the metaphor AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY highlights the progressive 
and organizational aspects of arguments and hides the confrontational aspects: 
 We’ll proceed in step-by-step fashion. 
 We’ve covered a lot of ground.  
Metaphoric mapping is therefore only partial: speakers use only some aspects of a source 
domain in understanding a target. 
 
 Croft and Cruse (2004: 198) summarize Lakoff's theory of conceptual metaphors as 
follows: 
-It is a theory of recurrently conventionalized expressions in everyday language in which 
literal and metaphorical elements are intimately combined grammatically. 
-The conventional metaphorical expressions are not a purely linguistic phenomenon, but the 
manifestation of a conceptual mapping between two semantic domains; hence the mapping is 
general and productive (and assumed to be characteristic of the human mind). 
-The metaphorical mapping is asymmetrical: the expression is about a situation in one domain 
(the target domain) using concepts mapped over from another domain (the source domain). 
-The metaphorical mapping can be used for metaphorical reasoning about concepts in the 
target domain. 
 
 Since the publishing of Metaphors we live by many different but equally important 
contributions have been added to the theory of metaphor. One of them is made by Joseph 
Grady (1997) who makes a distinction between primary metaphors and compound metaphors. 
Primary metaphors are foundational metaphors and when combined, they produce compound 
ones. He rejects the distinction between source and target domains as concrete and abstract, to 
him primary source concepts relate to sensory-perceptual experience, while primary target 
concepts relate to subjective responses to sensory-perceptual experience. Primary source 
concepts are derived from external sensory experience and have image content, whereas 
primary target concepts, which are more evaluative and subjective in nature, are said to have 
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response content. In the metaphor DESIRE IS HUNGER (We're hungry for a victory) desire as 
target is not something abstract to us humans, but something we experience as fundamental 
and essential. Hence the term 'primary'. Primary metaphors are basic mappings with strong 
experiential basis which, when combined, produce more complex metaphors. An example of a 
complex metaphor would be THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS (The theory needs more support) 
because here the entire complex domains of experience are related. In this complex metaphor, 
two primary metaphors are united: PERSISTING IS REMAINING UPRIGHT and ORGANIZATION IS 
PHYSICAL STRUCTURE. 
 
Figure 12. Compound metaphor (Evans and Green 2006: 330) 
 
 So far it has been shown that metaphors can be based on similarity between two 
concepts or on embodiment. Kövecses (2015) adds that metaphors can also emerge through 
schematization. In the metaphor HEAVEN IS AN IDEAL PHYSICAL PLACE, the target is “an 
idealized schematization of a variety of particular and specific source domains.” (2015: 22). 
 
 When it comes to levels of language description, metaphor is not only found on the 
sentential level, as it is often described in literature, but on all levels of linguistic structure. 
Dirven (1985), following Ullmann's (1959) proposal of four levels of linguistic structure 
(phonology, lexis, syntax and discourse, with morphology and semantics as part of all four 
levels), claims that metaphor operates on all four levels. He distinguishes between sound 
metaphors, word metaphors, phrase and sentence metaphors and discourse metaphors (1985: 
87-94). Sound metaphors appear at the level of phonology due to the fact that the relationship 
between form and meaning is not always arbitrary. One of the examples is sw sound denoting 
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a curved, fast motion as in swerve, swish, swipe, swift and many more. The curved motion of 
the air stream in the mouth is the vehicle for the meaning curved fast motion of these verbs. 
Word metaphors are words used as vehicles for other meanings, either already familiar ones 
or new ones. Thus the word heart can express love (lose someone's heart to), tenderness (You 
have no heart), central part of something (the heart of the city), emotional disposition (happy 
heart), or the most important part (the heart of the matter). Since for Dirven a metonymy is a 
metaphorical process, he labels all his examples as metaphors. Phrase and sentence metaphors 
occur due to the syntagmatic relations within the phrase or a sentence, that is, the whole 
sentence or a phrase stands as a vehicle for some other target. Dirven's examples are phrasal 
verbs, specifically the verb talk which creates spatial metaphors to talk back, to talk somebody 
into, to out-talk and many more. Discourse metaphors are found in in poetry, proverbs (The 
early bird catches the worm), sayings, catch-phrases, but even myths, allegories and fables. 
The example given is George Orwell's Animal Farm where animals and their behaviour 
represent different types of people, but not only the characters are metaphorical, the setting as 
well. As Dirven claims, the metaphorical character is based on the discourse as such, not on 
individual words or utterances.  
 
 
 
11.5.2. Metonymy 
     Metonymy, like metaphor, has long been seen as a figure of speech in which one 
concept simply stands for another concept. Lakoff and Johnson were the first to describe 
metonymy as a cognitive tool used for conceptualization. They define it as “a process which 
allows us to conceptualize one thing by means of its relation to something else” (1980: 39). 
Later, the studies on metonymy add that it is a conceptual mapping within a single domain, it 
involves a ‘stand-for’ relationship and has a mainly referential function. 
 Lakoff (1987: 288) states that metonymic mapping takes place “within a single 
conceptual domain, which is structured by an ICM”  where the term 'domain' is equated with 
Langacker's abstract domain. This abstract domain or domain matrix is created by experience.  
 Kövecses and Radden (1998: 39) define metonymy as “a cognitive process in which 
one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the 
target, within the same domain, or ICM.” Their definition does not include the term 'mapping' 
since they base their conception of metonymy on Langacker's notion of 'reference-point' 
where one conceptual entity provides access to another conceptual entity. We can say that 
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metonymy serves as an access mechanism (Langacker 1993, Croft 1993). We access a target 
through domain highlighting within domain matrix. In 
 
 Proust is tough to read. 
 
 the expression highlights Proust's literary work, it becomes the active zone6. 
 Martin Hilpert (2006) states that a linguistic sign can have a reference to another 
referent if they belong together, that is they stand in the contiguity relationship. One aspect 
can stand for another because they coexist within the same domain. In the well-known 
example 
 
 The ham-sandwich is waiting for his check. 
 
the ham-sandwich can stand for the customer because both the source (ham sandwich) and the 
target (customer) belong to the same domain, the one of CAFÉS. 
 
 Klaus-Uwe Panther and Linda L. Thornburg (2009a: 180-181) sum up all the given 
aspects of metonymy as follows:  
i.  Metonymy is based on associative thinking, which itself may be grounded in human 
experience and culture. 
ii.  A linguistic metonymy consists of a vehicle that conveys a source meaning that 
provides mental access to an associatively connected target meaning. More specifically, 
the target meaning is an elaboration of the source meaning, i.e., the source meaning is 
'contained' in the target meaning, but becomes backgrounded as a result of the 
metonymic operation. 
iii.  Access to the target meaning may be facilitated or even enforced by other meaning 
components in the conceptual domain of the metonymic operation and/or contextual 
triggers (including the linguistic and extralinguistic environment).  
iv.  The metonymic shift is construed as occurring in a single conceptual domain – in 
contrast to metaphor, which involve cross-domain mappings. 
                                                 
6 The term 'active zone' is Langacker's term: “An entity’s active zone, with respect to a profiled relationship, is 
defined as that facet of it which most directly and crucially participates in that relationship.” (2009: 42). In 
the example The cigarette in her mouth was unlit the nominal the cigarette in her mouth does not denote the 
whole cigarette, but only the first part of it, just as the landmark in her mouth denotes the part between her 
lips. 
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v.  The relation between source and target meaning is contingent, i.e., the metonymic 
relation as such is conceptually non-necessary. This entails that the metonymic relation 
is, in principle, defeasible. 
vi.  In a prototypical metonymy, the target becomes conceptually prominent; the source is 
contained in the target but backgrounded. 
vii.  In prototypical metonymies the relation between source and target is conceptually tight. 
viii. Metonymic relations provide natural inference schemas that allow fast, economical, and 
effortless access to target concepts. 
 
 Since our knowledge of the world is organized by structured ICMs which we perceive 
as wholes with their parts, Kövecses and Radden (1998, 1999) argue that there are two kinds 
of motivating relationships that produce metonymies:  
 
a) part-whole, whole-part relationships, where parts of the domain stand for the whole domain 
and vice versa, that is we access a part of an ICM via its whole or a whole ICM via one of its 
parts; 
 
b) part-part relationships, where parts of domain stand for other parts, that is we access a part 
via another part of an ICM. 
 
 The first type of metonymy producing relationships can be exemplified as follows (all 
the examples are taken from Kövecses and Radden (1998 and 1999)): 
 
Part-whole, whole-part relationships 
 WHOLE THING FOR PART OF A THING: 
 America for ‘The United States’ 
 
 PART OF A THING FOR THE WHOLE THING: 
 England for ‘The United Kingdom’  
 
 A CATEGORY FOR A MEMBER OF THE CATEGORY: 
 The pill for ‘birth control pill’ 
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 A MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY: 
 Aspirin for ‘any pain-relieving tablet’  
 
 These whole-part configurations typically apply to things and underlie following 
ICMs: 
-Thing-and-Part ICM: this ICM mainly includes metonymies which involve things. Parts of 
the things can stand for the whole (the above example of England), just as the whole thing can 
represent its parts (America). Other metonymies within this ICM are: 
 THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION: 
 Washington for 'political institution' 
and 
 THE PLACE FOR THE EVENT: 
 She is in the hospital, meaning 'She is ill'. 
 
-Scale ICM: here the metonymy WHOLE SCALE FOR UPPER END OF THE SCALE is at work: 
 Henry is speeding again for Henry is going too fast.  
 
There are also cases with a reversed situation: 
 UPPER END OF A SCALE FOR WHOLE SCALE: 
 How old are you? used to ask for somebody's age.  
 
-Constitution ICM contains two metonymies: 
 OBJECT FOR MATERIAL CONSTITUTING THAT OBJECT:  
 There was cat all over the road. 
 
 THE MATERIAL CONSTITUTING AN OBJECT FOR THE OBJECT :  
 Wood for 'the forest' 
 
 In these kind of metonymies object that is perceived as material becomes a mass noun 
(cat) and when material is used as an object, it can be coded as a count noun (in the woods). 
 
-Event ICM: events consist of several parts or subevents that can occur in succession or 
simultaneously and they metonymically stand for the whole event: 
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 SUCCESSIVE SUBEVENTS FOR COMPLEX EVENT:  
 They stood at the altar. 
 
 CO-PRESENT SUBEVENTS FOR COMPLEX EVENT:  
 Mary speaks Spanish. 
 
 In the first example, 'the first part' of event stands for the whole wedding ceremony. In 
the second example all four skills we understand as knowing a language (speaking, writing, 
listening and reading) are represented through speaking. This example also shows the effect 
metonymies have on the English tense system and can also be viewed as PRESENT FOR 
HABITUAL metonymy. The Present Tense can also be used to express the Future via PRESENT 
FOR FUTURE metonymy: 
 I am off. for 'I will be off'. 
 
 The influence of metonymy on grammar is a special section of this thesis, but another 
type of metonymy is worth mentioning here and this is POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY 
metonymy studied by Panther and Thornburg (1999), since it also belongs to the event ICM. 
This pattern has two variants: 
 ACTUAL FOR POTENTIAL: 
 He is an angry person. means that he sometimes can get angry or that it is possible for 
him to easily get in the state of being angry. 
 
 POTENTIAL FOR ACTUAL: 
 I can see your point. actually means I see your point.  
 
-Category-and-Member ICM: this ICM was already exemplified with the 'pill' and the 
'Aspirin': in these cases either a source or a target is somehow salient among its members. A 
special type of metonymic relationship can be observed in the following examples: 
 Boys don't cry.  
 The/ a spider has got eight legs. 
 
The first example is a generic statement about boys, but can be used in a specific situation due 
to the GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy. The second example can be applied to spiders in 
general via SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC metonymy. Radden and Kövecses (1999: 48) claim that 
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the use of this metonymy can be explained due to people's tendency to generalize. The authors 
also put proverbs here: 
  
 Blind blames the ditch 7. 
 
In proverbs there is usually a specific situation described which can then be used more 
generally.  
 
-Category-and-Property ICM: within this ICM a category can metonymically stand for the 
property and vice versa:  
 CATEGORY FOR DEFINING PROPERTY:  
 jerk for 'stupidity' 
  
 DEFINING PROPERTY FOR CATEGORY:  
 blacks for 'black people' 
 
-Reduction ICM: Metonymies that belong here typically involve abbreviations (UN), 
acronyms (NATO), clippings (exam), euphemism (What the heck are you doing? for What the 
hell are you doing?). Here the linguistic form changes, but the concept stays the same: 
FORMA-CONCEPTA FOR FORMB-CONCEPTB 
The variant of this type is PART OF A FORM FOR THE WHOLE FORM as in crude for 'crude oil'. 
Part for part metonymies are built on the interaction between a relation and one of the things 
participating in the relation. Relation can be construed as a thing, just as a thing can be 
recategorized as a relation. These metonymies include the Action ICM, the Perception ICM, 
the Causation ICM, the Production ICM, the Control ICM, the Possession ICM, the 
Containment ICM, the Location ICM, the Sign and Reference ICMs and the Modification 
ICM. We will briefly describe each of them.  
-Action ICM: participants within this ICM can be related to an action or to each other by the 
following types of metonymies: 
 AGENT FOR ACTION:  
 to author a new book 
 
 
                                                 
7 Lakoff and Turner (1989) treat proverbs as GENERIC IS SPECIFIC  metaphor, but since they belong to the same 
ICM, Radden and  Kövecses treat them as metonymies. 
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 ACTION FOR AGENT: 
 driver 
 
 INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION: 
 to ski 
 
 ACTION FOR INSTRUMENT: 
 screwdriver  
 
 OBJECT FOR ACTION: 
 to blanket the bed 
 ACTION FOR OBJECT: 
 The flight is waiting to depart.  
 
 RESULT FOR ACTION: 
 to landscape the garden 
  
 ACTION FOR RESULT: 
 the production 
 
 MANNER FOR ACTION: 
 to tiptoe into the room 
 
 MEANS FOR ACTION: 
 He sneezed the tissue off the table.  
 
 TIME FOR ACTION: 
 to summer in Paris 
 
 DESTINATION FOR MOTION: 
 to porch the newspaper 
 
 INSTRUMENT FOR AGENT: 
 the pen for 'writer' 
 
 TIME OF MOTION FOR AN ENTITY INVOLVED IN THE MOTION: 
 The 8.30 just arrived. 
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 In all the examples we see how metonymies affect the grammatical system: nouns are 
converted into verbs and verbs are presented as nouns. There are cases, however, where 
metonymies do not bring about changing of the word class, as in RESULT FOR ACTION 
metonymy: 
 
 Win a fortune! 
 
Here, the verb win as a result metonymically stands for the action of gambling. Again, this 
issue of metonymy's impact on grammatical system will be addressed a bit later.  
-Perception ICM: this ICM can produce following patterns: 
 THING PERCEIVED FOR PERCEPTION: 
 There goes my knee. for There goes the pain in my knee (from Lakoff 1987: 511). 
 
 PERCEPTION FOR THING PERCEIVED: 
 sight for 'things seen' 
 
-Causation ICM: effects and causes can both serve as metonymic vehicles and thus we can 
talk about following metonymies: 
 CAUSE FOR EFFECT: 
 healthy complexion for 'the good state of health bringing about the effect of healthy 
complexion' 
 
 EFFECT FOR CAUSE: 
 sad book for 'sadness resulting from reading a book' 
 
EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy can have several subtypes: 
 
 STATE/EVENT FOR THING/PERSON/STATE CAUSING IT: 
 She was my ruin. 
 
 EMOTION FOR CAUSE OF EMOTION: 
 She was my joy. 
 
 MENTAL/PHYSICAL STATE FOR OBJECT/PERSON CAUSING IT: 
 You are a pain in the neck.  
 
79 
 PHYSICAL/BEHAVIORAL EFFECT FOR EMOTION CAUSING IT: 
 She was upset. 
 
The Action ICM and Causation ICM can sometimes be combined and produce SOUND FOR 
EVENT CAUSING IT metonymy:  
 The train whistled into the station. 
 
-Production ICM: in the metonymies belonging to this ICM one of the participants is a 
product, as in:  
 PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT: 
 a Ford for 'a type of a car' 
 
 ARTIST FOR HIS WORK: 
 They are playing Mozart tonight. 
 
 INVENTOR FOR THE THING INVENTED: 
 macadam 
 
 INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCT: 
 Did you hear the whistle? meaning the sound of it. 
 
 PLACE FOR PRODUCT MADE THERE: 
 mokka, java, China 
 
-Control ICM: This ICM involves the controller and the controlled: 
 CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED: 
 Schwarzkopf defeated Iraq.  
  
 CONTROLLED FOR CONTROLLER: 
 The Mercedes has arrived. 
 
-Possession ICM can lead to the following metonymies:  
He married money, where money stands for the person with money, via POSSESSED FOR 
POSSESSOR metonymy. It is also possible to have the reversed type: 
 POSSESSOR FOR POSSESSED: 
 That's me! for 'my bus'. 
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-Containment ICM: in this ICM the target is usually the content, so the type CONTAINER FOR 
 CONTENTS: 
 glass for 'wine' 
 is found more frequently than CONTENTS FOR CONTAINER: 
 The milk tipped over. 
 
-Location ICM: within this ICM it is possible to have several metonymies: 
 PLACE FOR INHABITANTS: 
 The whole town showed up. for 'the people who live in that town' 
 INHABITANTS FOR PLACE: 
 The French hosted the World Cup Soccer Games.  
 
 INSTITUTION FOR PLACE: 
 I live close to the University. 
 
 PLACE FOR EVENT: 
 Waterloo for 'battle fought at Waterloo' 
 
 EVENT FOR PLACE: 
 Battle for 'name of the village in East Sussex where the Battle of Hastings was fought' 
 
-Sign-and-Reference ICM: there are two types of metonymies belong here, a sign metonymy 
and a reference metonymy. In a sign metonymy, a word (a form) stands for a concept (dollar 
for 'money'). In a reference metonymy, a sign, a word form or a concept stand for a real thing 
(word cow for a real cow). 
 
-Modification ICM: this ICM is applied when a sign is modified, but cases other than 
reduction (which was the case with PART-FOR-WHOLE metonymies). Thus SUBSTITUTE FORM 
can stand for THE ORIGINAL FORM: 
 Do you still love me?- Yes, I do.  
 
 Several cognitive principles are responsible for the choice of the metonymic vehicle: 
human experience (HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN, SUBJECTIVE OVER OBJECTIVE, CONCRETE 
OVER ABSTRACT, FUNCTIONAL OVER NON- FUNCTIONAL, INTERACTIONAL OVER NON-
INTERACTIONAL), perceptual selectivity (IMMEDIATE OVER NON-IMMEDIATE, MORE OVER 
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LESS, DOMINANT OVER LESS DOMINANT, OCCURENT OVER NON-OCCURENT, GOOD GESTALT 
OVER POOR GESTALT, BOUNDED OVER UNBOUNDED, SPECIFIC OVER GENERIC) and cultural 
preference (STEREOTYPICAL OVER NON -STEREOTYPICAL, IDEAL OVER NON-IDEAL, CENTRAL 
OVER PERIPHERAL, TYPICAL OVER NON-TYPICAL, INITIAL OR FINAL OVER MIDDLE, BASIC 
OVER NON-BASIC, IMPORTANT OVER LESS IMPORTANT, COMMON OVER LESS COMMON, RARE 
OVER LESS RARE) (from Kövecses and Radden 1998). Let us see what it means on the 
following examples. When we talk about driving, as part of our everyday experience, we do 
not normally use non-functional parts of a car as doors or windshield wiper, but rather more 
functional ones, as the wheels or the motor: 
 Sit behind the wheel! 
 
 When it comes to perceptual selectivity, we usually take something more immediate, 
bigger or more dominant as a vehicle since it is usually more salient. The reason why England 
can stand for Great Britain is that it is the biggest of the countries (and the most powerful). 
The same is the reason why we do not ask somebody How short are you? but rather How tall 
are you? 
 Some members of a category are 'better' examples of it than the others. When wanting 
to emphasize the repetition of one's utterance, we say I've told you a hundred times! meaning 
I've told you that many times. This happens because hundred is a basic number (BASIC OVER 
NON-BASIC PRINCIPLE). 
 
 Communicative principles that determine the metonymic vehicle are the principle of 
clarity (CLEAR OVER LESS CLEAR) and the principle of relevance (RELEVANT OVER 
IRRELEVANT). They ensure that communication flows without misunderstandings. Some 
metonymies are so 'natural' that the usage of the targeted meaning would sound 'unnatural': 
  
 The dog bit the cat.  *The dog's teeth bit the cat. 
 
 Sometimes one principle overrides the other, as in the example The ham-sandwich is 
waiting for his check, where relevance principle overrides the one of HUMAN OVER NON-
HUMAN. All the mentioned principles help us understand why something is or is not a 
metonymic source. These principles, as already exemplified with the ham-sandwich, do not 
always function and that is due to various social-communicative and rhetorical reasons to 
produce euphemism or even humor.  
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 In domain-internal mapping of metonymies The Invariance Principle and Extended 
Invariance Principle are also implied (Ruiz de Mendoza and Usón 2007). In the example 
 
 He has been drinking bottle after bottle. 
  
container-content relationship of the container image-schema is preserved, as is controller-
controlled relationship between ‘bus-driver’ and ‘bus’ in  
 
 The buses are on strike. 
 Correlation Principle is also of relevance. This is the reason why the patient is referred 
to as gallbladder  
  
 Go see the gallbladder in room 203. 
 
and not the newly changed sheet or some other element of the hospital environment.  
 
 Kövecses (2015: 19) claims that metonymic mapping is a 'through-connection'8: “one 
entity is mentally activated by or through another entity.” He differentiates between outward 
looking and inward looking. In the example  
 
 I bought another Hemingway. 
 
we are dealing with outward looking because the target (the book written by Hemingway) is 
outside the primary domain of Hemingway as a person. Inward metonymies, on the other 
hand, activate or highlight an aspect that is inside the primary domain: 
 
 This book is large. 
 
This book has more primary domains, one of them being a physical object, and what is 
activated in the example is its size.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Metaphoric relations are 'as-if-connections': a frame or an element of a frame is conceived in terms of 
another frame or element. The third connection between constituents of a conceptual system Kövecses 
(2015) mentions is 'is-connection' or identification connection: a concept is identified with another concept.  
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11.5.2.1. Metonymic models in literature 
 Metonymies can be categorized according to what they are used for, according to the 
relationship between domains and according to different types of contiguity that operate 
within metonymies. The most important authors and their distinctions will be given below.  
 
 Warren (1999, 2003, 2006) distinguishes between referential and propositional 
metonymies. The first type relates one entity to another, the other one proposition to another 
proposition.  
In referential metonymy: 
 
 Table 13 is complaining. (people sitting at table 13) 
 
truth conditions are violated, since things (tables) cannot complain. 
 
 This is not the case with propositional metonymies: 
 
 How did you get there? I waved down a taxi. (A taxi took me there).  
  
Here one proposition is related to another via if-then relationship (If I waved town a taxi, then 
it took me there). 
 
 Warren states that referential metonymies occur in the head noun and they function as 
nominals and modifiers, whereas propositional metonymies involve other parts of speech. 
 
 Panther and Thornburg (1999, 2004) identify two broader types of metonymy, namely 
propositional and illocutionary. Propositional metonymies are divided into referential (in 
Warren's terms) and predicational. Referential metonymies have, as their name states, 
referential function:  
 
 The Pentagon has issued a warning. PLACE FOR INSTITUTION 
 
 Predicational metonymies involve relationships between events: 
  
 General Motors had to stop production. OBLIGATION TO ACT FOR ACTION 
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In these metonymies, a potential event (such as he ability, possibility, permission, obligation 
to undertake an action) is metonymically connected to its achievement in reality.  
 
 Panther and Thornburg add another type and these are illocutionary or speech act 
metonymies. They involve pragmatic inferencing. In the example  
 
 I would like you to close the window,  
the wish of the speaker metonymically evokes the request for the window to be closed. An 
attribute of the speech act can stand for the speech act itself, just like an attribute of a person 
can stand for the person.  
 
 Panther and Thornburg's contribution to the study of metonymies is not relevant only 
because it classified metonymies. They view metonymies as something far more inclusive 
than just a lexical phenomenon used for understanding one concept in terms of another 
concept. They insist that research on metonymy should be carried out from a much broader 
perspective, which includes both pragmatics and grammar.  
 
 Metonymies can also be predicative (Ruiz de Mendoza 2000, Ruiz de Mendoza and 
Pérez 2001), as in the example 
 
 She is just a pretty face.  
  
Here a statement is used to refer to a different statement. 
 
         Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Díez Velasco (2001) base their distinction on 
Radden and Kövecses's analysis of metonymy-producing relationships and Panther and 
Thornburg's classification. They differentiate between low-level metonymies based on non-
generic ICMs and high-level metonymies based on generic ICMs. Non-generic ICMs are 
conventional representations that are based on experience and created by well-entrenched 
links between elements of our knowledge. Generic ICMs “are observed to underlie 
axiological effects, pragmatic inferences, and discourse connections like cause-consequence 
and evidence–conclusion.” (Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez 2001: 355). Low-level metonymies 
can be subdivided into propositional and situational. Propositional metonymies are cases of 
typical metonymies, where a concept stands for another concept: 
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 Tired faces all of them, some old, some young. FACE FOR PERSON 
 
 In a situational metonymy, one part of a situation stands for the whole situation or 
event: 
 
 The poor dog left with its tail between its legs. 
In this example the leaving of the dog stands for the whole scenario of a dog being punished 
and leaving in the described manner.  
 
 High-level metonymies are also divided into propositional and situational. 
Propositional ones are sometimes termed grammatical metonymies since they can influence 
the grammatical structure, like turning a noun into a verb: 
 
 He hammered the nail into the wall. INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION 
 
 Situational ones are employed in indirect speech acts and can be equivalents to 
Panther and Thornburg's illocutionary metonymies.  
 
          Summing up this division, we can say that only high-level metonymies influence the 
grammmatical structure, while low-level ones operate on lexical level. Referential 
metonymies are of the low-level type, while predicative and illocutionary metonymies are 
cases of the high-level type.  
 
 Another important classification of metonymies is aimed at the relationship between a 
source and a target domain. Ruiz de Mendoza (2000) argues that there are: 
a) target-in-source and (target-source inclusion) 
b) source-in-target (source-target inclusion) metonymies. 
 In target-in-source metonymies a whole domain stands for one of its subdomains:  
  
 She's taking the pill. 
 
 The pill stands for the contraceptive pill. 
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Figure 13. Target-in-source metonymy (Ruiz de Mendoza and Peña Cervel 2009: 7) 
 In source-in-target metonymy a subdomain stands for the whole domain matrix:  
 
 All hands on deck. 
 
Here hands stands for the sailors who do hard physical work on the ship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Source-in-target metonymy (Ruiz de Mendoza and Peña Cervel 2009: 6) 
 
 In target-in-source we are dealing with a process of domain reduction: we highlight 
only the relevant subdomain in the whole domain. We find domain expansion in the examples 
of source-in-target metonymies: by means of one subdomain we gain access to the whole 
domain. 
 
 Sometimes it is possible to have both mappings at the same time, which is illustrated 
by the next example (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Díez Velasco 2003: 517): 
 
 Shakespeare is on the top shelf.  
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Figure 15. Double metonymy AUTHOR FOR WORK FOR (NON-UNIQUE) SAMPLE (Ruiz de 
Mendoza Ibáñez and  Pérez Hernández 2003: 39) 
 
 Shakespeare is used to refer to ‘books written by Shakespeare’ and it is a target-in-
source relationship. At the same time, Shakespeare’s work is used to refer to the actual books 
in which this work appears and this is a source-in-target relationship. This is labelled double 
metonymies or metonymic chains.  
 Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006) treat metonymy as a radial category where concrete 
metonymies are at the center of the category and abstract ones are more towards periphery. In 
concrete or prototypical metonymies such as 
 
 I’ll be able to eat every day and have a roof over my head, 
 
the vehicle (roof) is very close to its target (house) since they are both concrete things, but 
also since roof is actually part of the intended meaning (house). 
 In the example 
 
 Clinton plans a round table discussion. 
 
the vehicle (table) stands for people involved in a discussion, but there is no contiguousness 
between the source and the target so it is the case of more peripheral metonymy.  
 
 They also argue that metonymies that are on the edge usually have unbounded  
referents and targets, as in: 
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 The classic Hollywood narrative. 
  
Hollywood as a city is bounded, but as a referent not so. Metonymies with concrete, bounded 
terms and referents are prototypical and stand at the center of the category: 
 
 I couldn’t bear the way men regarded me as just a pair of legs. 
 
 Another distinction is given by Barcelona (2003, 2005, 2011a). He proposes four 
classes of metonymies: schematic, typical, prototypical and conventional metonymies. 
 
“A schematic metonymy is a mapping, within one cognitive domain, of a cognitive 
(sub)domain, the source, onto another cognitive (sub)domain, the target, so that the target is 
mentally activated.” (2003: 245). In the example 
 This book is highly instructive. 
 
subdomain THE SEMANTIC CONTENT of the domain THE BOOK is mentally activated. These 
kinds of metonymies always include intradomain mapping and activation of a target or an 
'active zone' of a target by a source (Barcelona 2005, Langacker 1999). 
 
 In a typical metonymy the target is distinct from the source: 
 
 She is just a pretty face. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 37) 
 Prototypical metonymies have individuals as targets and as referents: 
 
 Paris agreed to a truce.  
 
They represent “the 'classical' instances of metonymy, and, as such, they constitute the model 
for the whole category of metonymies.” (Barcelona 2005: 315). 
 
 All of them may eventually become conventional, with protoypical metonyies having 
the highest degree of likelihood of becoming conventionalized.  
 
 To conclude the part on topology of metonymies, it is obvious that metonymies do not 
only have a referential function, which was held by many cognitive linguists for a long time, 
but they can be used non-referentially as well. Different classifications and definitions of 
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metonymy are due to the fact that there are different views on the concepts used in them, such 
as mapping, domain, highlighting etc. One of the more recent definitions of metonymies was 
given by Barcelona (2015: 146-147) and can serve as the one uniting all of the previously 
mentioned ones:  
 
 Metonymy is an asymmetric mapping of a conceptual entity, the source, onto another 
conceptual entity, the target. Source and target are in the same frame and their roles are linked 
by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated.  
 
 His definition does not include the term 'domain', because he believes it to be 
ambiguous, but the 'frame', which is the same as Fillmore's frame or propositional ICM.   
 
 
 
 11.5.3. Contrasting and comparing metaphor and metonymy 
  Cognitive linguists have long been trying to pinpoint the crucial differences between 
metaphor and metonymy, but also to see how and why they are so closely related. This task is 
a complex one and here is only a brief overview of similarities and differences between the 
two.   
To start with the characteristics they share, Barcelona (2003a) argues that both 
metaphor and metonymy are conceptual processes and that they both have experiential basis. 
They are also conventional and systematic and include conceptual mappings.  
      As far as the differences are concerned, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 35-40) and Lakoff and 
Turner (1989: 103-104) name the following ones:  
1. In metaphor there are two conceptual domains involved, one being understood in terms of 
the other, while metonymy only involves one conceptual domain, i.e. the mapping occurs 
within a single domain and not across domains. 
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Figure 16. Metaphorical and metonymic mappings (Figure taken from Brdar et al. 2001: 39) 
 
2. In metaphor, the source domain is mapped onto the target domain, and thus it is mainly 
used for understanding, e.g. I have control over him (HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP). In 
contrast, metonymy is mainly used for reference, as we can refer to an entity in a schema by 
referring to another entity in the same schema, 
3. The relationship between the source and target domains in metaphor is of the 'IS A' kind; in 
metonymy there is a 'STANDS FOR' relationship, since one entity in a schema is taken as 
standing for another entity in the same schema or for the schema as a whole. 
 
 Beatrice Warren (2003) states that metaphors are hypothetical (LOVE IS A JOURNEY- 
We see love as if it were a journey), whereas metonymies are not. Metaphor is used to extend 
lexicon, whereas metonymy does not have to fulfill this function. Metonymy is limited to a 
phrase level, and metaphor is not. Metaphor allows multiple mapping from the source to the 
target domain; metonymy never allows more than one relation. Metaphor is based on 
similarity and metonymy on contiguity. The essence of metaphor is property transferral, and 
of metonymy highlighting. Metonymy, in her view, is a syntagmatic construction consisting of 
a modifier and a head. The head is implicit and it is the target, the source is that which is 
explicit and it is the modifier of the construction. What is meant by  
 
 The kettle is boiling. 
is that which is in the kettle is boiling, that is, water (which is the head of the construction). 
Thus, the source and the target are connected via relation that is “typically one of location in 
time or space, possession, causation or constituency giving rise to metonymic patterns.” 
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(2003: 122). In metaphors, the source and the target are connected via a property, usually 
more than one property, which is contained in the source and transferred onto the target.  
 
 Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco (2003) argue that some of the above mentioned 
differences need modification. They state that metonymies can be predicative, just like 
metaphors are, and that at the same time metaphors can have referential function, which was a 
typical characteristic of metonymy. Domain highlighting can appear in both metaphors and 
metonymies. 
METAPHOR : 
- Used referentially: The pig is waiting for his bill. (the pig is the customer). 
- Used non-referentially: I have control over him. (HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP). 
 
METONYMY: 
- Used referentially: Wall Street is in crisis. (the street stands for the institution). 
- Used non-referentially: He is a brain. (He is very intelligent).    
 
To them, “the only really crucial difference between metaphor and metonymy concerns the 
domain-internal or domain-external nature of the mapping.” (2003: 496). They base their 
distinction of source-in-target and target-in-source metonymies on this assumption.  
 
 Klaus-Uwe Panther (2006) proposes that the difference between metaphor and 
metonymy lies in the type of semiotic relation between their respective source and target. He 
claims that metaphor is an iconic relation and metonymy an indexical relation. He takes into 
account Jakobson's approach (2003) to metaphor and metonymy who distinguished between 
relations of similarity and relations of contiguity and they are manifested in the two 
dimensions of meaning and (syntactic) position, respectively. Paradigmatic axis of language 
are words that occur in similar position and words that occur in syntactic position represent 
syntagmatic axis of language. For Jakobson, metaphors are linked to paradigmatic, and 
metonymies to syntagmatic structuring.  
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Figure 17. Metaphor and metonymy along paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes (Dirven 2003: 
77) 
 
 The link between source meaning and target meaning in metonymies is indexical: 
source indexically evokes, or points to, the target. Metaphor is based on an iconic relation 
between source meaning and target meaning. The source meaning has some frame or domain 
structure that is iconically replicated in the target domain.  
 
 Barcelona (2003b) claims that in both metaphors and metonymies there is a mapping 
of a conceptual domain, the source, onto the target domain, the difference being that in 
metaphors these domains are not linked by a pragmatic function, whereas in metonymies they 
are. Pragmatic function is a kind of conceptual link in our memory that activates the target 
(CONDITION-RESULT, AGENT-INSTRUMENT) and that allows metonymic sources to be the 
sources.  
 Croft (2006) uses the term domain matrix as an essential part to differentiate the 
phenomena: a metonymic mapping occurs within a single domain matrix, not across domains. 
Metaphor is a mapping between two domains that are not part of the same matrix.   
 
 Geeraerts (2010) also claims that the notion of domain cannot be taken as a criterion 
for distinguishing metaphors from metonymies. In the example  
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 Proust is tough to read. 
Proust and his creative work do not seem to belong to the same domain. Proust as a person is 
a concrete domain, whereas his literary work belongs to an abstract domain. He calls this 
cross-domain metonymy. (2010: 216).  
 
 He also gives an example of non-metonymical intra-domain mapping: 
 
 Maggie Thatcher is the Ronald Reagan of the UK. 
 
where Thatcher and Reagan belong to the same domain.  
 
Some expressions can be explained both metonymically and metaphorically: 
 
 There are dirty fingers on the window. 
 
This is a metaphor if there is a similarity relationship between fingers and their prints on the 
window; it can also be a metonymy if we take fingers as the cause of the visual image. 
 
 Later developments in cognitive linguistics have shown that it is sometimes difficult to 
make an absolute distinction between these phenomena. Since they are both cognitive 
phenomena present in our everyday language, they interact with each other in many ways.  
 
 
 
11.5.4. Interaction between metaphors and metonymies  
 A very important description of metaphors was done by Dirven (1985) where he 
distinguishes three major metaphorical processes: metonymy, metaphor and synaesthesia and 
thus makes a connection between metaphor and metonymy. He describes these phenomena in 
relation to the extension of the lexicon, claiming that they are “the most productive and the 
most natural means” (1985: 107) used there. He defines metonymy as “the metaphorical 
process whereby one thing comes to stand in place of something else due to their various 
intrinsic relationships.” (1985: 96) and it can be used to expand the lexicon in the cases where 
the place stands for people living there (village for 'villagers'), the symbol stands for the 
person representing it (the Crown for 'the British monarch'), container for the contained (dish 
94 
for 'food prepared in it') and the name of a product or a place for the product (Hoover as a 
product). A subcategory of metonymy where the part stands for the whole or vice versa is 
termed synecdoche (hands for 'people working with their hands'). Here he mentions an 
expression 
 
 Give me a hand! 
 
as a transitional case between metaphor and metonymy. When we take hand to mean manual 
assistance, it has got a metonymic reading, if it means any kind of help, its reading is 
metaphorical.  
 He defines metaphor as follows: “a process of transference where the relationship 
between the two entities, qualities, processes or states is no longer a contiguous one as is the 
case with metonymy, but metaphor presupposes a non-contiguous relationship.” (1985: 98). 
Not only that in metaphor this relationship understands an 'associative leap', as he puts it, but 
also in metaphors the ground on which it operates is less transparent and self-evident.  
 The third metaphorical process he discusses is synaesthesia, “a process whereby one 
sensory stimulus may evoke a stimulus in a different sensory organ” (1985: 99), as in 'warm 
color'. Here one domain of a sensory experience is transferred into another.  
 Dirven emphasises the similarity between the three processes since “they are all 
associative processes which eliminate or cancel the first or literal interpretation, so that 
another, viz. figurative interpretation must be looked for.” (1985: 100).  
 
 One of the most influential works on the interaction is the one by Goossens (1990). He 
calls this interaction metaphtonymy and there are four ways of its realization:    
a) Metaphor from metonymy- here a metaphor is grounded in a metonymic relationship. The 
expression close-lipped can mean 'silent' which derives from metonymy. It can also mean 
'speaking but giving very little away', which is metaphoric: we understand the absence of 
meaningful information in terms of silence.  
b) Metonymy within metaphor- the expression to catch one's ear can be described as  
ATTENTION IS A MOVING PHYSICAL ENTITY metaphor, with a metonymy within it: ear stands 
for 'attention'. 
c) Demetonymization inside a metaphor- in the expression to pay lip service, 'lip service' 
which stands for 'speaking' lost its metonymic property. 
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d) Metaphor within metonymy- to be on one’s hind legs where metaphor is used in order to 
add expressiveness to a metonymy. 
 Similar view was discussed by Warren (1992) in the analysis of noun + noun 
compounds: hammerhead ('a stubborn person') is an example of metaphor within metonymy, 
since the whole compound is PART FOR WHOLE metonymy (head stands for the person), 
within which hammer metaphorically refers to something hard.  
 
 Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza and Alicia Galera-Masegosa claim that all these 
cases are, in fact, “metonymic developments of a situational metaphoric source.” (2011: 10). 
They agree with Ruiz de Mendoza (1997) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2003) proposing 
that metaphor and metonymy interact through following patterns:  
 
(i) metonymic expansion of a metaphoric source, 
 
(ii) metonymic reduction of a metaphoric source, 
 
(iii) metonymic expansion of a metaphoric target and  
 
(iv) metonymic reduction of a metaphoric target. 
 
 In (i) To beat one's breast, the action of breast beating action in the metaphoric source 
is metonymically expanded onto a situation in which someone does the same in order to show 
regret about his actions. The target domain of this metonymy is metaphorically mapped onto a 
situation in which the speaker regretfully shows his sorrow in order to avoid punishment or 
any other undesired consequences of his behaviour. 
 
 In (ii) to be the life and soul of the party means to be the most cheerful person of the 
party. The source domain is the person, the target domain is the party, and in the source 
domain there is metonymic reduction because of the highlighting the most relevant aspects of 
the target.  
 In (iii) the metaphoric source has the function of enhancing the meaning impact of a 
selected aspect of the target:  
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 The singer was given a big hand after her performance.  
To give a big hand is a metaphor in which target domain contains metoynymy: big hand 
stands for 'a loud applause', and further a loud applause stands for 'enjoyment' or 
'appreciation'. 
 
In (iv)  He finally won her heart we conceptualize love in terms of winning. In the target 
domain 'love' someone's heart is reduced to mean someone's love.  
 
 Riemer (2003) uses the terms post-metonymy and post-metaphor to show the 
interaction between the two. Post-metonymy appears in situations where “description of the 
semantic relation between source and target can no longer be convincingly presented in 
metonymic terms, but whose origin and principle of explanation nevertheless remain 
metonymic in character” (2003: 397), an example of which is to kick someone out of the flat. 
We are not dealing here with the real act of kicking, which could also bring about similar 
effect, but an action that causes someone to leave. Riemer uses the term post- or dead 
metonymy since the target may become completely detached from its source. The same is true 
for post-metaphors: “originally metaphorical applications of a core meaning which have 
subsequently lost their metaphoricity and now refer to the original target of the metaphor, 
which is no longer seen as being metaphorically conceptualised.” (2003: 398), as in to knock 
someone about their haircut meaning to tease someone about it. These two phenomena often 
interact and it is difficult to fully commit to either one description. Thus the verb knock can be 
interpreted in both ways: 
 
 Knocking up and down all over the country. 
 He had knocked about all over the Pacific. 
 
Metonymically, knocking could mean moving and wandering if we assume that knocking 
stands for the sound that human or animal feet or vehicle do against the ground while 
travelling, or metaphorically, if we visualize the area in which one does the 'knocking' as a 
container. 
 
 Interaction between metaphor and metonymy in composite expressions was studied by 
Geeraerts (2003), who classifies the interaction in three categories:  
 
97 
1. consecutive interaction between the two,  
2.  parallel presence of metaphor and metonymy and  
3. interchangeability of metaphor and metonymy.  
 
 Metaphor and metonymy can act consecutively in the examples such as schapenkop 
('sheep’s head', meaning ‘dumb person’): sheep's head metaphorically stands for human head 
like that of a sheep (stupid head), and then the head metonymically stands for the whole 
(dumb) person. Metaphor and metonymy can act parallely when “there is a difference in type 
among the different motivational links that occur in the semantics of a composite expression.” 
(2003: 457). And finally, the examples such as badmuts ('swimming cap', meaning ‘bald 
person’) show the interchangeability of metaphor and metonymy: swimming cap as a 
compound can metonymically stand for the person who looks as if he was wearing a 
swimming cap, or it can be interpreted in a way that swimming cap is metaphorized as a head 
that looks as if it is covered by a swimming cap, a bald head, which then metonymically 
stands for the bald-headed person.  
 
 Many linguists such as Kövecses, Lakoff and Barcelona (as reported in Barcelona 
2000) investigated metonymy-based metaphors and claim that most metaphors for emotions 
have metonymic basis. Taylor (1995) was the first to investigate these types of metaphors. 
They are primary metaphors with experiential correlations as a basis and he claims that this 
correlation is metonymic in nature: In the metaphor MORE IS UP height correlates with 
quantity, that is increasing of heights stands for increasing of quantity. Radden calls them 
'metonymy-based metaphors' (2003: 412). Expressions like high prices and rising prices are 
metaphoric expressions (MORE IS UP) based on metonymic relationship. Barcelona (2000, 
2011a, 2015) calls this 'generalization' or 'detextualization of metonymy'. In the metaphor 
DEVIANT COLOURS ARE DEVIANT SOUNDS (a loud colour) salient EFFECT of deviant sounds 
and colours is metonymically mapped onto its CAUSE. This metonymic motivation for 
metaphor is called correlation-abstraction. He even goes to say that “The tendency for 
metaphor to be conceptually motivated by metonymy seems to be the rule, rather than the 
exception.” (2010: 277). 
 
 There are four metonymic sources of metaphors (Radden 2003, 2005):  
a) the common experiential basis of two domains, with two types of metonymic relationship, 
namely correlation and complementarity. The notion of correlation means that any change in 
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one variable is followed by a change in another variable, as in MORE IS UP, HAPPY IS UP, 
IMPORTANT IS BIG, ACTIVE IS ALIVE or SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS metaphors: 
 
 He is a big man.  
 
This example can be applied in situations where somebody, who is very important, physically 
takes up a lot of space (for example the biggest office).  
 
The complementarity relationship is a metonymy-producing relationship where 
complementary, or opposing, parts form a unity. This is evident in THE MIND IS A BODY 
metaphor, “based on our common complementary experience of BODY and MIND.”  (Radden 
2003:  417): 
 
 How are you going to handle this situation? 
 
b) conversational implicature, when metaphors emerge from the pragmatics of a situation. 
There are three types of metonymic relationship that create metaphors and these are  
-implicated result and causation, as in SEE FOR KNOW metonymy (I see the solution) 
producing KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor,  
-implicated possession, as can be seen in the POSSESSION IS HOLDING metaphor (to hold 
power) and 
-implicated purpose and activity, where PLACE FOR (PLACE AND) ACTIVITY and DESTINATION 
FOR (DESTINATION AND) PURPOSE metonymies produce PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS 
metaphor (We've reached an agreement).  
 
c) taxonomic structure of categories, when categories may stand for one of its members and 
vice versa, also exploited in metaphors that contain category inclusion. In the example  
 
 Her death hurt him.,  
 
HARM IS PHYSICAL INJURY metaphor is based on a metonymic relationship between PHYSICAL 
INJURY and PSYCHIC HARM, since we usually experience them together. Other metaphors 
where an abstract category is understood in terms of a concrete member are PROPERTIES ARE 
PHYSICAL PROPERTIES (a big discovery), A PROBLEM IS A TANGLE (a knotty problem), 
COMMUNICATION IS LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION (People should have a say on the treaty), 
ACTION IS MOTION (What's your next move?) and CHANGE IS MOTION (She fell in love).  
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d) cultural models are widely accepted models of the world shared by language users. There 
are three ways how these cultural or folk models can be used to explain metonymy-based 
metaphors: 
- physical forces: Here metaphors FORCE IS A SUBSTANCE CONTAINED IN AFFECTING CAUSES 
and FORCE IS A SUBSTANCE DIRECTED AT AN AFFECTED PARTY are based on SUBSTANCE IS 
FORCE metonymy (His punches carry a lot of force), 
-communication and language: In the folk model of language and communication, the form of 
a word metonymically stands for its content and since they belong to different domains, their 
relationship can also be described metaphorically. 
-emotions and physiological reactions to them: Some metaphors of emotions have metonymic 
basis,  such as ANGER IS HEAT, LUST IS HEAT, AFFECTION IS WARMTH, LOVE IS MADNESS and 
LOVE IS FIRE. 
 Radden concludes that traditional distinction between metaphors and metonymies 
should be abandoned and replaced by the view that metaphors and metonymies are 
“prototypical categories along a metonymy-metaphor continuum.” (2003: 431). 
 
 Barnden (2010) also investigated the distinctions and overlaps between metaphor and 
metonymy. He questions many previously established elements of differentiation such as 
similarity/ contiguity and domain-internal/ domain-external nature of the mappings and 
concludes that metonymies can also be built on resemblance, just as contiguity can be found 
in metaphors. As the example of contiguity in metaphors, he uses the following referential 
metaphor: 
 
 The creampuff didn't even show up., 
 
where the creampuff metaphorically stands for the person whose profession is a boxer. This 
metaphor is based on the relation of similarity between boxers and creampuffs, but to him this 
similarity is actually a type of contiguity, which appears “whenever a metaphorical link is 
used for accessing something in the target via something in the source.” (2010: 10). 
 Similarity can be found in two types of metonymies, namely in representational 
metonymy and partitive metonymy. He uses the term 'representational' metonymy in the sense 
of Warren's (2006) referential metonymy and the term includes REPRESENTATEE FOR 
REPRESENTATION (There is a tanker in the left hand side of the picture.) and REPRESENTATION 
FOR REPRESENTATEE (In 'Goldfinger' Sean Connery saves the world from a nuclear disaster.) 
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metonymies. In these metonymic patterns there need not be any visual resemblance between 
representation and representatee, but rather some sort of “intrinsic perceptual similarity” 
(2010: 12). Partitive metonymies include patterns WHOLE FOR PART and PART FOR WHOLE. 
For example, hand is often used do denote a sailor due to the functional similarity between 
the two.  
 Source-target link can sometimes be both metaphoric and metonymic. The conclusion 
of his investigations is that there are no clear cut differences between metaphors and 
metonymies.  
 
 This all goes to show that there are different approaches within cognitive linguistics 
and that scholars define and classify metaphors and metonymies differently. However, all of 
them do agree that  
 
 In Cognitive Linguistics, metaphor and metonymy are not considered as tropes of 
figurative language, but as cognitive mechanisms used for drawing inferences, and to reason 
about and understand the world. These cognitive operations are accomplished by means of 
conceptual mappings of knowledge from a source domain into a target domain and are crucial 
for concept formation and concept understanding. (Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez 2003: 24).  
 
 Metaphor and metonymy are like natural categories: they do not have clear-cut 
boundaries, but fuzzy ones, and form a continuum. It has been shown that metaphors may 
emerge from metonymies or be based on them.  
 
 
 
11.5.5. Metaphor and metonymy in grammar 
 Recent developments in cognitive linguistics have shown that grammatical patterns are 
motivated by conceptual and pragmatic factors. Metaphor and metonymy are no longer seen 
as figures of speech, but figures of thought that affect grammar. Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez 
(2001: 329) call the instances of metonymies that bring about grammatical rearrangement of 
clausal elements 'grammatical metonymies'. Grammatical metaphors and metonymies are 
defined by Panther and Thornburg (2009b: 16) as follows:  
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 Grammatical metonymies/metaphors are conceptual metonymies/metaphors that 
motivate distributional properties of function words, grammatical morphemes, and word 
classes (nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc.). To the extent that the boundaries between lexicon and 
grammar are fuzzy, the boundaries between lexical metaphor/metonymy and grammatical 
metaphor/metonymy will also be fuzzy. 
 
 Metaphor plays an important role in the grammaticalization process where lexical 
words acquire grammatical function. For example (Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer 1991; 
Evans 2013) the conceptual metaphor TIME IS OBJECT IN MOTION (ALONG THE PATH) accounts 
for the future meaning of the going to construction:  
 
 Lilly is going to town. -allative sense 
 It is going to rain.- future sense. 
 
There are also intermediate senses of intention/purpose: 
 
 Jane is going to work in our office.  
 
so the shift went from motions sense to intention and then finally to prediction. 
 
  Metaphors also shape the English tense system, for example using the present simple 
tense to refer to the past (PAST IS PRESENT). Brdar (2007) addresses two metaphoric processes 
here:  
1. TIME IS SPACE (PROXIMITY/DISTANCE IN TIME IS PROXIMITY/DISTANCE IN SPACE) 
2. SOCIAL AND MENTAL WORD IS PHYSICAL WORLD ( PROXIMITY/DISTANCE IN SOCIAL AND 
MENTAL WORLD IS  PROXIMITY/DISTANCE IN SPACE) 
These two processes correlate creating  PROXIMITY/DISTANCE IN THE SOCIOPHYSICAL AND 
MENTAL WORLD IS  PROXIMITY/DISTANCE IN TENSE (VIA TIME).  
 
 Klaus-Uwe Panther and Linda L. Thornburg (2009b: 17) explain this on the example 
 
 And then he grabs my book. 
Here the source is the present tense with the targeted past tense. They claim that grammatical 
metaphors usually have their grounding in the source, that is, the source influences the 
grammatical structure of the target. 
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 Annalisa Baicchi (2011: 149-169) investigates the behaviour of non-motion verbs in 
the caused- motion constructions as in  
 
 The dogs barked them out of town.  
 
and many other examples containing cognition verbs (deceived us into thinking), verbs of 
visual and tactile perception (gazed me out of the club; knocked him into a coma), speech 
verbs (shouted me out of the shop) and verbs of sound emission (laughed me out of the 
classroom). Her conclusion is that this is made possible by the activation of some high-level 
metaphors such as A COGNITIVE ACT IS AN EFFECTUAL ACTION/ ACCOMPLISHMENT or 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION IS EFFECTUAL ACTION/ ACCOMPLISHMENT.  
 
 Metonymy, although long neglected, has been proven to have even greater impact on 
grammatical patterns than metaphor. Langacker (1999: 67) states that though “usually 
regarded as a semantic phenomenon, metonymy turns out to be central and essential to 
grammar”, and that grammar is “a rich source for the investigation of metonymy. At the same 
time, a recognition of its prevalence and centrality is critical not just for describing grammar 
but for a realistic assessment of its basic nature.” 
 Whereas in metaphors it is the source that is at play in structuring the system, in 
grammatical metonymy the targeted meaning is the one that has the crucial role.  
  We will now give a brief overview of the most cited examples and phenomena that 
include the metonymic influence on grammar. We will start with Dirven (1999) who claims 
that noun-verb conversion in English has metoynymic basis and can be explained by three 
different types of schema and belonging metonymies.  
1. the action schema that includes OBJECT (INSTRUMENT OR MANNER) FOR ACTION 
metonymy: 
 I spooned a gob of whipped cream over my gooseberry pie. (BNC) 
 
2. the location schema that involves PLACE FOR ACTION metonymy:  
 It is often bottled and sold as mineral water. (BNC) 
 
3. the essive schema involves STATUS FOR ACTION metonymy: 
 Dhani put him in a Buddhist monastery and nursed him back to health. (BNC) 
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 Recategorization can also be found with adjectives and verbs, as well: adjectives can 
be recategorized into nouns via A DEFINING PROPERTY FOR AN ENTITY metonymy (black, 
nobles), and so do verbs (a big cut, a bad scratch) via ACTION FOR RESULT metonymy.  (Ruiz 
de Mendoza and Pérez 2001). 
 
 Klaus-Uwe Panther and Linda Thornburg (1999) explore POTENTIALITY FOR 
ACTUALITY metonymies. They can appear as: 
 ABILITY TO PERCEIVE FOR ACTUAL PERCEPTION: 
 
 I can taste the vanilla.  
 
This pattern is found with verbs of perception such as seeing, hearing and tasting.  
 
 ABILITY TO PROCESS FOR ACTUAL MENTAL PROCESS: 
 
 I can remember when we got our first TV. 
 
This metonymy is fully exploited in the domain of mental processes and states.  
 
 POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy is also found with hedged performatives 
with can, must, would like (I must ask you to leave) and indirect speech acts (Can you pass the 
salt?). Other variants of this metonymy are  
 ABILITY TO ACT FOR ACTION: 
 
 John was able to finish his paper before deadline. 
 
 DISPOSITION FOR OCCASIONAL BEHAVIOR: 
  
 Dogs can be dangerous. 
 Metonymy also places constraints on many grammatical phenomena, for example 
when inherently mass, non-count nouns are recategorized as count nouns due to MATERIAL 
FOR OBJECT MADE OF THE MATERIAL metonymy:   
 Too much polishing can wear down the finish on some silvers.  
 
This metonymy can be reversed and appear as OBJECT FOR MATERIAL CONSTITUTING THE 
OBJECT: 
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 We did not always have turkey for dinner.  
 
This metonymy produces a non-count noun from a count one. The similar process can be 
found with names of trees and some plants where some lexical items denote a species or an 
instance of it, but also metonymically refer to type of material (for trees), to the product of a 
fruit tree used as food, to the root of a vegetable used as food or spice etc. (Brdar 2007: 83): 
 
 Lavender, known for its fragrance, is a perennial that may reach 1-3 feet tall with 
narrow, gray-green foliage.  
 
 An impact of metonymy on grammatical structure is seen by the use of proper names 
as common nouns (paragons) denoting whole class of individuals (Panther and Thornburg  
2007): 
 
 A real Shakespeare would never use those trite images. 
 The Shakespeares of the twentieth century. 
 
 The use of names as paragons is motivated by a chain of two metonymies: the first 
assigns a stereotypical property to a famous individual (CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY FOR 
INDIVIDUAL) creating a class of distinct individuals that have that same property, and the 
second activates that class from its ideal member (MEMBER/SUBCATEGORY FOR CATEGORY) 
(Barcelona (2004a: 38, 2004b: 365). Due to these metonymies proper nouns can be used with 
articles or be pluralized.  
 
 When names of places are used to mean 'aspect/ edition/ issue' of the given instance, 
they lend themselves to recategorization as common nouns and can have articles in front of 
them: 
 
 The first was a satirist and journalist, whose hard-driving works pointed out 
anachronisms and absurdities of the Spain of his day. (Brdar 2007: 88). 
 Panther and Thornburg (2000) discuss the usage of stative verbs in imperative 
constructions such as  
 
 Be quiet, John! 
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and claim that this is made possible by the activation of the RESULT FOR  ACTION metonymy. 
It is not possible to have 
 
 Be tall, John! 
 
since tall denotes a state, and quiet a result.  
 
 Metonymy can also influence transitivity. In the example  
 
 John walked the dog. 
 
the intransitive verb walk is used as transitive, that is predicate got an extra argument which is 
called valency extension (Dik 1997). Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez (2001: 334) argue that 
metonymy that is active here is ACTIVITY FOR CAUSED EVENT. Walk is elaborated into caused 
to walk, the activity of walking stands for the whole event, and that includes the instigator of 
the activity (John).  
 
 It is also possible to find metonymy in valency reduction, such as 
 
 The door opened. 
Here we have target-in-source metonymy ACTION FOR PROCESS. We must assume that 
someone or something have opened the door. In both cases we have recategorisation of a 
predicate and consequences for the syntactic organization of the clause. 
 
 Metonymy ACTION FOR (ASSESSED) RESULT is also at work in so-called middle 
constructions, such as 
 
 This bread cuts easily.  
 
The adverb is obligatory here since the focus is not on the action, but on the result. (Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Díez  Velasco 2001). 
 
 Metonymy is also responsible for the choice of anaphoric pronouns (Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Díez Velasco 2003, 2004;  Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez 2001): 
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 The ham sandwich is waiting for his check and he is getting upset. 
 
The usage of his and he instead of its and it is because of the metonymic reading ORDER FOR 
CUSTOMER of the sentence. Here the target meaning is conceptually prominent and Domain 
Availability Principle (Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez 2001) requires the anaphoric pronoun to 
be coreferential with the matrix domain. The term 'matrix domain' was first used by Ruiz de 
Mendoza to refer to the most encompassing of the two domains in a metonymic mapping.  
 
 Metonymy is also involved in word-formation processes such as clipping, 
abbreviations and blending. MODIFIED FORM FOR THE ORIGINAL FORM enables us to use short 
or blended forms instead of longer or original forms (e.g. NATO for North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization or math for mathematics). Radden (2005) claims that metonymy is evident in 
compounding. Compounds are subcategories of the category described by the head (a 
wheelchair is a kind of a chair with wheels). This modifier (wheels) is a salient property that 
distinguishes a wheelchair from other types of chairs, thus metonymy PART FOR WHOLE is 
implied, or to be more specific, A SALIENT PROPERTY FOR A BUNDLE OF PROPERTIES since 
categories and subcategories own a bundle of properties.  
 
 Many examples on how metaphor, metonymy or both can be found in compounding is 
given in Benczes (2006). The author gives numerous examples that show how metaphors 
operate on either one constituent, modifier (heartland, the central part of a country or area of 
land) or profile determinant (belly button, navel) or both constituents (chicken hawk, a person 
who now advocates war but who once took special measures to avoid military service), as 
well as on the relationship between them (submarine sandwich). In the example submarine 
sandwich (a long bread roll split open and filled with meat, cheese, etc.) the shape of the 
submarine is metaphorically mapped onto the shape of a sandwich (here the first constituent is 
the source, and the second one is the target). When it comes to metonymies, they can also act 
on the modifier (bear jam, a traffic jam in a park caused by motorists stopping to watch one or 
more bears), on the profile determinant (handwriting, the style of someone’s writing), or on 
both elements (phone neck, neck and shoulder pain caused by holding a phone for long 
periods). There are cases where the whole compound is metonymical, that is, the whole 
structure is a referent point for the targeted meaning within the same ICM. The example she 
mentions, among others, is glue sniffing (the habit of breathing in gases from glues or similar 
substances in order to produce an artificial state of excitement), where the whole compound 
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stands for one stage of the activity via SUBEVENT FOR MAIN EVENT metonymy. Metonymic 
relationships WHOLE–PART, THE PART–WHOLE AND THE PART–PART can be found between 
compound constituents in many cases in the English language, such as bookcover, student 
group and lamppost.  
 
 We have already discussed the interaction between metaphors and metonymies and 
Benczes also gives evidence for this phenomena. There are four ways in which they interact: 
1. metonymical modifier and metaphorical profile determinant, as in gutter bunny (person 
who commutes to work on a bicycle); 
2. metaphor based modifier and metonymical profile determinant, as in acidhead (an LSD 
user); 
3. metaphorical relationship between modifier and profile determinant and the modifier is 
metonymical, as in alpha geek (the person with the most technological prowess in an office or 
a department) and  
4. metaphor based semantic relationship between constituents of the compound and the 
profile determinant is metonymical, as in snakehead (a smuggler, particularly one from China, 
who specializes in getting people into another country without going through normal 
immigration channels). 
 All of these are only a few examples from the vast studies of metaphor and metonymy 
in grammar that show that they are used to explain various grammatical phenomena. 
Metaphor and metonymy do motivate grammatical system, at least the English grammatical 
system. We have shown this on different examples of recategorization: using stative verbs in 
imperative constructions (Be quiet!), turning of nouns into verbs (bottle) or adjectives into 
nouns (nobles), conversion of proper nouns into common nouns (John has five Picassos) and 
conversion of mass nouns into count nouns (silvers) and vice versa (to have Turkey for 
dinner), just to sum up what has already been stated.  
 Valency reduction and expansion is also metonymically motivated, and so is 
transitivity and anaphoric choice. Metaphors and metonymy also play role in English 
morphology, what is shown mainly in compounding and affixation. Metaphors and 
metonymies are employed in indirect speech acts and implicature. This all shows that 
metaphors and metonymies are really much more than figures of speech used in reasoning and 
understanding, they are much more than lexical phenomena, but rather basic cognitive tools 
for expanding lexicon and motivate grammar.  
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11.5.6. Metaphor and metonymy- recent developments 
 Theory of metaphor and metonymy has, since Lakoff, largely been focused on 
cognition. Newer developments suggest that “metaphor is not just a matter of language and 
thought, but also of communication; and metaphor cannot just be approached from a linguistic 
(or more generally, semiotic) as well as a cognitive (or more adequately, psychological) 
perspective, but it also demands a social approach.” (Steen 2013: 28). 
 He proposes a three-dimensional model of metaphor which adds the dimension of 
communication to the already existing language and thought dimensions. He also addresses 
the question of metaphor deliberateness, which is about the presence or absence of a change 
of addressee's perspective. Non-deliberate metaphor stays on the topic and does not require 
the addressee to “step outside the dominant target domain of the discourse and look at it from 
an alien source domain.” (Steen 2013: 38), which deliberate metaphors do. 
 Steen (2008) claims that those metaphors that are used deliberately are processed by 
comparison of two domains. Non-deliberate metaphors involve categorization. Processing by 
categorization was introduced by the psycholinguists Glucksberg and Keysar (1993), who 
claim that “metaphors are class-inclusion statements” (1993: 423). The topic (my job) of the 
metaphor in the sentence 
 My job is a jail.,  
 
belongs to a certain category (something unpleasant, hard to escape from etc). The vehicle, 
jail, is a protoypical example of that category. (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990, 1993). 
 
 Whether people process metaphors by comparison or categorization is one of the main 
issues for The Career of Metaphor Theory, developed by Gentner and Bowdle (2001, 2005). 
They claim that it depends on the degree of conventionality: conventional metaphors may be 
processed by categorization or comparison, whereas novel metaphors are processed by 
comparison alone (Gentner and Bowdle 2001).  
   Recent researches into metaphor and metonymy do not only concentrate on their roles in 
language and thought, but also in artificial intelligence, psychotherapy and non-verbal 
communication (art, gestures).  All this provides a rich soil for the future exploration of these 
cognitive phenomena.   
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11.6. Conceptual integration theory or blending theory 
 This theory was developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner. They introduce the 
term integration network which consists of inputs that are linked by mapping, but unlike in 
the Conceptual Metaphor theory where the mapping takes place between domains, here it 
appears between mental spaces. Domains are relatively stable knowledge structures, whereas 
mental spaces represent temporary constructions created context dependently. Two or more 
input spaces are connected by generic space. This generic space contains all the features that 
input spaces have in common. Input spaces are then projected to the blend and this space 
contains a new or emergent structure. It is new because it is not contained in any of the input 
spaces. This theory can explain examples like  
 
 This surgeon is a butcher. 
 
which could not be adequately described by the Conceptual Metaphor theory. In this example 
the input space BUTCHER describes someone who is skilled at what they do, but it certainly 
does not involve operations on humans. This is a surgeon's task, which is the second input. So 
the two inputs defer in many respect: a surgeon operates on humans, while a butcher operates 
on dead animals; a surgeon usually tries to heal a human body by repairing what is damaged, 
a butcher on the other hand brings animal's body into pieces and so on. These differences are 
brought together in the generic space and a new, emergent meaning appears in the blend: a 
surgeon here is described as incompetent and not skillful enough. So this feature of 
incompetence is what is created by the blend.  
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Figure 18. A basic integration network (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 313) 
 
In this figure the circles represent mental spaces. The bold lines between input spaces 
represent counterpart connections and they can be of many kinds: connections between 
frames and roles in frames; connections of identity or transformation or representation; 
metaphoric connections, etc. In this example an animal, cleaver, a goal (of severing flesh) of 
input space 1 correspond to a human, a scalpel and a goal (of healing) in input space 2. What 
is shared by these two inputs in projected onto a generic space, which in turn, maps onto input 
spaces. This space is highly schematic. A structure form two input spaces is projected onto a 
blend. Blended and generic spaces are related, but blends contain more specific structure than 
the generic space. Not all structures from the inputs are projected to the blend, only the 
matched information, which is called selective projection. Blend is constructed through three 
operations: composition, completion, and elaboration. Composition brings together elements 
form input spaces and provides relations that do not exist in the separate inputs. Counterpart 
elements can appear as separate elements or as fused elements. Completion involves schema 
induction, that is, a great deal of our background knowledge or background frames is 
recruited unconsciously to complete the blend. Without these background frames we would 
not be able to infer the emergent meaning. Elaboration is the final process which creates the 
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unique blend structure, because structures in the blend are not copied from the inputs. The 
square inside the blend in the above represents emergent structure. 
 Any space in the integration network can be modified by reverse mapping from the 
blend. This is called backward projection since the structure that emerges in the blend is 
projected back to the input spaces. Let us look at the example from Evans and Green (2006: 
46): 
 
 In France, Bill Clinton wouldn’t have been harmed by his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. 
 
which means  
 
 Clinton is not politically harmed by his relationship with Lewinsky if he were a French 
 president. 
 
 In one input space there is Clinton, Lewinsky and their relationship and this space is 
structured by the frame American politics and all the implication connected to it: 
responsibility, moral and the fact that infidelity can harm political status. In the other input 
space there is a French president, but also a mistress since it is known in the French public life 
that presidents often enjoy companies of mistresses. Generic space contains generic roles 
COUNTRY, HEAD OF STATE, SEXUAL PARTNER and CITIZENS. The blended space contains BILL 
CLINTON and MONICA LEWINSKY, as well as the roles FRENCH PRESIDENT and MISTRESS OF 
FRENCH PRESIDENT. The frame that structures the blend is FRENCH POLITICS rather than 
AMERICAN POLITICS which produces the meaning that Clinton is not politically harmed by his 
marital infidelity. In this case backward projection produces disanalogy between the US and 
France, that is there is a great contrast between the French and American moral attitudes. 
 An interesting work on how blending theory can be applied in word formation 
research was done by Benczes (2006, 2010) who studied creative compounding in English. 
Since compounding is not our main concern here, it is worth mentioning since it sheds some 
light on how cognitive approaches of metaphor, metonymy and blending can be used to 
describe different language phenomena, one of them being word formation. We will give the 
example Hogwarts headache ('migraine headache caused by the physical stress of reading the 
870-page Harry Potter book, The Order of the Phoenix', 2010: 223). Here the first part of it is 
a PART-FOR-WHOLE metonymy (the name of the school stands for the whole novel). The 
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author also uses blending to explain the compound. Hogwarts is the name of the school, and 
school with its requirements can often cause too much stress with children resulting in 
headache. The same is true for reading. These are two input spaces brought together in the 
generic space by cause-effect relationship, producing compound  Hogwarts headache in the 
blend.  
 
Figure 19. The blend analysis of Hogwarts headache (Benczes 2010: 228) 
 
 In their 2002 book The Way We think Fauconnier and Turner (2002) argue that 
blending is a fundamental cognitive operation, pervasive not only in language, but in human 
cognition in general.  
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12. SUFFIXES -HOOD AND -NESS 
 Haselow (2011) studied English suffixes and how they changed historically. He sees 
suffixes as linguistic signs with abstract, categorical meanings. He adopts Langacker's 
approach in describing the meaning of derivatives as 'meaning potentials' they are equipped 
with (2011: 51), since many derivatives have more than one sense. The meanings change 
according to the context they appear in. The semantic context of suffixes is abstract and 
categorically construed. Categories derive from the interaction between the speakers and their 
environment and this interaction produces cognitive activities reflected in language use. 
Different categories form the schema of a particular situation, where a schema is an abstract 
cognitive structure of knowledge and experience. Haselow distinguishes between five 
conceptual categories that suffixes can indicate and these are: Person, Object, Location, 
Action and Abstract. Suffixes -hood and -ness belong mainly to this last category which is 
defined in the following manner (2011: 68): 
 
 Lexical items of the category Abstract denote entities in the extra-linguistic 
environment which are characterized by the absence of a physical body and therefore lack 
perceptibility. The entities are usually mental constructs, which become materialized either 
through particular actions which they are related to, or through objects or persons for which a 
particular abstract quality is characteristic. 
  
 They can denote mental or physical states, non-material result of an action, the 
temporally extended consequence of a particular type of action/behaviour, an extended period 
in time or a a group of individuals who have certain properties in common such as rank, 
office, occupation, or behavioural practices in general. The specific meanings of the suffixes 
of this study will be given below.  
 
 Suffix -hood is of Germanic origin and can attach to both native and non-native bases. 
In OE hād was an independent noun, a free morpheme, denoting degree, rank, order, 
character, nature, kind and state, but just as similar to the suffix -dom, it underwent change 
from a free to a bound morpheme during the Middle English period. Carola Trips (2009) 
studied diachronic morphology of English suffixes -ship, -dom and -hood and claims that 
most formations ending in -hood have the meaning 'the status of' or ‘general natural 
conditions of human life’. Some derivations denote 'civil states with legal right and duties’, 
exemplified in widowhood or wifehood, some denote time or period (boyhood, girlhood); 
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examples like ladyhood and brotherhood denote collectivity and the nominal base in the 
examples of cathood or duckhood denotes the nature of animals. (2009: 41). Before giving 
more detailed description of the semantics of this suffix, let us look at the diachronic 
development of the suffix. 
 Trips mentions Wiesner's study (1968) who gives the meaning 'clerical order' found in 
the church texts. This meaning is a translation of the Latin ordo and correlates with the Old 
Norse where heidr denotes a ‘person of high rank’, and more explicitly ‘rank of a priest’. It is 
also noticed that denominal verb hādian with the meaning ‘ordain, consecrate’ often follows 
the noun denoting the person ortained. It has been suggested that there is a strong connection 
between the constructions containing the verb hādian on the one hand and constructions 
containing nominal head hād 9on the other.   
 There are other formations with hād, such as hādung in the meaning of 'ordination' and 
with an eventive reading (as contrasted to the result meaning of hād). Trips also gives 
examples where hād is followed by some elements (hādnotu, ‘office of a priest' or 
hādungdæg ‘ordination day’). This all implied that the salient meaning of hād in Old English 
must have been the one of ecclesiastical office. Other meanings in either compounds or 
syntactic phrases of the type noun + hād are sex, person and condition. There were also 
phrases in Old English where an adjective precedes hād and shows agreement in case, number 
and gender (hālgum hāde, 'holy office'). 
 A very interesting example that Trips gives is clænan hāde ('pure office') where 
clænan seems to be a qualitive adjective (the property of being pure), but is actually a 
relational one, which means that clænan hāde is metonymically extended to mean the office 
for pure persons (it is not the office itself that is pure but the people chosen to be in it). The 
collective usage of the suffix -hood is found in the Middle English examples such as 
brotherhood- ‘a fraternal relationship between members of a fraternal organisation’. Due to 
the metonymical shift this also denotes the fraternal organisation itself.  
 In the Early Modern English period -hood is a suffix with salient meanings of ‘office 
of N’ and ‘state of N’, “as well as metonymic shifts like ‘time’ (childhood) and ‘surrounding 
area’ (neighbourhood) that resulted from these old meanings.” (Trips 2009: 77).  
 Today this suffix attaches to [+common, –abstract, +animate] nouns which is 
exemplified in neighborhood, priesthood, *democracy-hood, *correction-hood, *George-
hood (Scalise and Guevara 2005: 153, Lieber 2005: 410). There are also word-formations 
                                                 
9 Messing (1917) is the one cited by Trips who first implied that syntactic constructions with certain verbs, e.g 
German schaffen and a noun are a precondition for the compounds containing noun + certain suffix.  
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with the same nominal base, but ending in suffixes -dom and -ship and expressing similar 
abstract concept, the one of 'state of N': 
 
   The native suffix -dom is semantically closely related to -hood and -ship, which 
express similar concepts. -dom attaches to nouns to form nominals which can be paraphrased 
as “state of being X”, as in apedom [. . . ], or which refer to collective entities, such as 
professordom [. . . ], or denote domains, realms or territories as in kingdom [. . . ].(Plag 2003: 
88).  
 
 Lieber mentions Aronoff and Cho's (2001) distinction between -ship and -hood nouns, 
where they state that -ship attaches to stage-level nouns only (which denote temporary 
characteristics of the referents) as in friendship, whereas -hood can attach to both stage-level 
and individual-level nouns (these are the nouns that denote characteristics without time taken 
into consideration).  For example, sisterhood is a stable property that holds all the time. There 
are bases that can have both suffixes (Hamawand, 2008: 7), for example father, with 
significant differences in meaning: fathership means ‘the state or condition of being the oldest 
member of a community’, a property that is not permanent in nature; fatherhood means ‘the 
state or condition of being a father’, a property that is permanent in nature. Trips (2009: 169) 
also adds that stage-level property is a state assigned to someone by society (priest), whereas 
individual-level is not, it is something a person own regardless of the external factors and 
influences of the society.  
 As already noted, nominal basis mostly denote animate beings, usually persons that 
could (bishop), but need not to refer to an office (parent). They can also denote transient 
stages like priest or enduring properties like brother. Sortal nouns that refer to concrete 
entitites (thing) as basis do not appear very often. In general, -hood builds formations that 
denote 'the state of N'. Meanings of 'time' and 'area' are metonymic.  
 
 Apart from nouns, adjectives and whole phrases can also serve as basis (falsehood, 
wife-and-motherhood, blood-brotherhood).  
 Ingo Plag (2003: 113) also describes the suffix and claims that it expresses concepts 
such as 'state' (the examples being adulthood, childhood, farmerhood) and 'collectivity' 
(beggarhood, Christianhood, companionhood.). He says that the meaning of -hood in 
neighborhood is metaphorically extended to mean 'area'.  
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 Zaki Hamawand claims that each suffix should be understood relative to the category 
to which it belongs: not all senses of a category have equal status, some or more 
representative or prototypical, some are less. For the suffix -hood he gives (2008: 87) the 
following meanings: 
a) the condition of being what is referred to by the nominal root 
b) a union of people sharing the thing referred to by the nominal root 
c) the period of time referred to by the nominal root 
d) an instance of the quality referred to by the adjectival root. 
  
  In Webster's New World College Dictionary we find that the suffix -hood is derived 
form of the Old English 'had' with the meaning order, condition, quality, rank. Following 
meanings are given:  
a) state, quality, condition: childhood 
b) the whole group of (a specified class, profession, etc): priesthood. 
Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary gives the same definitions.  
 
     Longman's Grammar of Spoken and Written English gives only 'state of being N/A' 
definition (childhood, falsehood, widowhood). 
 
 Taken all the above sources into account, we can sum up the meanings of the suffix -
hood as follows: 
1. the state or condition of being N (fatherhood) 
2. a group of people sharing the thing referred to by N (priesthood) 
3. the period of time referred to by N (childhood) 
4. an instance of the quality of A (falsehood) 
5. the area of the thing referred to by N (neighborhood). 
Hamawand illustrates it like this:  
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Figure 20. The semantic network of the noun-forming suffix -hood (Hamawand 2008: 88) 
 
Prototypical senses are represented by the solid arrows, whereas the extended ones are 
represented by the dashed arrows.  
  
 According to Haselow, the suffix -ness was the most frequently used suffix in Old 
English and the early Middle English. It used to belong to the Action category in Old English, 
since this category includes all lexical items with an eventive or a situational meaning. Then it 
had the meaning of one single instance of V-ing. This usage changed in the ME when -ness 
continued to be used to create abstract nouns. It had the following meanings: the quality of a 
state, the abstract result of an action or process and a permanent state that characterized a 
particular place. 
 It is still one of the most productive English suffixes and can be attached to practically 
any adjective. Its origin is Germanic. It can be attached to adjectives (naiveness), nouns 
(thingness), pronouns (us-ness) and phrases (over-the-top-ness, all-or-nothing-ness) to form 
abstract nouns (Plag  2003). 
 
 The suffix that is considered as rivalrous one is -ity, and it sometimes blocks the usage 
of -ness, which is called type-blocking. -ness is said to belong to an unrestricted domain of 
application since it can easily be attached to any adjective. The application of -ity, on the 
other hand, is limited by many lexical, phonological, morphological and semantic restrictions. 
Both suffixes can be attached to bases that end in suffix -ous with the exception when simplex 
abstract noun already exists (e.g., glory ~glorious, but *gloriosity). Suffix -ity is preferred if 
the adjective ends in -ate, -ent, -ant, -ic, -ill and  -acious. -ness is more productive on bases 
ending in -ive (Aronoff 1976).  
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 The productivity of these suffixes was described by Riddle (1985: 435-61) who claims 
that they are not in fact synonymous, since we can find difference in meaning between the 
two. In her view, -ness denotes an embodied attribute or trait, whereas -ity denotes an abstract 
or concrete entity: 
 
 However, don't call this third-grader a picky eater. She's a selective one, a Feingold 
 diet subscriber, whose hyperactiveness has decreased, her mother says, since she 
 began the program four years ago. 
 
 But to date there is no evidence that this type of dietary regime will have any effect on 
 hyperactivity in children. 
 
Hyperactiveness is an embodied trait of a certain child and hyperactivity is the condition or 
abstract entity. She gives many other examples such as ethnicity vs ethnicness, brutality vs 
brutalness and many others. Her claim is that some words, for example, color words, will 
always take -ness, since color is inherent trait, like redness. Ethnic names will do the same 
(Slavicness). On the other hand, count nouns which denote abstract or concrete entities, will 
take -ity (rarity). It is possible for -ness here to denote an attribute here. She adds that only a 
handful of -ness words can be pluralized (kindnesses, likenesses, weaknesses, illnesses and 
sicknesses).  
 
     The meaning of the suffix is given in Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary as 'quality, 
state or character of' (dryness, blindness, silliness). Similar is with the Webster's New World 
College Dictionary: 'state, quality or instance of being' (togetherness, sadness), Longman's 
Grammar of Spoken and Written English: 'state or quality of being A' (blindness, darkness, 
preparedness) and Collins COBUILD English Dictionary for Advanced Learners Dictionary: 
'state or quality of being A' (sadness- state, kindness- quality). 
 
  Hamawand gives the following senses (2008: 63): 
a) the trait denoted by the adjectival root: Here suffix is usually attached to adjectives 
describing humans and creates abstract derivatives. 
b) the property denoted by the adjectival root: The suffix is attached to qualitative adjectives 
that are characteristic of both humans and non-humans. Created derivatives are abstract. 
c) an instance or example of the quality denoted by the adjectival root. Here countable 
derivatives are created.  
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d) characteristic denoted by the adjectival root: -ness is here attached to classifying adjectives 
that apply to humans and result is non-count noun (deafness) that usually expresses some kind 
of inability. 
 
 Summing it up, the suffix -ness can have the following meanings: 
1. the trait or quality denoted by the adjective (the quality of humans to be aware- awareness) 
2. the property denoted by the adjective (object can be bright- brightness) 
3. the state denoted by the adjective (the state of being sad- sadness) 
4. an instance or example of the quality denoted by the adjective (an example of being kind- 
kindness) 
5. an example of inability (dumbness- the inability to speak). 
 
Figure 21. The semantic network of the de-adjectival suffix -ness (Hamawand 2008: 64) 
 
 
 
13. THE ANALYSIS 
 We have already stated criteria by Tyler and Evans (2003) for finding the prototypical 
sense of a polysemous word. In establishing the central meanings of -hood and -ness, we 
followed their criteria, the ones proposed by Hamawad (2008) and the meanings given in the 
dictionaries and grammars that serve as confirmation of our examples, namely Webster's New 
World College Dictionary, Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, Longman Dictionary of 
Contemporary English, Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English, Collins 
COBUILD English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, Dictionary.com and The Free 
Dictionary.  
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 In order to interpret a nominalization that ends in -hood or -ness or any other derived 
noun, one can apply either strictly or partially the compositionality principle (Taylor 2002: 
589):  
 
 According to the compositionality principle, the properties of a complex expression 
can be fully computed from the properties of its component parts and the manner of their 
combination (= strict compositionality). Partial compositionality requires only that the 
component units contribute to the properties of the whole, without, however, fully 
determining the properties of the whole.  
 
 We will, of course, follow the partial compositionality principle, since different 
meanings of our nominalizations simply cannot be interpreted as the meaning of the base + 
the meaning of the suffix and since this principle is used in cognitive linguistics theories.  
 
 
 
13.1. The suffix -hood 
 For the suffix -hood, as already exemplified, the meaning of 'state and condition' is 
taken as central due to the frequency of occurrence, but also considering other factors that 
Hamawad (2008: 83) explains: 
 
 The meaning of a de-nominal suffix, I argue, is modeled in terms of a network of 
senses, which language users intuitively organise with respect to a prototypical sense. The 
prototypical sense is the best example of the network; it exhibits the common properties of the 
category. It is the sense that comes to mind first or is the easiest to recall. The other, 
peripheral, senses build around the prototypical sense; they are assimilated to the category 
according to how closely they resemble the prototype. The relations between the senses 
resemble those between family members, which share some but not all of the features. Like 
members of a family, the peripheral senses share the general properties of the category, but 
they differ in specific details. Category refers to a cognitive ability which upholds the unity of 
a lexical item. It presents the senses in order by starting from a basic sense and linking all the 
other ones to it. 
 The majority of examples in our corpus confirm this. Contrary to Scalise and 
Guevara's statement (2005) that -hood is attached to common and animate nouns, we find 
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examples where -hood is attached to inanimate nouns as well, producing abstract nouns 
denoting states (nounhood, adjectivehood, sentencehood, compoundhood, lexemehood): 
 
 (1) Workshop on the Syntax and Semantics of Nounhood and Adjectivehood   
 (http://filcat.uab.cat/clt/Adjectivehood/index.html) 
 
 (2) What it means is that an arbitrary modifier cannot be inserted between elements of 
 a compound and still maintain compoundhood. (Lieber 2005: 377). 
 
 We will start our analysis with nouns as bases. Since the number of nouns ending in -
hood is not infinite, or even that large (comparing it to nouns ending in -ness), we are going to 
give all those nouns that appear in the BNC list more than once. There are some examples of 
nouns ending in -hood we have encountered in the literature, as the above mentioned 
nounhood and sentencehood (presumably found only in registers dealing with language) and 
we believe there are more examples like these that are connected to specific registers, but they 
will not be included in our study. However, we believe that the sense of these unmentioned 
examples (so far not observed in the literature) is 'state of N' since it is a prototypical sense. 
This prototypical sense will be dealt with in the first part, with the majority of examples 
belonging to this group. Then we will analyse the meanings that are extended from the central 
meaning and we will try to establish metaphoric and/ or metonymic motivation for these 
extensions. We will then continue with adjectives as the basis and see whether these 
nominalizations denote something else apart from 'state of being A'.  
 
 
 
13.1.1. Nominal roots 
13.1.1.1. The state of what is being expressed by the base noun  
 A state is a physical or mental condition an animal or a person has. Hamawand (2008: 
87) distinguishes between three types of states when dealing with the suffix -hood: 
1. conditions of human life (in general)- maidenhood 
2. social statuses- nationhood 
3. legal rights-statehood. 
 The majority of examples in our corpus have this meaning, either as the only meaning 
or together with other meanings. Most of the examples belong to the first group of conditions, 
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that is, conditions of human life. We will expand this category and include conditions of non-
human existence as well: some of the examples involve animals, some include inanimate 
nouns and some even super-human, or divine. Due to the lack of space, example sentences for 
this central sense will be given only for some nominalizations.  
 
 
 
13.1.1.1.1. States of (non)-human life 
 Nouns belonging to this central group are numerous and are all paraphrazed as 'the 
state of being N'. They include the following: adulthood, angelhood, animalhood, aunthood, 
babyhood, beggarhood, boyhood, brotherhood, childhood, cousinhood, creaturehood, 
cubhood, daughterhood, duckhood, fatherhood, girlhood, godhood, grandparenthood, 
humanhood, ladyhood, manhood, motherhood, neighbourhood, orphanhood, parenthood, 
peoplehood, personhood, puppyhood, sainthood, selfhood, servanthood, sisterhood, sonhood, 
toddlerhood, victimhood and womanhood: 
 
 (3) Greer, like the most chauvinist of traditional psychologists, sees women's 
 psychology as  characterized by frustration, dependency and victimhood, fear, 
 passivity, inferiority, hatred for other women, mental disorders, and bodily 
 pathology. (BNC) 
 
 All the above nominalizations could be paraphrased as being N: 
 
 (4) All investigations into the perpetuation of evil point ultimately to the conclusion 
 that the human race has never placed anywhere near sufficient emphasis on the 
 importance of training its members for parenthood. (BNC) 
 
 (4a) All investigations into the perpetuation of evil point ultimately to the conclusion 
 that the human race has never placed anywhere near sufficient emphasis on the 
 importance of training its members for being parents.  
 
 In the case of 'sisterhood' a paraphrase having N is also possible: 
 (5) For many, sisterhood means having a friend who will be there for life, and who 
 was there in its beginning. (http://www.keepinspiring.me/quotes-about-
 sisters/#ixzz3ovvj9aCQ) 
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 The majority of examples belong to the domain of family, with family members as 
base words (motherhood, fatherhood, brotherhood, parenthood) and they all denote some 
qualities that are required by the society to be fulfilled. When it comes to mother, father, 
parent, grandparent they are connected to nurturance and responsibility. We will show this on 
the following examples: 
 
motherhood 
 (6) It is time society acknowledged the importance of motherhood and all the 
 responsibility this entails (…) (BNC) 
 
fatherhood 
 (7) Because apparently, society doesn't think fatherhood is a job as worthy of support 
 and admiration as motherhood. (WD) 
 'The importance of motherhood' implies the importance of taking care of one's family, 
providing for them, giving them support and attention they need. 'Fatherhood is a job' entails 
that being a father brings certain responsibilities, just like any other job does. It is not just a 
state somebody is in, but rather a complex network of tasks and requirements, or, to put it 
short, a complex condition. In 'Training for parenthood', 'parenthood' could be understood as 
a skill that can be taught and trained, which again, emphasizes the practical side of being a 
parent. Examples with brother and sister as basis, again, rely more on the relationship 
between siblings, which is expected to be the one of getting along and taking care of one 
another.  
 It is interesting to notice that, whereas fatherhood occurs in contexts other than the 
Bible (where it is spelled with capital F), sonhood in mainly found in relation to being a son, 
but the son of God, that is, Jesus Christ.  
 
 Examples containing bases other than family members express general notions of 
being human, or simply, belonging to the human race (from childhood to the old age): 
adulthood, childhood, boyhood, creaturehood, girlhood, humanhood, ladyhood, manhood, 
peoplehood, personhood, selfhood, toddlerhood and womanhood.  
 
 A detailed look at these examples reveals that they not only express conditions of what 
is being denoted by the noun, but also behaviour typical of the noun: 
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 (8)  (...) to be schooled in the ways of ladyhood (...)(OD) 
 
 This can be paraphrased as to be schooled in the ways of how to behave like a lady. 
There are certain dress codes and behavioural patterns that can be described as ladylike. 
Ladies are usually gentle and gracious, they speak properly and dress nicely. On the other 
hand, 
 
 (9) These sports serve to define dominant masculinity, connecting manhood with 
 violence and competitiveness and often marginalising girls and women. (OD) 
 
manhood has long been associated with physical strength, courage and superiority (in relation 
to a woman), although in today's world, this stereotypical characterization has changed and 
manhood also denotes a gentle character, rather than roughness.  
 
 Other examples that do not involve humans, exhibit bases denoting divine creatures 
(angelhood, sainthood, godhood) and states (heavenhood), or animals (puppyhood, cubhood, 
animalhood).  
 
  There are a few examples that do not include family membership or divine or animal 
character, but simply general notions of human life (maidenhood, neighbourhood, 
orphanhood, servanthood and victimhood). They all denote the state of what is being 
expressed by the N. 
 
 In all the examples that do have family members or animals as bases, as well as those 
that denote general notions of being human we can observe that the whole noun 
metonymically stands for the behaviour typical of the base noun via metonymy STATE OF N 
FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF THAT N. We could not, however, find this interpretation with 
divine creatures as bases. This leads us to conclusion that metonymy here serves as a means 
of social stereotyping: all these base nouns (or better to say, their behaviour) is socially 
defined. There are certain social norms that dictate what is expected from them. 10   
 Let us look at the example of neighbourhood, the definition of which is also 
'neighbourly feeling' or 'exhibiting the qualities of a friendly neighbour': 
 
                                                 
10  cf. house-wife stereotype (Lakoff 1999). 
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 (10) Social interactions based on neighbourhood have been deteriorating for decades 
 particularly in highly transitory urban areas. (OD) 
 
 This means that 'neighbour' has positive connotations, or at least, that most people 
hope to have neighbours with positive values: helpfulness, friendliness and kindness. This is 
also something we have already mentioned in the examples with mother and father, meaning 
behaving the way that is expected form a mother or a father.  
 
 Sometimes examples belonging to this group have an additional meaning. 
Maidenhood is not only the state of being unmarried woman, it can also denote one's virginity, 
as well as freshness and newness: 
 (11) Ruth was blushing, but it was the blush of maidenhood called upon for the first 
 time to discuss the sacred things of life with a mother held equally sacred. (WD) 
 
 Virginity is still, in many cultures, considered as uncontaminated state, especially in 
societies where religion plays an important role. The basis of this can be traced back to the 
Holy Bible, where the following has been made clear: 
 
 
  Flee from sexual immorality. Every other sin a person commits is outside the body, 
but the sexually immoral person sins against his own body. Or do you not know that your 
body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom you have from God? You are not your 
own, for you were bought with a price. So glorify God in your body. (Corinthians:6:18-20).  
 
 Thus, any woman that engages in a sexual intercourse before marriage is considered 
impure and sinful and every woman who enters marriage as a virgin is seen as 'pure' and 
'innocent'. The meaning of 'freshness' is metonymically derived from 'virginity' via PHYSICAL 
ASPECT OF A PERSON FOR A MENTAL ASPECT. 11 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Not all examples like 'maidenhood' that have additional metaphorical meanings will be discussed here if the 
meaning still belongs to the domain of 'state' or 'condition' since we are mainly interested in the extensions 
of the base meaning.  
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13.1.1.1.2. Social statuses and legal rights 
 We will start this chapter with the following definitions: 
  
 Social status, also called status, the relative rank that an individual holds, with 
attendant rights, duties, and lifestyle, in a social hierarchy based upon honour or prestige. 
Status may be ascribed—that is, assigned to individuals at birth without reference to any 
innate abilities—or achieved, requiring special qualities and gained through competition and 
individual effort. Ascribed status is typically based on sex, age, race, family relationships, or 
birth, while achieved status may be based on education, occupation, marital status, 
accomplishments, or other factors. (https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-status) 
 
 Legal rights are, clearly, rights which exist under the rules of legal systems or by 
virtue of decisions of suitably authoritative bodies within them. 
(https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-rights/) 
 
Examples from this group include bachelorhood, husbandhood, kinghood, knighthood, 
monkhood, nationhood, priesthood, prophethood, queenhood, spinsterhood, spousehood, 
statehood, widowhood, widowerhood and wifehood. In the examples with animate bases the 
base word represents someone who holds a certain status in the society a role that one is 
supposed to fulfil.  
 
bachelorhood 
 (12) Bachelorhood suited him perfectly. (BNC) 
 
 In this example it is clear that what suited the character is being unmarried adult male 
who obviously enjoys being unmarried and without attachments and obligations to others.  
On the other hand, being a husband or a wife also brings certain enrichment in one's life, but 
obligations and expectations are present all the time. Being a spouse is not only living up to 
your spouse's expectations and fulfilling the promises you gave one another, but also the 
society as a whole also have a certain 'vision' of what an ideal husband or wife should be. In 
the example 
 
 (13) Juggling fatherhood and husbandhood with editing and writing doubtless keeps 
 you on  your toes. (OD)  
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it is represented as something you need to handle and perfect to keep it going. The example  
 (14) People think women who do not want to marry unfeminine, people think women 
 who do want to marry immodest — people combine both opinions by regarding it as 
 unfeminine for women not to look forward longingly to wifehood as the hope and 
 purpose of their lives, and ridiculing and condemning any individual woman of their 
 acquaintance whom they suspect of  entertaining such a longing. (BNC) 
 
shows that the expectations of others for woman of a certain age are to get married (to look 
forward longingly). Often women who simply do not want to get married are considered 
either selfish or egocentric or not having their purpose of life fulfilled. They seem to lead 
lonely, empty lives. But with the raise of feminism this is starting to change and wifehood is 
only one aspect of a woman, just the same as motherhood is.  
Base words in this group usually contain pairs: 
husband- wife 
widow- widower 
bachelor- spinster 
king- queen 
 In the cases of bachelorhood, husbandhood, knighthood, spousehood, widowhood, 
widowerhood and wifehood we also encounter additional meaning of 'behaviour typical of N' 
via STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy. 
 A special subgroup is found with royal (kinghood, knighthood, queenhood) and 
clerical (monkhood, prophethood) conditions where we find additional meanings, such as  'the 
rank of N' or 'vocation of N' via STATE FOR RANK metonymy. 
Kinghood, queenhood and knighthood are here seen as professions of N and as professions 
they include duties and rights, as well as activities connected with a certain position: 
 
kinghood 
 state 
 (15) In Louis, surely, if in any one, the majesty of kinghood is represented. (WD) 
 rank 
 (16) In the first battle Nuada, king of the Danaans, lost his hand; and, because a king 
 must be blemishless, lost his kinghood too. (WD) 
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queenhood 
 state 
 (17) But Lincoln was now distracted by the French princes, who bowed to him but not 
 too low, as befitted their royal birth, while Mary simply inclined her head, as 
 befitted her Republican Queenhood. (http://findwords.info/term/queenhood) 
 rank 
 (18) They would typically have two routes to queenhood - either be the heir to the 
 throne and reign in the own name, like QE II, or marry into it. (WD) 
 
knighthood 
 state 
 (19) If he didn't understand before, he knew now: knighthood can be painful. (BNC) 
 (20) Although the significance of the terms knight and order will be fully realized only 
 after initiation, you should remember that knighthood was originally the quality of 
 being an armed and mounted warrior. 
 (http://members.tripod.com/~Jesus_Christ_Saves4/KandC.htm) 
 rank 
 (21) Henry III originated the practice of forcing landowners to take up knighthood, in 
 order apparently to recruit cavalrymen for an overseas campaign. (BNC) 
 
 Knighthood often appears as an object of the verbs offer, receive, earn, be rewarded 
with. Especially in the last sense, knighthood is also defined as an honour whereby one is 
made into a knight, and one can thereafter be called 'Sir' or 'Dame'. Here a 'knight' does no 
longer denote a servant of a king as in medieval times or of high birth, but rather as a recipient 
of the 'Most Excellent Order of the British Empire' or 'order of chivalry of British 
constitutional monarchy'. This order was established in 1917 by King George V and is given 
for major contribution to the arts, science, medicine, or government lasting over a long period 
of time. Honorary knighthood is appointed to citizens who live in the countries where Queen 
Elisabeth II does not rule: 
 
 (22) The knighthood for Colonel David Stirling, founder of the SAS, who helped to try 
 and set up a strike-breaking organisation called GB75 in the 1970s, may prove 
 controversial. (BNC) 
 (23) He received his knighthood in the 1979 Birthday Honours List and in 1980 was 
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 elected an Elder Brother and a Member of the Court of Trinity House. (BNC) 
 (24) It continued to be so through more than two decades, and then — in the mid-
 1980s — it seemed, almost inexplicably, to be secure no longer, despite his having only 
 recently been honoured with a knighthood for services to literature. (BNC) 
 
When it comes to clerical professions, nouns ending in -hood typically collocate with 'enter': 
 
monkhood 
 state 
 (25) No hysteric visions, no madman's dreams, no clever conjurer's tricks, have ever 
 shed a  tawdry glory on the monkhood of the Buddha. (DCT) 
 order 
 (26) Pongruengrong, who is also a popular singer, entered monkhood after being 
 released on bail last month. (WD) 
 
priesthood 
 state 
 (27) It could have been a lot of things. His priesthood, maybe, or even his Irishness. 
 (BNC) 
 order 
 (28) Thence he went to the English School at St. Omer before entering the priesthood. 
 (WD) 
 
 It is important to notice that all nominalizations belonging to this group, that is, the 
ones of royal and clerical conditions, appear with expressions typical of physical world: enter, 
receive, lose, take up, routes to..., which suggests that something non-physical (the state 
someone is in) is seen as a physical entity. Ontological metaphors allow us to view activities, 
emotions, ideas or states as something that is concrete, like substances, containers, persons or 
objects. Thus in priesthood, monkhood we encounter A STATE IS A CONTAINER, in kinghood 
and knighthood STATE IS A POSSESSED OBJECT and in queenhood STATES ARE LOCATIONS 
metaphors.  
 
 Nationhood and statehood are nouns derived from inanimate basis and also denote 'the state 
of N', paraphrasable by 'being a N': 
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 (29) Our drift out of nationhood — a collective, willed political identity — into a 
 reality we could not shape nor even talk about began a long time ago. (BNC) 
 
 (30) But its anxiety on this occasion surely reflects the worries of Mr Gorbachev 
 himself, who is to take part in this weekend's celebrations in Berlin of the 40th 
 anniversary of East German  statehood. (BNC) 
 
 
13.1.1.2. A group of people (or animals) sharing the thing referred to by the nominal root 
 In this section we will deal with another meaning of the suffix -hood, namely a group 
or a union of people denoted by the base. We will give cases where this also applies to 
animals. We will claim that the whole noun, the prototypical meaning of which is a condition 
or state, is used metonymically to denote a group of people (animals) sharing the same state 
and we will try to describe the type of that metonymic mapping.  
 
  This broader section of nouns can be subdivided into two groups according to the 
purpose of the group: 
a) A general group of people or animals, a collectivity and  
b) A group of people denoted by N that stands for a union with a specific purpose, goals of 
function, often a religious one. 
 
 
 
13.1.1.2.1. A general group of people or animals, a collectivity 
 In the following examples what is denoted by the -hood nominalization is a plural of 
Ns or a group of Ns with behaviour typical of N. A 'group of Ns' in this sense is not gathered 
for a specific purpose or goal, the meaning is simply 'collectivity'. They sometimes do have a 
goal, but one apprehended only via specific examples: 
 
 (31) Nightmarish stories about about the criminalizing of motherhood have been 
 making headlines of late.  
 (https://www.thenation.com/article/how-end-criminalization-americas-mothers) 
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 In this example, motherhood denotes a group of working mothers who try to fight for 
more rights and understanding of their tasks in the society.  
 This group contains the following: animalhood, aunthood, beggarhood, boyhood, 
childhood, cousinhood, cubhood, fatherhood, girlhood, ladyhood, manhood, motherhood, 
neighbourhood, sainthood and womanhood. They all denote 'the state of N' and the collective 
meaning is an extension.  
 
animalhood 
 state 
 (32) Coriscus is both a man and an animal, but his manhood is nearer to his 
 individual existence than is his animalhood. (WD) 
 a group of animals 
 (33) Earth belongs to Man, and in a lesser degree to the animals that man raised from 
 animalhood. (WD) 
 
aunthood 
 state 
 (34) Babies are born from the womb. Maternity is born from the soul. There are many 
 ways to "mother" a child. Aunthood is as close as it gets. (Huffington Post, Jul 25, 
 2014) 
 a group of aunts 
 (35) Let’s Hear It for Aunthood. (New York Times, Sep 18, 2011) 
 
beggarhood 
 state 
 (36) The condition of peasant children, their sorrows and joys, their sports and 
 bickerings -- the coarse insolence of the richer, the timid dispiritment of the 
 needy, all stood in lively remembrance before his fancy, which liked to go back into 
 that first and only period of his freedom, though, perhaps, also of his beggarhood. 
 (WD) 
 a group of beggars 
 (37) Never was a form of rascally beggarhood more complete. (WD) 
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boyhood 
 state 
 (38) The glory of boyhood is all around him, embraces him: The manliness of his 
 father, the great name of his grandfather, adorn him. (BNC) 
 a group of boys 
 (39) Although the remarkable oeuvre of Shirley Temple dominated what came to be 
 regarded as the childstar era, films featuring American boyhood attracted 
 audiences as well. (Clement and Reinier 2001: 251) 
 
childhood 
 state 
 (40) What is clear in this exhibition are the changing attitudes towards and 
 perceptions of childhood by adults who control and order where they can seem to have 
 an aim of accurate recall. (BNC) 
 children, taken collectively 
 (41) (...) The well-governed childhood of this realm (...) 
 (http://www.hyperdictionary.com/dictionary/childhood) 
 
cousinhood 
 state 
 (42) North Carolinians emphasize not just Scottish ancestry, but Cape Fear ancestry; 
 not just the cousinhood of the clans, but the genealogical proximity of ‘cousins.’  (OD) 
 (43) ‘Some conditions that may lead to cousinhood include Tourette syndrome, 
 hydrocephalus, Williams syndrome, and some learning disabilities.’ (OD)12 
 persons related by blood 
 (44) In 1870 the lay leaders of the Ashkenazi congregations in London had established 
 the United Synagogue, over which ‘the cousinhood’—and pre-eminently the 
 Rothschilds — presided. (BNC) 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 The base noun 'cousin' is sometimes found in connection with autism and denotes a person who is not 
neurotypical, but also not quite autistic, that is a person who is considered 'autistic-like' with respect to social 
skills.  
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cubhood 
 state 
 (45) They were a brave group, but they were walking into the nightmares of their 
 cubhood, and  it shook the most stalwart among them. (WD) 
 
 
 group 
 (46) He was better fitted for the life than the other dogs, for he had the training of his 
 cubhood to guide him. (OD) 
 
fatherhood 
 state 
 (47) The joys of fatherhood had softened him. (OD) 
 fathers collectively 
 (48) Instead, the new attitude of fatherhood is hands-on and involved, but with a hint 
 of playfulness. (http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-06-16-dad-fathers-
 parenting_N.htm) 
 
girlhood 
 state 
 (49) I rejected womanhood, not because I preferred manhood, but because I preferred 
 girlhood.  (BNC) 
 group 
 (50) That Flaubert, still damp from skewering boys in Cairo bath-houses, should fall 
 on the name of Nabokov’s seducer of underage American girlhood?  (BNC) 
 
ladyhood 
 state 
 (51) But the effect of her voice, her ladyhood, and her command of this philosophy--
 those moved him. (WS) 
  ladies collectively  
 (52) After allowing my pocket to be filled with “notions” by the generous “Biddy,” I 
 took leave of Miss Kenjins, who is good, clever, and agreeable enough to redeem the 
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 young-ladyhood of the island — nor was there enough of pleasant promise for the 
 future to compensate for the regret I felt at leaving those who had received a stranger 
 with such kindness and hospitality. (WD) 
 
motherhood 
 state 
 (53) The capacity for motherhood is a capacity for transformation; by accepting new 
 life within our bodies, allowing it to grow, giving birth to it and rearing it, we 
 ourselves are irrevocably changed. (BNC) 
 a group of mothers 
 (54) However, it was motherhood rather than the needs of individual mothers which 
 evoked concern and relatively little attention was paid to the conditions faced by 
 working class wives in their daily lives.  
 (https://www.thenation.com/article/how-end-criminalization-americas-mothers) 
 
neighbourhood 
 state 
 (55) ‘the importance of neighbourhood to old people’ (OD) 
 neighbours 
 (56) The family had been odd she remembered; their accent was more up market, and 
 they had formal, stiff manners, unlike the relaxed style and broad accents of the 
 Glaswegian neighbourhood. (BNC) 
 
sainthood 
 state or status of being a saint 
 (57) And I understand sainthood is achieved by avoiding the occasions of sin. (BNC) 
 a group of saints 
 (58) He then quitted the Congress membership, finding that sainthood is tarnished by 
 too close contact with politicians. (WD) 
 
womanhood 
 state 
 (59) Any woman who falls outside the boundaries of a family pattern of expectation 
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 may feel she has failed or that her expression of womanhood is not valued, and  when 
 a woman believes she has failed at womanhood itself, she often abandons her root, the 
 place of her failure. (WD) 
 a group of women 
 (60) Half of Britain's womanhood is dress size 14 and over. (OD) 
 
 Manhood is an interesting example. Metonymy SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC operates on the 
base 'man'. 'Man' stands for 'human' in many cases and often covers both terms, which is 
never the case with 'woman'. 
 
manhood 
 state of masculinity 
 (61) We drank to prove our manhood. (OD) 
 a group of men 
 (62) Germany, too, had lost the best of her young manhood. (OD) 
 people in general (in the sense of humanhood) 
 (63) He feared the speedy decline of all manhood.  (WS) 
 
 The metonymy that enables the collectivity sense in these examples is DEFINING 
STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY within Category-and-
Property ICM.  That is, the state of one member is understood as the whole category or a 
group of members.  
 
 
 
13.1.1.2.2. A group of people denoted by N that stands for a union with a specific 
purpose, goals of function, often a religious one 
 Examples in this group are specific since the group is understood as having a certain 
goal or function in the society. These are: brotherhood, sisterhood, monkhood, priesthood, 
prophethood and knighthood. All of them denote 'a group of Ns connected by profession or 
business'. We have already given the examples where the state denotes one's rank or vocation. 
The collectivity sense is derived through DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR 
THE WHOLE CATEGORY. In the cases of monkhood or priesthood state is understood as a 
vocation of one monk or one priest as a clerical function. 
136 
 (64) And therefore the monkhood, powerful as they were, left all politics alone. (DC) 
  
 In this example, monkhood is in singular, but the pronoun and the verb following it are 
in plural (they were), which only emphasizes the collectivity sense of the noun and the fact 
that it denotes more than one monk.  
 
For the priesthood, the folowing example illustrates its collective sense: 
 
 (65) There was another important political factor affecting the south-eastern tribes 
 which  created serious problems for Rome; the insidious but powerful influence of the 
 Druidic priesthood. (BNC) 
 
 The same explanation can be given for knighthood and prophethood. The state of 
being a knight or a prophet is mapped onto the rank of a knight or 'vocation' of a prophet and 
then further mapped onto the whole group of knights and prophets. 
 
 (66) But the white fury of the northmen burned the hotter, and more skilled was their 
 knighthood with long spears and bitter. (Tolkien 2012: 113)  
 
 (67) There is no doubt whatever that such souls were prophets, for the mission of 
 prophethood is education, and these wondrous souls trained and educated mankind. 
 (WS) 
 
 Brotherhood and sisterhood are a bit different from the above examples. Their bases 
are highly polysemous and we believe that metaphors and metonymies operate on these bases. 
The meaning of the whole is also a bit different than 'the group of Ns', still the sense is a 
collective one. 
 
brotherhood 
 None of the meanings found in our corpus is 'brothers collectively' or 'a group of 
brothers as male siblings'. However we have found the following definitions with 
corresponding examples: 
1. fellowship (an association of friends): 
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 (68) It is customary for young men who are attached to each other to swear eternal 
 brotherhood (compare the Slavonic pobratimstvo); the contract is regarded as sacred, 
 and no instance has been known of its violation. (YD) 
 
2. fraternity as an organization of people are linked or connected in several ways: 
a) by the common interests (such as sports or free time activities): 
 
 (69) But by and large rugby has much to be proud of as a vehicle for bringing nations 
 together in a sporting brotherhood when political barriers threaten to keep them 
 apart. (YD) 
 
b) by religious beliefs: 
 (70) A fierce quarrel arose over his burial between the brotherhood of St Stephen, to 
 which he had belonged, and the university professors, who desired to escort his 
 corpse to the grave. (YD) 
 
c) by trade: 
 (71) Not only did the railroad strike of 1894 lead to greater rights for workers, the 
 lawmakers wrote, but the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters — America’s first 
 African American union — also 'helped build the black middle class and laid the 
 groundwork for the Civil Rights movement of the mid-20th century.' (COCA) 
 
 Generally speaking, all of these express the same kind of a union of brothers, with the 
word brother having more meanings (in Oxford English Dictionary): 
1. a male sibling 
1.1. colleague, associate, companion, partner, comrade, comrade-in-arms, co-worker, fellow, 
friend 
1.2. North American Informal a black man 
1.3. A thing which resembles or is connected to another thing 
2. A (male) fellow Christian 
2.1. a monk 
2.2. a member of a fundamentalist Protestant denomination 
 
 The first meaning of brotherhood, as fellowship or an association of friends and 
partners, is based on the meaning of brother as a friend, a companion or a partner.  We believe 
138 
the reason why brother can be interpreted this way is both a metaphoric and a metonymic one, 
or to be more precise, we are dealing with the case of metaphor from metonymy in the sense 
of Goossens (1990), where metaphors are grounded in the metonymic relationship. In 
metaphors one domain, the source domain, is mapped onto the target domain. Here brother as 
a male sibling (in blood relation) is the part of the source domain, which is closeness between 
male siblings. Closeness between friends is the target domain. Both domains belong to the 
domain of humans, but one domain is a domain of physical functioning, whereas the other is a 
mental or psychological one. Within this metaphor PART FOR PART metonymy BLOOD LINE 
FOR PHYSICAL CLOSENESS enables us to define the term brother in the physical sense. Blood 
line stands for the kind of physical relation that makes one person your brother. Metaphor 
MENTAL (CLOSENESS) IS PHYSICAL (CLOSENESS) is the reason why we call our friends 
brothers. What is meant by mental closeness are all those behaviors that count when we talk 
about friends: a friend is person who hangs out with you, helps you, understands you and who 
you feel close to. This is understood via MENTAL CLOSENESS FOR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOUR. This 
relation can also be reversed: when a friend does all these things where he shows how much 
he cares for you, we say: He is like a brother to me. There is a saying: Friends are family you 
choose. This means that we cannot choose our blood family members, but we do chose people 
to spend our time with based on the interest, similarities or sometimes life circumstances and 
these are the people we trust. 
 Family is the nucleus of the society, a fundamental social group.  Aristotle wrote: “The 
family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants.” 
(http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html). There are also some political 
movements and organizations today that want to impose what 'a typical family' should look 
like and define a nuclear family as an organization consisting of a husband, a wife and 
children. Of course, things in our society are changing and to many people, family is more 
than a bloodline. Many people consider their godmother or godfather family, although they 
need not be in a blood relation.  
 Since metonymies work on the principle of highlighting of some aspects within the 
same domain matrix, we cannot exclude the possibility of dealing with metonymy here: 
Brother, as a whole domain matrix, consists of several subdomains: a person you share 
parents with, a person who might have lived with you in childhood, a person who helps you, 
etc. What gets activated here is the positive aspect of the domain 'brother' (helping, caring and 
spending time together) via WHOLE PERSON FOR ONE ASPECT OF THAT PERSON metonymy. 
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 Other meanings of brotherood, such as 'an association of people connected by the 
same interests, trade or religious order', are also metaphoric and metonymic. In all these 
meanings the metaphor MENTAL (CLOSENESS) IS PHYSICAL (CLOSENESS) produces the 
connection between a brother as a male sibling and a fellow member of a fraternity. Physical 
closeness is the starting point, having the metonymic basis (BLOOD LINE FOR PHYSICAL 
CLOSENESS). We also find metonymy in the target domain. Mental closeness actually stands 
for similarity in the way of thinking or acting (CLOSENESS FOR SIMILARITY): 
 
 (72) The brotherhood of international Jewry was, and still is, established in all large 
 centers of Jewish concentration. (BNC) 
 
This is an organization of people united by the same religion.  
 
sisterhood 
This example is similar to the one of 'brotherhood' since it does not denote 'a group of sisters 
as female siblings' but rather a different kind of 'sisters' are taken here collectively. Again, as it 
is the case with 'a brother', 'a sister' has several meanings (taken from Oxford English 
Dictionary): 
1. a female sibling 
2. a female friend or associate, especially a female fellow member of a trade union or other 
organization (comrade, friend, partner, associate, colleague) 
2.1. a fellow woman seen in relation to feminist issues 
2.2. Informal a fellow black woman 
3. often Sister: a member of a religious order of women (nun or novice) 
4. a senior female nurse, typically in charge of a ward 
 
Depending on which of these meanings becomes activated, sisterhood denotes several types 
of groups: 
1. a religious society of women: 
 
 (73) The order of the Sisters of Mercy is a religious sisterhood of the Roman Church. 
 (YD) 
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2. an association of women related by a profession of being a nurse: 
 (74) The earliest forerunner of the great sisterhood of nurses of whom we have any  
 record was Fabiola, a patrician Roman lady. (YD) 
 
3. an association of women that is formed to promote cooperation and unity of women: 
 
 (75) When women bond together in a community in such a way that sisterhood is 
 created, it gives them an accepting and intimate forum to tell their stories and have 
 them heard and validated by others. (WD) 
 
 We find that same metaphors and metonymies operate here as it is the case with 
brotherhood. First the metonymy BLOOD LINE FOR PHYSICAL CLOSENESS operates on the 
source domain of the metaphor MENTAL (CLOSENESS) IS PHYSICAL (CLOSENESS). What is 
meant by mental closeness is an emotional bond between sisters which can also be found 
between friends, co-workers and like-minded people. In sisterhood we are dealing with 
females, and they are, by nature, more emotional and have this nurturance aspect more 
emphasised than males. That is why all those groups do have this dimension of helping and 
understanding, they are formed with the goal of helping the ones who need help. 
 
 We will finish this section by claiming that metonymy found in these examples again 
fulfills the function of social stereotyping, both in examples that represent a group of Ns with 
specific goals and purposes and in those that simply denote collectivity or a body of Ns. 
Following Lakoff (1999: 398) in stating that 
  
  Social stereotypes are cases of metonymy—where a subcategory has a socially 
recognized status as standing for the category as a whole, usually for the purpose of making 
quick judgments about people. 
 
We can observe that the state of one member of the category stands for the whole category in 
question. 
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13.1.1.3. A period of time during which one is N 
 The third group of are examples are the ones where -hood nominalization denotes a 
period or a length of time during which one is N, as in childhood:  
 
 (76) Life is presented as a succession of ‘ages’: from birth, through babyhood, infancy, 
 childhood, adolescence, adulthood, middle age and finally old age. (BNC) 
 
 Time is something we cannot observe as such, since “it is not conceptualized on its 
own terms, but rather is conceptualized in significant part metaphorically and 
metonymically.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 136). What we can measure are concepts such as 
events, space and motion. When we measure time, we actually count iterations of events. In 
our examples, we measure the length of time during which one is in the state of N. This state 
metonymically stands for the period of time during which one is in that state. The metonymy 
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE IS N operates after the 
word has been formed. Since period is something that has its beginning and ending, nouns 
serving as basis denote 'roles' in humans' lives that are transient: children (toddlers) are boys 
and girls before they become men or women, widow is a woman who has become a widow 
after her husband's death. Transient stages can only be interpreted in relation to time, since the 
definition of transient is 'passing or disappearing with time'. We found the following examples 
that denote both the state of being N and the period of time: adulthood, babyhood, 
bachelorhood, boyhood, childhood, cubhood, girlhood, grandparenthood, maidenhood, 
manhood (as opposed to boyhood), priesthood, puppyhood, queenhood, spinsterhood, 
toddlerhood, widowhood, widowerhood and womanhood (as opposed to girlhood). All those 
states and conditions are not permanent, but usually follow or precede another stage (of 
human life and development).  
 They often collocate with 'early', 'young', 'since', 'outgrow', 'through', 'during' 'spend' 
and 'years of' and they also appear as premodifiers (of 'memories', 'days' and 'dreams')  which 
is the reason why they have metonymic reading: 
 
adulthood 
 state 
 (77) But the emotional fracture cut through every aspect of his adulthood. (BNC) 
 period of time 
 (78) First of all, we can note that there is nowadays an increasing emphasis on the 
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 idea of ‘life-long education’— that is to say education that continues through the 
 whole of adulthood.  (BNC) 
 
babyhood 
 state 
 (79) Other children might play, but the child who was to be queen of England must not 
 be allowed to give even her babyhood to amusement. (BNC) 
 period of time 
 (80) This feeling of helplessness has been experienced before, ontogenetically, during 
 the person's own babyhood and childhood, and phylogenetically, when human 
 society began to evolve. (BNC) 
 
bachelorhood 
 state 
 (81) Enforced bachelorhood had left him unkempt and ill-groomed. (BNC) 
  period of time 
 (82) He, like the Prince's detective John McLean and several other staff who served 
 the Prince during his bachelorhood, knew that it was time to leave once he was  safely 
married. (BNC) 
 
boyhood 
 state 
 (83) Young males yearn to leave boyhood behind and to become men. (OD) 
 period of time 
 (84) Ramaciotti is not just one of Europe's finest car designers (the stunning Mythos 
 concept car was the result of his boyhood dreams) but he is also considered one  of the 
 best analysts of design in the business. (BNC) 
 
childhood 
 state 
 (85) Just as our concepts of childhood have changed, so have our concepts of 
 childhood problems. (OD) 
 period of time 
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This sense is found by far more frequently than other senses: 
 (86) Mister Softee's iconic jingle serves up childhood memories with a side of ice 
 cream. (BNC) 
 (87) Since childhood he'd had a recurring magical dream. (BNC) 
 (88) In this study, 215 early childhood educators in two states responded to a survey 
 regarding early literacy curricula and assessment. (BNC) 
 
cubhood 
 state 
 (89) His forgotten cubhood, all that was associated with that familiar snarl, rushed 
 back to him. (WD) 
 period of time 
 (90) Why would the big cat attack the person who raised him from cubhood, the 
 person who once snuggled with him on the couch?’ (OD) 
 
girlhood 
 state 
 (91) Until recently, the literature on adolescent girls has been scarce, lacking a 
 serious professional review of the gender-specific issues unique to girlhood. (OD) 
 time period, a girl's childhood 
 (92) She asked what I had in mind, and I said an informal conversation about the 
 principal events of her life from her girlhood at Glamis Castle to the present day.  
 (BNC) 
 
grandparenthood 
 state 
 (93) And what were the implications of these traditional roles for grandparenthood? 
 (BNC) 
 period of time 
 (94) Basically, for 72 years researchers at Harvard have been following 268 men who 
 entered college in the late 1930s -- following them through war, career, marriage 
 and divorce, parenthood and grandparenthood, and old age. (WD) 
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maidenhood 
 state 
 (95) I have waited long enough; I have got tired of maidenhood. (OD) 
 period of time 
 (96) If the negotiations go off smoothly, the marriage contract is written, presents are 
 exchanged between the engaged couple, through their respective parents, and all that 
 is left the girl of her maidenhood is a period of busy preparation for the wedding. 
 (BNC) 
manhood  
 state 
 (97) Nor do Piaroa young men learn the self-regarding virtues of manhood that would 
 set them as males against females, and, as such, superior to them. (BNC) 
 period of time 
 (98) This begins what becomes an obsessive quest, as Ronan - from adolescence to 
 manhood - tracks the storyteller's whereabouts across the lanes of Ireland. (OD) 
 
priesthood 
 state or order 
 (99) Women were admitted to the priesthood in the Church of England in 1996. (OD) 
 period of time 
 (100) Father Aguilar, who began his priesthood in Mexico in 1970, has shuffled from 
 parish to parish ... (BNC) 
 
puppyhood 
 state 
 (101) His puppyhood and the instinct of submission took charge of him. (WD) 
 the time of being a puppy 
 (102) We all realise puppyhood is the most important time in a dog's life. (BNC) 
 
queenhood 
 state 
 (103) This queen, she found was very sad, and very longing, and very lonely, three 
 things she thought queenhood exempt from, sadness, and longing and loneliness. 
 (WD) 
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 period of time 
 (104) During the first years of their marriage the couple lived in Kalmar in Sweden 
 and Philippa was to spend much of her queenhood living in Sweden. 
 (https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/the-legacy-of-timur-the
 great.198552/) 
 
spinsterhood 
 state 
 (105) Elizabeth never married but used her spinsterhood as a diplomatic bate — 
 Robert Dudley, the Earl of Leicester, was very close and, after his death, his 
 stepson, the Earl of Essex, became close, but he was executed for treason when it 
 was learned that he had entered into a conspiracy. (BNC) 
 period of time 
 (106) Her omnipotent Jewish mother valiantly works to end her daughter's 
 spinsterhood, but to no avail. (OD) 
 
toddlerhood 
 state 
 (107) But the 2,000 parents of toddlers surveyed said their children were losing the art 
 of inventive, imaginative play which is what toddlerhood should ultimately be about.  
 (OD) 
 period of time 
 This sense is found more frequently than the 'state of being a toddler': 
 (108) They were the sort of looks which at one time, if indulged in by children who'd 
 outgrown toddlerhood, could be guaranteed to attract a resounding ding around the 
 ear and the terse instruction: ‘Take that look off your face’. (BNC) 
 
widowhood 
 state 
 (109) But if widowhood is such a double shock for many women, why do widows 
 survive much longer than widowers?  (BNC) 
 the period of being a widow 
 (110) But for some, particularly in a generation whose men fought in the trenches, 
 marriage was a short interval before widowhood. (BNC) 
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widowerhood 
 state 
 (111) By the end of this ploddingbook, we sense that Lynley will return to New 
 Scotland Yard  once he has completed the coastal walk whose ending will coincide 
 with his acceptance of widowerhood. (WD) 
 period of time 
 (112) A silk hat with a crape band nearly to the top should be worn by widowers 
 during the first year of their widowerhood. (WD) 
 
womanhood 
 state 
 (113) All the wealth of her womanhood that she had treasured with such care she saw 
 become as dust, worthless.  (Wright 2008: 187) 
 time period 
 (114) When she was maturing into young womanhood Baldersdale was well 
 populated with youngsters of equivalent age — that is to say eligible for Hannah. 
 (BNC) 
 Examples involving animals (cubhood and puppyhood) can sometimes be used to refer 
to humans via PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor and denote youth and adolescence, a period in 
person's life preceding adulthood. Here the base nouns, cub and puppy, are metaphorically 
seen as humans. The characteristic that is mapped onto humans is the one of immatureness 
and lack of experience, but also of playfulness.  
 
 
 
13.1.1.4.  An area of the thing referred to by N 
 The only example we could find for the meaning 'area' is neighbourhood, but this is a 
nominalization found more frequently than many previously mentioned ones. This locative 
meaning of it is also more frequent than is the meaning of 'condition of being a neighbour'. 
Neighbourhood can denote more concepts of location or area, namely the following:  
1. a district within a town or city where people live (synonymous with 'district', 'area', 
'locality'): 
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 (115) We are the people that God has equipped, for this time in history, in our city and 
 neighbourhood, for the specific needs of the people around us. (BNC) 
 
 (116) Books were distributed in communities and neighbourhoods, and to family 
 members and  friends. (OED) 
 
2. the area surrounding a particular place, person, or object (in the sense of 'vicinity', 
'proximity'): 
 (117) Wait a while and a map of west London will open up showing the precise 
 location of the shot and all the other photos taken in the surrounding 
 neighbourhood. (OD) 
 (118) Taking heart, the exiled barons gathered together some troops, and war began in 
 the neighbourhood of Rome. (OD)  
 
2.1. In the neighbourhood means 'about', or 'approximately', when one talks about the age or 
amount of something that is specified: 
 
 (119) The average price at which shares sell during this period is somewhere in the 
 neighbourhood of $55 (more or less depending on the shape of the time-price curve). 
 (BNC) 
 
2.2. In mathematics, a neighbourhood is the set of all points whose distance from a given 
point is less than a specified value, it is a set containing the point where one can move that 
point some amount without leaving the set: 
 
 (120) A few years later in 1914 Hausdorff defined neighbourhoods by four axioms so 
 again there were no metric considerations. (OD) 
 
 Sometimes it is difficult to decide which meaning of a word came into existence first 
and therefore is a prototypical sense and which meanings are extended from it. We have 
already listed neighbourhood in the 'condition' sense and 'group' sense, meaning that the 'area' 
sense, although the most frequent one, is not the protoypical one. One could assume that the 
collective meaning of neighbourhood (people living in the area) is derived metonymically 
from the sense 'area' via metonymy PLACE FOR PEOPLE IN THAT PLACE, thus neighbourhood 
as an area stands for people living in that area. This is something that Lieber (2004, 2005) 
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observed as a very common phenomenon (sense extensions commonly go from place 
meaning to collective meaning). She, however, notices, that this can go the other way round, 
which is the case with nouns ending in -ery (piggery: place sense is derived from collectivity 
sense). We will also follow Plag's statement (2003: 113) “As with other suffixes, metaphorical 
extensions can create new meanings, for example the sense ‘area’ in the highly frequent 
neighbourhood, which originates in the collectivity sense of the suffix.” and Trips' 
observation that notions like “‘time’ (childhood) and ‘surrounding area’ (neighbourhood)” 
(Trips, 2009: 77) are metonymically extended from the meanings found in the Early Modern 
English period -hood ('office' and 'state') and claim that the 'area' sense is the one that is 
derived from other sense(s) and not vice versa. Our aim is to establish which metaphor(s) and/ 
or metonymy/ies) enabled that extensions. According to the http://www.etymonline.com and 
http://www.dictionary.com the meaning 'community of people who live close together' was 
first recorded in 1620s and in 1857 the meaning of 'near, somewhere about' was first found.  
 
 The central meaning of hood is 'the state of being N', and for neighbourhood this 
means 'the state of being a neighbour'. From this sense the 'collectivity' sense is derived via 
STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY metonymy, where 
'category' actually denotes a group. Collectivity sense can further be extended to mean 
location via PART FOR WHOLE LOCATION METONYMY13: a neighbourhood as a group of people 
who live near you metonymyically stands for the area that surrounds that group of people, that 
is, the whole setting: houses, flats, streets and other facilitities that operate within the area. 
This is the case of PEOPLE LIVING IN A PARTICULAR PLACE FOR PLACE metonymy. We believe 
this metonymy to be conditioned by transformation of multiplex image schema to mass image 
schema: “Imagine a group of several objects. Move away (in your mind) from the group until 
the cluster of individuals starts to become a single homogeneous mass.” (Johnson 1990: 26). 
It is our conceptual ability to view a group of objects as a homogenous mass that is situated in 
a certain area.  
The first location sense is the one of 'living and dwelling' in a particular area, the second one 
is simply the one of 'being around at a given point'.  
 
  
                                                 
13 This type of metonymy for locative sense of -ište suffix in Croatian was argued for by Brdar and Brdar-
Szabó (2014). Just as there is a metonymic relationship between a plant or a number of instances of plants as 
the metonymic source and an area covered by these plants as the target, we claim to have this relationship 
between neighbours and the area they live in.  
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 Once the location sense has been established, other senses occur, with their own 
metaphorical motivation.  
The meaning of 'about', or 'approximately' as in  
 
 (121) SunSoft is spending in the neighbourhood of $5m on training and education, 
 lead generation and promotion and user-oriented advertising. (BNC) 
 
is metaphorically conditioned via SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY metaphor, in which SIMILARITY 
IS SPATIAL CLOSENESS and DIFFERENCE IS SPATIAL DISTANCE metaphors work. The source 
domain is being at a physical closeness/ distance from someone and that is mapped onto the 
targeted domain, which is being similar (close) or distant in amount.  
 
 In mathematical sense 'neighbourhood' is a set of all points which lie within a stated 
distance of a given point, that is, an area that surrounds a given point: 
 
 (122) In the neighbourhood of a given probe, X, the most distant neighbour can be 
 defined either as that probe whose own neighbourhood shares the smallest 
 number of probes with X, or/and as that probe with the smallest number of clones 
 connecting it with X. One can define the least distant neighbour of the probe X 
 analogously. (http://nar.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/8/1965.full.pdf) 
 Here points are viewed as neighbours via OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE metaphor “where the 
physical object is further specified as being a person. This allows us to comprehend a wide 
variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human motivations, characteristics, 
and activities.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 32). The area surrounding a certain point is an area 
surrounding a person.  
 
 
 
13.1.1.5. A part of the body 
 In our corpus we have found two examples in which 'the state of being N' 
metonymically denotes parts of human's body, namely in manhood and womanhood where it 
also denotes 'genital organs': 
 
 (123) He shifted on her, and she felt the hard thrust of his manhood against her thigh. 
 (BNC) 
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 (124) (...) finding the hard nub of her womanhood before slipping below to the hot, 
 molten tightness at her center (...) (BNC) 
 
 The example of 'manhood' is found in many medical articles on prostate cancer where 
men deal with the 'lose of their manhood' as a vital part of their masculinity. We believe it is 
possible to understand these nominalizations as body parts due to WHOLE FOR PART 
metonymy: all the physical and mental characteristics of a man and a woman are reduced to 
their physical dimension (WHOLE PERSON FOR PART OF THE BODY). We were able to find only 
one example with 'womanhood' in this sense, although some dictionaries give the definition of 
'vulva' as one of the meanings for it (YD adds that it is used euphemistically).  
Dictionary.com gives an additional meaning of manhood, which can be seen as an extension 
of this meaning, namely virility, potency: 
 (125) As Patricia Simons has suggested, scholars should reorient their discussions of 
 bodily  manhood to consider more closely the centrality of semen as a marker of 
 libido, vigour and strength. (http://shm.oxfordjournals.org) 
 
 Potency again signals a state, a condition of being able to perform sexual intercourse. 
Although we have not been able to find more examples where manhood could stand for 
potency, we believe this meaning is metonymically derived from 'male genitalia' via  
INSTRUMENT FOR RESULT (INSTRUMENT USED TO PREFORM A CERTAIN ACTION FOR ABILITY 
TO PERFORM IT). 
 
 
 
13.1.2. Extensions from the prototypical sense  
 All the nominalizations formed by the suffix -hood have the central meaning of 'state 
or condition of being N'. The following nominalizations have three meanings, namely the 
central meaning of 'state' + 'collectivity sense' + 'period of time' sense14: 
 
boyhood 
 state 
 (126) Somehow my father and I remained in boyhood, not developing, turning into big 
 hairy ageing boys. (BNC)  
                                                 
14 We will repeat some of the example sentences in this section since our corpora has not provided us with 
adequate examples.  
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 a group of boys 
 (127) (...) each in his creator's idealized version of American boyhood and, by the 
 same token, a prototype of democratic character. (MacLeod 1996:  77) 
 a period during which one is a boy 
 (128) It was an evening of blissful happiness for Jack's brother, a return to boyhood, 
 those beloved ‘Malvern days when it was just the two of us against the P'daytabird’. 
 (BNC) 
 
childhood 
 state 
 (129) As she grows up and matures, you will notice many of these childhood traits 
 develop into adult ones. (OD) 
 a group of children 
 (130) Ah, those far off days when childhood still retained the innocence that has been 
 so sadly lost today. (OD) 
 a period in one's life when one is a child 
 (131) Toomey's childhood was dominated by ‘constant worry about money’, but it 
 spurred him on. (BNC) 
 
cubhood 
 state 
 (45) They were a brave group, but they were walking into the nightmares of their 
 cubhood, and  it shook the most stalwart among them. (WD) 
 a group of cubs 
 (46) He was better fitted for the life than the other dogs, for he had the training of his 
 cubhood to guide him. (OD) 
  a period of time during which one is a cub 
 (132) Trace the growth of these beautiful and ferocious striped felines from cubhood 
 through adulthood and learn how they hunt, raise their young, and get along with 
 other tigers. (OD) 
 
girlhood 
 state 
 (49) I rejected womanhood, not because I preferred manhood, but because I preferred 
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 girlhood.  (BNC) 
 a group of girls 
 (133) As I said in this presence last year, how can you expect complete independence 
 for Egypt when, as shown by the last census, 95 percent of the people are still 
 illiterate, and when the womanhood of Egypt and its girlhood is 99.3 percent 
 illiterate? (WD) 
 a girl's childhood 
 (134) Sightless, she smiled thinly and inhumanly; she who had not seen a smile with 
 which to compare since her girlhood, nor a mirror either. (BNC) 
 
priesthood 
 state 
 (135) Our priest is a very prepared man of prayer who loves his priesthood and it 
 shows.  (BNC) 
 a group of priests forming an order 
 (136) But such a scheme finds no place in the monarchy; it presupposes a hierocracy 
 under which the priesthood increased its rights by claiming the privileges which past 
 kings had enjoyed (...) (YD) 
 a period of time during which one has the function of a preist 
 (137) With the other two books being completed during his priesthood from 391 to 
 395. (BNC) 
 
 The collectivity sense is derived from the sense 'state of being N' via DEFINING STATE 
OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY. The period of time can be 
understood via THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE IS N.  
 
 Two examples have all these senses + 'part of the body' sense, derived via STATE OF 
THE WHOLE PERSON FOR PART OF THE BODY Metonymy, namely manhood and womanhood. 
Metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR RESULT (INSTRUMENT USED TO PREFORM A CERTAIN ACTION 
FOR ABILITY TO PERFORM IT) enables us to understand manhood as 'potency':  
 
manhood 
 state of being a man 
 (138) He tended to be a little touchy about remarks concerning his manhood. (BNC) 
  a group of men 
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 (139) 'These institutions instil and cultivate in their cadets what were once commonly 
 referred to as the virtues of southern manhood — honour, chivalry and devotion  to 
 God, state and family,' wrote one alumnus in a letter to a newspaper. (BNC) 
 time of being an adult male  
 (140) After having wooed her in the old high way for most of his young manhood, 
 Yeats was horrified when she suddenly decided to marry the revolutionary hard- man 
 John MacBride. (BNC) 
 man's genitalia 
 (141) CAR worker Dave Baxter nearly lost his manhood on the production line. 
 (BNC) 
 
womanhood 
 state  
 (142) But the things that belonged to her womanhood- the charm of her manner; the 
 beauty of her face and form; the appeal of her sex; the quick intuitions of her soul- all 
 these this world received and upon them put a price. (Wright 2008: 44) 
 women collectively 
 (143) There's also the racist Sharron Angle campaign ad that contrasts scary Hispanic 
 gangsters with pure and innocent white children in much the same way that Bible Belt 
 politicians used to speak of protecting the flower of young Southern womanhood from 
 the "colored." (WD) 
 time of being an adult female 
(144) So long you have been growing out of childhood, now you step into  
womanhood. (BNC) 
part of the body 
 (124) (...) finding the hard nub of her womanhood before slipping below to the hot, 
 molten tightness at her center (...) (BNC) 
 
 The location sense is found only in neighbourhood: 
 
neighbourhood 
 state of being a neighbour 
 (10) Social interactions based on neighbourhood have been deteriorating for decades 
 - particularly in highly transitory urban areas. (OD) 
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 group of neighbours 
 (145) Entire Neighbourhood Secretly Learns Sign Language To Surprise Deaf 
 Neighbor. (https://www.boredpanda.com/) 
 a place, area where people live / an area surrounding a particular person, place or 
 object 
 (146) He was reluctant to leave the neighbourhood of London. (OD) 
 
 The location sense is derived from the collective one via PEOPLE LIVING IN A 
PARTICULAR PLACE FOR PLACE metonymy, with the collective meaning being derived via 
STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY metonymy, where category 
actually denotes a group.  
 
 
 
13.1.3. Adjectival roots 
 Nominalizations with adjectives as bases are not numerous. They prototypically 
denote 'the state of being A'. An extension from this sense is found only in one example, 
which will be shown below.  
 
 
 
13.1.3.1. The state of being A 
 Nouns belonging to this group do not have nouns as basis, but rather adjectives.  
 
falsehood 
 the state of being false or untrue 
 (147) On this level of mere temperamental affinity (not considering its truth or 
 falsehood) we feel Lewis to be a man who would be most happy in Christian garb. 
 (WD) 
 
 This meaning is the opposite of 'being true' and in many examples appears in 
collocation with 'truth'.  
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hardihood 
 the state of being hardy 
 All the definitions of hardihood in Oxford English Dictionariy (boldness, daring), 
Collins COBUILD English Dictionary for Advanced Learners (courage, daring or audacity) 
and Webster's New World College Dictionary (courage, fortitude and resolute and self-assured 
audacity often carried to the point of impudent insolence) express a mental state of a person, 
rather than a physical one, although the adjective hardy also expresses (among other meanings 
of bold, daring and courageous) physical qualities such as able to withstand fatigue and 
privation. Our examples show that the central meaning of hardihood is the state of being 
mentally fit, physical traits are found rarely:   
 
 (148) Few nations have ever existed, who have evinced more indomitable courage or 
 hardihood, or shown more devotion to the spirit of independence than the Iroquois. 
 (OD) 
 
 Physical endurance is found in the following examples: 
 
 (149) Russian organization and training were poor, although her soldiers always 
 showed great  hardihood and endurance, and she had to find forces to defend a 
 frontier from the Baltic to the Black Sea, as well as detachments for the Caucasus, 
 central Asia and the Far East. (BNC) 
 (150) But even contacts between the most developed states of the West could on 
 occasion, as in previous generations, demand from diplomats a good deal of 
 physical hardihood. (BNC) 
 
 But even in these examples the context is what makes us believe physical strength is 
what is meant here and only because it is followed by the noun endurance, or preceded by the 
adjective physical. Thus, hardihood can mean both mental and physical strength, i.e. the state 
of being mentally and physically fit.  
 
 In our corpus there are few examples in which the meaning of 'the state of being hardy' 
is extended to mean the nerve, self-assured audacity or insolence needed at a given moment 
for a specific situation: 
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 (151) The defective article might still be in the manufacturer's possession three years 
 after the date of manufacture, and he might sell it later, but no one would have the 
 hardihood to suggest  that the three years' limitation had already cut off all right of 
 action before he had sold it. (BNC) 
 
likelihood 
 the state of being likely or probable (probability, a chance) 
 (152) In fact, as Lévi-Strauss has helped us to recognize in his distinction between 
 ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, it is in all likelihood a universal human obsession.  (BNC) 
 
 'It is in all likelihood a universal human obsession' can be paraphrased as 'it is very 
likely a universal human obsession' and this paraphrases enable us to see this nominalization 
as a state or condition. 
 
livelihood 
 the state of being lively, liveliness 
 The meaning 'state of being lively' as liveliness (energy, vigor) is obsolete now and 
replaced by the noun liveliness. The noun today has several meanings, which we will not 
discuss in detail since these meanings are not derived from lively + hood, but rather from Old 
English lifad 'course of life', from lif 'life' + lad 'way, course'. These other meanings are 
'means of living or of supporting life', 'occupation', 'employment' or 'the source of income'. In 
the following two examples we can, however, find the meaning of liveliness: 
 
 (153)  Like many northern Colorado communities, the river gave Lyons its character, 
 identity and livelihood, and then the river almost took it all away.  (BNC) 
 (154) Patrick Michael Tovani, 75, said he has survived a harrowing motorcycle 
 accident and a stroke that partially paralyzed him and robbed him of his livelihood. 
 (BNC) 
 
unlikelihood 
 absence of likelihood, the state of being unlikely 
 (155) The unlikelihood of the urban parish continuing to exhibit the features of a self-
 standing community has also been revealed by research showing the way in 
 which kinship and friendship contacts are kept up over ever increasing 
 geographical distances, largely because of mass car and telephone ownership. (BNC) 
157 
lustihood 
  state of being lusty 
 (156) We sympathize with James, a romantic, active, and accomplished prince, cut off 
 in the  lustihood of youth from all the enterprise, the noble uses, and vigorous delights 
 of life; as we do with Milton, alive to all the beauties of nature and glories of art, 
 when he breathes forth brief,  but deep-toned lamentations over his perpetual 
 blindness. (WD) 
 
 
 
13.1.3.2. An action of making something A 
We have found one example in our corpus that has action reading, namely falsehood: 
 
falsehood 
 action of lying and deceiving someone 
 (157) Grappelli had to be content with an action for malicious falsehood. (BNC) 
 (158) The action for malicious falsehood is much less favourable to plaintiffs than 
 defamation. (BNC) 
 This action is the one that repeats itself, someone has been telling lies in order to hurt 
or someone's reputation. It usually collocates with malicious, which adds even more negative 
connotations. 
 Metonymy that is at work here is STATE (OF BEING FALSE) FOR ACTION (OF MAKING 
USE OF THAT STATE). 
 
 
 
13.1.3.3. An instance or example of being A 
 There is one noun belonging to this group and it denotes the actual occurrence of the 
given state, namely falsehood.  Apart from the meanings 'the state of being untrue or false' 
and 'lying', it also has the meaning of 'a false statement', which is the actual example of the 
given state, that is an instance  of the quality referred to by the adjectival root. 
a lie or a false statement 
 (159) And some high priests have told falsehoods. (BNC)  
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 The action of lying leads to concrete utterances or false statements, which are seen as 
the result of lying. In this sense, the noun can become pluralized and usually appears with the 
verb tell. Here we are no longer dealing with the state of being untrue or repeated lying, but 
rather with the result of it, a statement or utterance given at a certain point in time. In our 
view this is the case of ACTION FOR RESULT metonymy. Telling lies is a mental activity which 
results in a false belief or idea that is conveyed.  
 Falsehood is thus an example of a double metonymy: the state of being false stands 
for the action of lying, which in turn stands for the result. 
 
 Here we also encounter CONDUIT METAPHOR since the result is put into words. This 
metaphor is discussed in Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 9) where they go back to Michael Reddy 
“who observes that our language about language is structured roughly by the following 
complex metaphor: IDEAS (OR MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS.” 
 
 
 
13.1.4. Extensions from the prototypical sense  
As already stated above, only one nominalization with adjective as basis has additional 
meaning and that is falsehood: 
1) the state of being false: 
 (160) These two quests ultimately lead us to the truth, and it is the gradual process of 
 uncovering both falsehood and truth that provides the substance of this movie. (OD)  
2) action of making something false via STATE (OF BEING FALSE) FOR ACTION (OF MAKING 
USE OF THAT STATE) metonymy:  
 (161) Federal law now makes it a felony to use falsehood and deception to hide the 
 origin of the spam messages hawking your fraudulent wares. (OD)  
3) an instance or example of being false via ACTION FOR RESULT: 
 (162) Lynch's parents read the story, laughed at the ludicrous falsehoods, but made no 
 attempt to correct them. (OD)  
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13.1.5. Concluding remarks on the suffix -hood 
 After completing our analysis, we can conclude that when the suffix -hood is attached 
to nouns, it can produce the following meanings, some of which were not mentioned in the 
theoretical part on the suffixes: 
1. The state of what is being expressed by the base noun. This is the prototypical meaning 
of the suffix.  
1.1. States of (non)-human life. We have encountered the following nominalizations that 
belong here: 
adulthood, angelhood, animalhood, aunthood, babyhood, beggarhood, boyhood, brotherhood, 
childhood, cousinhood, creaturehood, cubhood, daughterhood, fatherhood, girlhood, 
godhood, grandparenthood, humanhood, ladyhood, manhood, motherhood, neighbourhood, 
orphanhood, parenthood, peoplehood, personhood, puppyhood, sainthood, selfhood, 
servanthood, sisterhood, sonhood, toddlerhod, victimhood and womanhood. 
Nominalizations in this group often denote behaviour of N via STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR 
TYPICAL OF N. 
1.2. Social statuses and legal rights: bachelorhood, husbandhood, kinghood, knighthood, 
monkhood, nationhood, priesthood, prophethood, queenhood, spinsterhood, spousehood, 
statehood, widowhood, widowerhood and wifehood. 
 
2. A group of people (or animals) sharing the thing referred to by the nominal root. This 
meaning is derived via DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE 
CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy. We have divided this into two subgroups: 
2.1. A general group of people or animals, a collectivity: 
 animalhood, aunthood, beggarhood, boyhood, childhood,  cousinhood, cubhood, fatherhood, 
girlhood, ladyhood, manhood, motherhood, neighbourhood, sainthood and womanhood.  
2.2. A group of people denoted by N that stands for a union with a specific purpose, goals 
of function, often a religious one: 
brotherhood, sisterhood, monkhood, priesthood, prophethood and knighthood. 
 
 We have found the activation of BLOOD LINE FOR PHYSICAL CLOSENESS and MENTAL 
CLOSENESS FOR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOUR/SIMILARITY metonymies within MENTAL (CLOSENESS) 
IS PHYSICAL (CLOSENESS) metaphor in the nominalizations brotherhood and sisterhood.  
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3. A period of time during which one is N. The state of being N is metonymically 
understood as the period of time during which one is in the state of N + hood via THE STATE 
OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE IS N metonymy. This extended 
meaning is found in the following nominalizations: 
adulthood, babyhood, bachelorhood, boyhood, childhood, cubhood, girlhood, 
grandparenthood, maidenhood, manhood (as opposed to boyhood), priesthood, puppyhood, 
queenhood, spinsterhood, toddlerhood, widowhood, widowerhood and womanhood (as 
opposed to girlhood).  
 
4. An area of the thing referred to by N. Metonymy responsible for this reading is PEOPLE 
LIVING IN A PARTICULAR PLACE FOR PLACE metonymy, which is found in neighbourhood. A 
group meaning of 'people' is derived by DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR 
THE WHOLE CATEGORY. (the whole category meaning 'people'). 
 
5. A part of the body. STATE OF THE WHOLE PERSON FOR PART OF THE BODY metonymy 
produces this meaning in manhood and womanhood. 
 When -hood is attached to adjectives, it can denote the following:  
1. The state of being A. This meaning is a central one: falshood, hardihood, likelyhood, 
livelihood, unlikelyhood, lustihood. 
2. An action of making something A. This is metonymically derived via STATE (OF BEING 
FALSE) FOR ACTION (OF MAKING USE OF THAT STATE): falsehood. 
3. An instance or example of being A. This reading is derived from the action reading via 
ACTION FOR RESULT metonymy in  falsehood. 
 
 
 
13.2. The suffix -ness 
 Examples ending in the suffix -ness are greater in number than those ending in -hood. 
As already stated, this suffix can freely be attached to almost any adjective, both native 
(cleanness) and non-native (perfectness), as well as adjectival compounds (church-
relatedness). Bauer, Lieber and Plag (2013) add that -ness is frequently found on nouns and 
nominal compounds (baseballness, nationness, couch-potatoness), phrases (every-girlness, 
take-it-for-grantedness, you-are-thereness) and other categories, as they put it (aboveness, 
beforeness, afterwardness), to name just a few examples of what they give. They further state 
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(2013: 246) that “-ness seems in effect to serve as a sort of a default way of forming abstract 
nouns from non-verbal categories in contemporary English.” In Old English, however, -ness 
was attached to infinitives and participles and had action meaning (Kastovsky 1985: 244-
246): gebregdness meaning 'sudden movement' from the infinitive gebregdan 'to move 
suddenly'; onfundenness meaning 'experience, discovery' from onfindan 'to find out, discover'. 
Other functions of the suffix were to produce objective, factitive, instrumental or locative 
nouns (foreset(ed)ness meaning  'preposition', setness  in the sense of  'ordinance, regulation', 
gereordness meaning 'food' and wuneness meaning 'dwelling'). In Modern English this action 
meaning is lost, the suffix is attached mostly to adjectives and denotes a passive state. The 
meaning of state or quality of being A is taken as a central meaning. Other meanings, in our 
view, equally central, are property, quality or trait. We will not make the same distinctions as 
the one made by Hamawand (2008) where he gives the meaning of trait as a central meaning 
found with human nouns only and sees the meaning of property (for non-humans) as an 
extension.15 We believe that the distinction between quality, property, characteristic or trait is 
irrelevant here, that is, it does not matter whether the derived noun refers to humans or non-
humans. We will treat all these notions under the common term state. We will use 
Hamawand's definition of state, as follows: “State is a condition of being that exists at a 
particular time, as with regard to circumstances. It is a condition that an entity is in at a given 
moment, which is subject to change.” (2008: 67). 
 
 For Hamawand's terms 'trait' and 'property' we will use the more general term 'quality'. 
Another reason why we will not treat 'quality' or 'state' separately is the fact that the majority 
of our examples is defined in the dictionaries we used as 'quality or state of'. Both of these 
terms denote the basic essence or nature of the noun in question. The only difference we will 
argue for is the one given in Givón (1993: 62): 
 One may divide adjectives somewhat roughly according to those that are more 
prototypical, and thus code inherent, concrete, relatively stable qualities of entities; and those 
that are less prototypical, and thus code more temporary, less concrete states. 
 
 In this view, qualities are more stable and concrete properties of entities and denote 
size, colour, auditory qualities, shape, taste and tactile dimensions, whereas states denote 
different social and mental properties that are less concrete and more transitory. Thus, sadness 
would be characterized as a state and sweetness as a quality, since sad denotes someone's 
                                                 
15 It is interesting to notice that for the suffix -ness, the author does not give the meaning of 'state'. 
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mental state, and sweet a taste property. Furthermore, we view state as something one finds 
themselves being in, and quality as something that one possesses. But again, we will not treat 
them as distinct senses in our analysis, but only acknowledge that there is a difference. 
 
 Furthermore, we will not use 'inability' as a separate, distinct meaning of the suffix -
ness since we believe it to belong under the meaning of 'ability', that is quality, only in the 
opposite sense. So, in our view, blindness will not have the meaning 'inability to see' but 
rather 'state of being blind', deafness is the inability to hear, but we will treat it as 'state of 
being deaf' and so on.  
 
 When it comes to derivatives with bases other than adjectives, we will not analyze 
them since they all denote the same: the suffix here “highlights or picks out the significant 
characteristics that make that entitiy what it is, denoting the abstract quality or state of those 
characteristics.” (Bauer, Lieber and Plag 2013: 261). That makes them semantically less 
interesting for our analysis. This is also the case with all the other, adjective-based derivatives 
that mean the state of being A. They are numerous and very predictable in meaning. That is, if 
one understands the meaning of a certain adjective, one can assume the meaning of the noun 
derived from this adjective by means of the suffix -ness (Carstairs-McCarthy 2002). As 
already explained in the methodology section, in deciding which examples to provide, we 
chose the criterion of frequency.  
 
 Due to the great number of nominalizations ending in -ness, when compared to those 
ending in -hood, we will organize this section a bit differently than we did with the suffix -
hood where we divided the meanings and listed all the examples for each meaning. That is, 
we will not have the separate section called 'the state or quality of being A' with the 
corresponding nominalizations and their examples, such as arbitrariness, fondness, 
homelessness or cheerfulness, since they do not have any extended meanings apart from the 
central meaning and since it would take up too much space, but rather start our analysis with 
the extended meanings of -ness, providing in each section the example(s) of a prototypical 
meaning followed by example(s) of other, less prototypical meanings. Sometimes, the central 
meaning of a state or quality is itself polysemous and all the meanings will be provided. Our 
analysis will be based on those derivatives that have other, metaphorically or metonymically, 
extended meanings.  
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13.2.1. An instance or example of the quality or state denoted by the adjectival root 
(by A) 
 As is the case with the suffix -hood, the suffix -ness can also denote an instance or an 
example of the quality or state in question. Instance is seen as a single occurrence or a 
manifestation of a state, in a specific context and in certain time period. This is why most of 
the -ness nominalizations can behave as count nouns: they can be pluralized or appear with 
the indefinite article. In the dictionaries we used, however, not many examples are given as 
being able to take indefinite article and become a count noun, but our analysis shows that this 
is possible for the majority of examples. Langacker (2008) states that this is especially true for 
emotion terms, which can be used as either a proper noun16, a common count noun and a 
mass noun. The usage of each of them is connected with the domain of instantiation.17 The 
noun being count or mass depends on the presence or absence of bounding within this 
domain. A count noun refers to a bounded region in space, a mass noun, on the other hand, to 
an unbounded region. Many examples in our analysis refer to emotive states such as 
happiness, sadness or loneliness and their domain of instantiation is the combination of both 
space and time, “a patch of emotive “substance” occurs wherever and whenever somebody 
experiences the emotion in question. Numerous discontinuous patches of this sort may 
constitute a single instance of this abstract type of substance.” (Langacker, 2008: 146). We 
have divided the instances into acts that show A + ness, causes of A + ness, special types of A 
+ ness and objects exemplifying A + ness. 
 
 
 
13.2.1.1. An act of being A 
 The nominalizations belonging to this group can be paraphrased as 'a A act' as in 'a 
kindness- a kind act' or 'an act in which one shows A-ness' as in 'a meanness- an act in which 
one shows meanness'. Most of the examples are count nouns. In this sense, an act is 
something that someone (an agent) has done and it will be termed as 'event'. We will give one 
example of the central meaning and one example of the extension. We will claim that the 
                                                 
16 The term 'proper noun' is used here to denote its unique reference (Langacker, 2008, 2013). 
17 Langacker (1991, 2008, 2009) distinguishes between a type and an instance of a noun phrase. Noun specifies 
a type of thing and an instance occupies a particular location, which, for physical entities, is most commonly 
space:  
 If (at a given moment) two things of the same type occupy exactly the same location, they are (in our naive 
conception) the same instance. If they are different instances, they occupy different locations. A type 
conception represents the abstracted commonality of its instances. (2009: 86).  
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extension is caused by STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT DEMONSTRATING THAT STATE OR 
QUALITY metonymy. Nominalizations belonging to this group are blindness, darkness, 
foolishness, kindness, madness, meanness, politeness, reasonableness, righteousness, 
rudeness, selfishness, ugliness, unfairness, unkindness and wickedness. In all these examples 
we are dealing with situations in which one shows the state in question, but the emphasis is on 
the act of doing so. All the adjectives in bases are typical of person's behaviour and denote 
how a person treats others so all our nominalizations are seen as results of somebody's quality. 
We metonymically perceive the quality as somebody's behaviour via QUALITY FOR 
BEHAVIOUR metonymy. 
 
blindness 
This is one of the examples where we find polysemy already in the central meaning, 'the state 
or quality of being blind':  
 -the state of being unable to see because of injury, disease, or a congenital condition 
 (163) It is useless against all other forms of meningitis which cause deafness, 
 blindness, and brain damage as well as death. (BNC) 
 
 -the state of not being able to understand things, ignorance 
 (164) The row that followed had left her deeply shaken, as much at her own blindness 
 to the  kind of man he really was as by the dreadful things he had done. (BNC) 
 
 This is the case of BEING IGNORANT IS BEING UNABLE TO SEE metaphor, a 
submetaphor of UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor.  
 
 -the acts of keeping something secret, concealment 
 (165) Of course, there were and are risks in doing that. From the vantage point of so-
 called  post-liberation, we know only too well the political blindnesses of sexual 
 desire, and how disastrous it can be to make sexuality the prime mover of a 
 political vision. (BNC) 
 In this case, the metaphorical blindness of not being able to understand is not 
deliberate. Here we are dealing with deliberate actions of keeping something secret from 
others or being ignorant on purpose.  An expression that often appears in this sense is wilful 
blindness, a term used in law for a situation where a person, in trying to avoid civil or 
criminal liability for a wrongful act, makes herself or himself ignorant of the facts connected 
to the act.  
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 (166) Nor is it enough if the accused acted with wilful blindness, even though in some 
 areas of criminal law wilful blindness is treated as knowledge. (BNC) 
 
darkness 
 This nominalization is very rich in meanings due to metaphorical processes. As a state 
or quality, it denotes the following (starting with literal meanings): 
 -the state of being dark, without light 
 (167) The darkness of the room made it difficult to see. (WS) 
 -the quality of being dark in colour 
 (168) Her hair was pulled back into a tight high ponytail; her hair was also streaked 
 with blond and red over the darkness of her natural dark brown. (OD) 
 
Metaphorically, it can denote: 
 -unhappiness or gloom, the state of trouble 
 (169) Not all elements of Tent City life are shrouded in gloom and darkness, however. 
 (OD) 
This is the case of SAD IS DARK metaphor.  
 -the state of being  intellectually or spiritually ignorant 
 (170) As the conventional story goes, once upon a time the West slumbered in 
 intellectual darkness. (OD) 
The reason for this meaning lies in the IGNORANT IS DARK metaphor and IMPEDIMENTS TO 
AWARENESS ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO SEEING metaphor.  
 -secrecy or mystery: 
 (171) They drew a veil of darkness across the proceedings. (OD) 
 (172) His arrival was shrouded in darkness and secrecy. (OD) 
 Similar to the previous example, this meaning of something unknown is connected to 
KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor: when we are unable to see something, we cannot understand it 
and that is why it is secret and mysterious to us.  
 -the state of being dark as wicked 
 (173) It scared her the way she would crave that darkness, the wickedness, the evil 
 forces.  (OD) 
 This is derived via BADNESS IS DARKNESS metaphor.  
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This state of being wicked further produces act of wickedness: 
 -an act in which one shows their wickedness 
 (174) Corruption in working units and other darknesses are major barriers which 
 constrain directly people's initiatives. (COCA) 
 
foolishness 
 -the quality of acting stupidly or rashly 
 (175) I did not need to go on about Jean-Claude's obstinacy, foolishness and 
 arrogance. (BNC) 
 -a foolish act , an absurdity, a wrong act attributable to bad judgment or ignorance or 
 inattention 
 (176) It was just foolishness, the kind of thing people do at your age. (BNC) 
 (177) We talk no more of this foolishness. (BNC) 
 
kindness 
 -the quality of being kind, considerate and sympathetic  
 (178) I believe in acting with kindness and compassion. (The Guardian, May 9, 2016) 
 -an act of kindness, a manifestation of kind feeling, an instance of kind behaviour 
 (179) (...) and so I take this opportunity to thank you again for all your kindnesses to 
 me and for the way you made me welcome when I arrived 5 years ago. (BNC) 
 
madness 
 The polysemy of the adjective mad (as mentally ill, angry, excited) can be explained 
through various  metaphorical processes:  
 -the state of having a serious mental illness or disorder impairing a person's capacity to 
 function normally and safely 
 (180) In any case, my mental state bordered on madness, and twenty-four hours of 
 Paris sufficed to restore me to my equilibrium. (OD)  
 -the state of chaos and wild activity 
 (181) The same madness is spreading everywhere as the small business crisis deepens. 
 (BNC) 
 
 This meaning is a case of WILD ACTIVITY IS MADNESS metaphor. In this state of chaos 
people behave as if they were mad, they are unstable and unreliable, which is often 
metaphorized as madness.  
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Madness can also denote excitement or enthusiasm, as well as fury or rage. These meanings 
are seen as very strong emotions derived by STRONG EMOTIONS ARE MADNESS metaphor: 
 -the state of enthusiasm or excitement 
 (182) The madness of Mardi Gras had crept into her veins. 
 (https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=madness) 
 -the state of rage and fury  
 (183) In a moment of madness Rosenoir kicked Alan Kernaghan as he lay on the 
 ground. (BNC) 
  -the quality of being rash or foolish 
 When we deal with madness as a type of person's character, we encounter a case of 
FOOLISHNESS IS MADNESS metaphor. 
 (184) The duo have been entertaining audiences all over the world for more than a 
 decade with their musical madness and bizarre antics. (OD) 
 -an extremely foolish act 
 In this sense we find both count and non-count nouns: 
 (185) To introduce this sentiment into modern society would be madness. (OD) 
 (186) The new laws are a madness. (OD) 
 
 This often collocates with sheer: 
 (187) It was sheer madness to attempt the drive during a blizzard. (WD) 
 
meanness 
 -the quality of being deliberately mean, a desire to harm others or to see others suffer 
 (188) (...) just so Mr Evans could live here and fill it with his meanness and greed. 
 (BNC) 
 -a mean act, the one in which one deliberately hurts someone 
 (189) Taking an aunt’s gift from a little girl is meanness that swallows the cause. 
 (Seattle Times, Nov 25, 2014) 
 
politeness 
 -the quality of being respectful and considerate of other people 
 (190) Politeness alone made her go back to see the doctor, and listen to her almost 
 stern advice. (BNC) 
 -the act of showing regard for others  
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 In this sense it can be used both as a count and a non-count noun: 
 (191) That is real politeness, then, to stay for two and a half hours, in an old woman's 
 bedroom, listening and asking questions. That is courtesy of a rare kind. (BNC) 
 (192) But this was no more than a politeness with little political meaning, and one 
 which  disappeared, though slowly, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
 (BNC) 
 
reasonableness 
 This is a characteristic found in both human and non-human entities. When we talk 
about reasonableness of a person, it means the person has a good sense and sound judgment. 
When ideas, actions or emotions are reasonable, it means they are plausible or acceptable to a 
reasonable person. We often talk about reasonableness of prices, meaning prices are 
affordable and moderate. The following examples illustrate this: 
 (193) The home secretary’s warrants will be reviewed by judges, who will check them 
 for lawfulness and reasonableness. (Economist, Jan 21, 2016) 
 (194) When he got hold of an idea it obsessed him, he could think of nothing else, and 
 he had a more than common power to persuade himself of the reasonableness of 
 what he wished to do. (Maugham: 1999: 301) 
 (195) Paul, despite his reasonableness, hasn’t energized the libertarian wing of the 
 party.  (Salon, Jan 4, 2016) 
 (196) The store is famous for the reasonableness of its prices. (VCB) 
 -a reasonable act 
 When a person engages in an activity reasonably and they show the quality of 
reasonableness, the meaning of a nominalization is changed from QUALITY into ACT: 
 
 (197) You say, 'A reasonable attitude towards mankind is also to my profit'; but what if 
 I find all these reasonablenesses unreasonable, all these barracks and 
 phalansteries? (BNC) 
 (198) Miss Bruce went upstairs again, much more nearly disposed to wonder at such 
 reasonableness than to admire it. (Delafield 2015: 88) 
 
righteousness 
 -the quality of being morally right or justifiable 
 (199) He is so convinced of the righteousness of the fight that he compares it to the 
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 Royal  Navy’s campaign against slavery two centuries ago. (The Guardian, Mar 9, 
 2016) 
 -the act or conduct of one who is righteous 
 (200) Kings led them into battle for the land (e.g. 2 Kings 8) and prophets pointed 
 them to a righteousness that would bring them to a new highway, a land where 
 mountains would be levelled, rough places smoothed (Is. 40.4), and the Prince of 
 Peace would establish his kingdom. (BNC) 
 
rudeness  
 -the quality of being rude 
 (201) Yet Mr. Marot’s rudeness, bad temper and propensity for violence were an open 
 secret.(New York Times, March 11, 2016) 
 -a rude act 
 (202) Mr. Hayes had been thoroughly cross all day, and had not forgiven Reynold's 
 rudeness of the evening before. (Veley 2012: 141) 
 
selfishness 
 -the quality of being selfish; stinginess resulting from a concern for your own welfare 
 and a disregard of others 
 (203) Another symptom of paedomorphosis is child-like selfishness and self-
 absorption, and Bill has shown he has that. (BNC) 
 -an example of selfish behaviour 
 (204) The mess of my life, the selfishnesses and false turnings and the treacheries, all 
 these things could fall into place. (BNC) 
 
ugliness 
 -the quality of being repulsive in appearance 
 (205) Breeze was struck by the uncompromising ugliness of her home. (BNC) 
 -the quality of being unpleasant or immoral by nature 
 (206) I knew the ugliness of Heine's nature: his revengefulness, and malice, and 
 cruelty, and treachery, and uncleanness; and yet he was supremely charming among 
 the poets I have read.  (FD) 
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 Here the physical property of an object is transferred onto someone's character, that is 
outer appearance is reflected in the character of the person through the metaphor MENTAL 
CHARACTERISTICS IS PHYSICAL APPEARANCE. When ugliness is seen as a personality trait, it 
can metonymically denote an act in which one shows this trait: 
 -an objectionable act 
 (207) Mr. Trump’s latest ugliness was to mock the disability of a newspaper reporter 
 who had displeased him. (Washington Post, Nov 27, 2015) 
 
unfairness 
 -the state of being unfair or unjust 
 (208) The striker then looks as if he’s going to burst into tears at the cruel unfairness 
 of it all. (The Guardian, Nov 14, 2015) 
 -an unfair or unjust act, an unfair or inadequate treatment of someone or something  
 (209) But, as the complaint illustrates, there’s no shortage of other legal principles 
 designed to prevent unfairness to consumers that could be applicable in this case. 
 (Slate, Oct 13, 2015) 
 
unkindness 
 -the quality of being unkind and insensitive 
 (210) And too many patients have stories of how unkindness or the sheer 
 obliviousness of doctors can be devastating and indelible. (Washington Post, Aug 
 11, 2016) 
 -an act in which one displays lack of sympathy 
 (211) All his faults, all his unkindnesses, were forgotten now: only his beauty, his 
 vigour, his great passion, his courage were remembered. (Weyman 2012: 139)   
 
wickedness 
 -the quality of being wicked as behaving morally objectionable  
 (212) A left-handed preschooler was allegedly forced by his teacher to write with his 
 right hand because left-handedness is “associated with wickedness.” (Washington 
 Times, Sep 23, 2015) 
 -the quality of being estranged from God 
 (213) This obedience resulted in death because of the wickedness and sin of humanity. 
 (BNC) 
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 -a wicked act, an act in which one shows their wickedness 
 (214) Always before, after similar wickednesses, she had felt almost gleeful triumph, 
 but this time, although she was not truly sorry for what she had done to Mrs Darrell, 
 she felt something like remorse. (BNC) 
 (215) This was a wickedness far outdoing Snowball’s destruction of the windmill. 
 (VCB) 
 
 
 
13.2.1.2. An event, a person or a situation that brings about A + ness  
 The nominalizations belonging to this group can be paraphrased as something (a thing, 
an event, a situation) or someone that makes you A or makes you feel A. These include 
happiness, sadness, ugliness, unpleasantness and weakness. They are all instances of EFFECT 
FOR CAUSE metonymy. The state actually stands for a thing, an event or a situation that has 
produced a certain state or that which has caused a certain state.  
happiness 
 -the state of well-being characterized by emotions ranging from contentment to intense 
 joy 
 (216) They want to share their happiness with everyone they know in a big 
 celebration. (BNC) 
 -a thing, an event or a situation that makes you happy 
 (217) He afterwards regarded making friends with Lord Halifax as one of the 
 happinesses of the York years. (BNC) 
 (218) For the people of Delhi this partridge fighting has always been a happiness. 
 (BNC) 
 
sadness 
 -the state of being sad 
 (219) In actual fact our children have feelings of joy and happiness and sadness just 
 as we do. (BNC) 
 -an event in one's life that causes sadness  
 (220) 'The only sadness is that Patrick Steptoe has not lived to see this day because it 
 was always a joint team effort,' Ledger said. (WD) 
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ugliness  
 Apart from being defined as a quality of being repulsive or unpleasant (exemplified 
above) and an unpleasant act, ugliness can also denote an unpleasant situation, something that 
occurs and creates the state of unpleasantness:  
 (221) The photo reflects the situation really well — the differences that exist here and 
 all the  ugliness that is happening here. (Time, Oct 23, 2014) 
 
unpleasantness 
 -the state of emotional distress 
 (222) Women reported less unpleasantness while holding their husband’s hand and 
 even slightly lower stress levels while holding the hand of a stranger. (Time, Aug 16, 
 2016) 
 -the quality of giving displeasure 
 (223) Nothing wrong with acknowledging the unpleasantness of the job market, 
 especially for  someone over 50. (Slate, Mar 1, 2016) 
 -an unpleasant experience, situation or event 
 (224) It said that “China welcomes anyone with friendly intentions and it bears no 
 grudge for past unpleasantness.” (New York Times, Jun 11, 2015) 
 
weakness 
 -the state of lacking strength, either physical or mental 
 (225) In a small number of horses, muscle weakness may progress to paralysis. (WS) 
 (226) Nor do I accept that such feelings are a sign of weakness, provided that they are 
 accompanied by an inner toughness where necessary and justified. (BNC) 
 
 When used with an indefinite article, weakness has two readings: one of them is the 
meaning of a disadvantage, a personal defect or a failing, that which makes a person weak. 
 
 -the quality or feature that prevents someone or something from being effective or 
 useful 
 (227) Those weaknesses just helped her office win a public records case with the 
 software company Oracle. (Washington Times, Aug 29, 2016) 
 (228) His inability to speak in front of an audience was his weakness. (WS) 
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 The other meaning is a strong or habitual liking for something, a special desire; it can 
also have the meaning of something or someone you like like so much that you are often 
unable to resist it, and it is often not good for you: 
 
 -a special desire 
 (229)  To tell you the truth I've always had a weakness for pictures ever since I was a 
 boy. (BNC) 
 (230) You’re his one weakness—he should never have met you. (OD) 
  
 Again we have the meaning of a mental weakness, or rather inability to resist someone 
or something.  
 
 
 
13.2.1.3. A specific type of A + ness 
 Two examples belonging to this group are specific since they are lexicalized in the 
language as instances of the state and therefore used as count nouns. They are also often 
premodified. The two examples of this group are illness and sickness. The instance sense is 
derived via GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy.  
illness 
 -the state of being unhealthy in your body or mind 
 (231) Working with adults who have suffered or are suffering from mental illness using 
 drawing and slide photography. (BNC) 
 (232) Her body was not able to defend itself against illness. (MW) 
 -an instance of a disease or poor health:  
 (233) Stop feeling sorry for yourself. I have patients with real illnesses -patients who 
 are dying from cancer. (BNC) 
 
 When used in a sense of an instance, the usual premodifications are terminal, tropical, 
mental, chronic, intestinal, life-threatening, heat-related, viral and others.  
 
sickness 
 This nominalization can denote two types of states:  
 -the unhealthy state of body or mind 
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 (234) There are grounds for the belief that the blacks even suffered from an infectious 
 disease similar to influenza, which they described as sickness of the mouth and nose. 
 (WD) 
 (235) She was plagued by sickness most of her adult life. (MW) 
 -the feeling you have in your stomach when you think you are going to vomit, nause; a 
 state that usually precedes vomiting 
 (236) Nor will he ever suffer from post-natal depression, morning sickness and the list 
 goes on. (BNC) 
 -a particular type of illness or disease 
 (237) He died from an unknown sickness. (MW) 
 
 
 
13.2.1.4. An object exemplifying A + ness 
 Several nominalizations belonging to this group are also examples of the state seen as 
representations or objects exemplifying the state. Emptinesses are words that have no 
meaning and they are treated as objects of communication (WORDS ARE CONTAINERS FOR 
IDEAS). Likeness is not only the quality of being similar to somebody else, it is also a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptured representation of something or someone, that is a two-
dimensional design intended to look like a person or thing. Another meaning of it is a copy or 
a doppel-ganger of somebody. We claim this and other examples to be cases of STATE FOR 
OBJECT EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE metonymy. It is important to notice that the term object 
refers here to both physical objects such as persons as well as non-physical objects like 
situations or ideas. Apart from emptiness and likeness, other nominalizations in this section 
are foolishness, goodness, highness, holiness and thickness.  
 
emptiness 
 -the state of containing nothing (of space an object) 
 (238) In spite of the hush and emptiness of the house, the two women smuggled the 
 habit in like thieves (...) (BNC) 
 
  Metaphorical meaning of emptiness is seen in the following examples:  
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 (239) Contempt for the emptiness of the 'caring' rhetoric of people like Chris Patten 
 (...) (BNC) 
 (240) He had talked wildly about the meaning of life, the emptiness of it all, the lack 
 of scope offered by the Guardian Building Society. (BNC) 
 (241) Lennis had stressed the emptiness of his life in having a daughter who had little 
 to do with him. (BNC) 
 (242) I could drink, he thought for a moment, and that would fill the emptiness and 
 ease the hunger. (BNC) 
 (243) Now it was an ache, an emptiness that made him think as well as well as act.  
 (VCB) 
 
 In all these examples we are dealing with CONTAINER metaphor. The postmodification 
of emptiness is seen as a container that is empty (LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS 
FOR MEANING, LIFE IS A CONTAINER). In the last two examples is the body that is 
conceptualized as a container.  
When used as a count noun, it refers to the actual utterances that contain no meaning: 
(244) Despite Leon's words, despite my certain knowledge that the spirit of Francis 
had sailed after its living son away, down the drive, out of Sleet to freedom, I entered 
Leon's room determined to winnow some vestige of that poor ghost, Francis's ghost, 
from what I would find in there; and, having found it, perhaps my intention was to sit 
with it awhile uttering such emptinesses as, I'm sorry and, Forgive me. (BNC) 
 
 Here the nominalization stands for words in the state of emptiness, that is, having no 
meaning.  
 
foolishness  
 Apart from the quality of being foolish, this nominalization denotes the following: 
 -ideas that are foolish 
 (245) “I don’t want to hear none of her foolishness,” Ms. Jones said. (New York 
 Times, May 24, 2016) 
 
 Here foolishness stands for a foolish idea, which is enabled by IDEAS ARE PEOPLE 
metaphor.  
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goodness 
 -the quality of being moral and good 
 (246) But along with my innocent childhood belief in the resurrection of rock music 
 and the essential goodness of mankind, this myth was shattered too. (OD) 
 
  In the sense of morality, we can talk about the goodness of character, of disposition or 
conduct, but goodness can also refer to physical objects, especially to food in the sense of 
having nutritional values: 
 
 (247) Even the busiest people have a chance to cook mouth-watering food that is full 
 of goodness and at the same time is low in fat. (BNC) 
 
 Goodness can also be used as a euphemism for God. According to Online Etymology 
Dictionary, it is used “from 1610s as a term of emphasis, first recorded in for goodnesse sake, 
i.e. "as you trust in the divine goodness" (i.e., God)”: 
 (248) For goodness sake stop panicking! (BNC) 
 
 In the given example it expresses annoyance and impatience, but it can also express 
anger or surprise: 
 (249) My goodness, you gave me quite a fright! (BNC) 
 
 Goodness substitutes God in exclamations and fixed expressions not only to show 
one's annoyance or anger, but also to display one's gratitude, relief or happiness that 
something good has happened or something bad has been avoided, as a substitution for thank 
God: 
 
 (250) She did not go on to express the next thought in her mind: thank goodness 
 Annabel was going away to school, and very soon the association would be closed.  
 (BNC) 
 
 Since God in Christianity is seen as an example of virtue and divine character and 
goodness is one of His characteristics, we believe the usage of goodness for God is due to 
STATE FOR PERSON EXEMPLIFYING THAT STATE metonymy.  
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highness 
 -the quality of being high or elevated 
 (251) Her wide dark brown eyes and her thick coarse hair that she keeps styled in a 
 professional bob accent the highness of her cheekbones. (OD) 
 
 Through EUPHORIC STATES ARE UP and HAPPY IS UP metaphor, highness can also 
denote happiness and euphoria: 
 
 (252) Hunger and sleeplessness seemed strangers to him, yet it was anxiety, not 
 highness of spirits, that kept him awake. (BNC) 
 (253) Many signs of highness are the same as drunkenness: poor balance, slurred 
 speech, watery eyes. (Time, Feb 11, 2014) 
 
 Metonymically, highness is used for person of a high rank. First we have the activation 
of HIGH STATUS IS UP metaphor in the nominalization highness and then this state of having a 
high rank stands for the person of a high rank:  
 
 -a title given to a person of royal rank, or used in addressing them: 
 (254) Therefore I would like to propose that her Royal Highness be re-elected with 
 acclaim. (BNC) 
 
 In this sense, the metonym is capitalized.  
 
This metonym is not used only for person of a high royal rank, but also for any person that 
has a high status in a society, as a celebrity etc.: 
 
 (255) Late last night, her highness Beyoncé shocked the Internet by dropping an entire 
 full-length album complete with videos for every single song. (Time, Dec 13, 2013) 
 
holiness 
 -the quality of being holy, that is spiritually pure or virtuous 
 (256) The right use of freedom leads to the Christian discipline that we call 'holiness'. 
 (BNC) 
 -a title or form of address given to high religious officials as the Pope, Orthodox 
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 Patriarchs and the Dalai Lama 
 (257) For Tibetan freedom and for thousands of years of long life for His Holiness the 
 Dalai  Lama -- and because the Chinese should leave Tibet. (BNC) 
 (258) I suppose His Holiness Pope Breakspear told you about the senator's offer. 
 (BNC) 
 
 In cases of QUALITY FOR PERSON EMBODYING THE QUALITY, the nominalization is 
capitalized to show respect for the person in question.  
 
likeness  
 -the quality of being alike, resemblance, similarity 
 (259) Given the bodily likeness of the great apes to ourselves (...) (BNC) 
 (260) The display was sad enough — due to its petty likeness to an infomercial — 
 before it was reported that the steaks weren’t even Trump Steaks. (Salon, Mar 9,  2016) 
 -depiction or portrait, a pictorial, graphic, or sculptured representation of something 
 In this sense the metonym is a count noun. This representation is actually 
characterized by the likeness of it with the real person: 
 (261) Few would argue that likenesses of American forefather George Washington 
 should be removed from public spaces, although he, too, owned hundreds of 
 slaves. (Washington Post, May 8, 2016) 
 (262) Throughout the weekend, fans could be spotted in T-shirts with Prince's 
 likeness, while others just wore purple. (Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2016) 
 -a copy, a doppel-ganger of someone:  
 (263) The German term for a GHOST which is actually the' double' or identical 
 likeness of someone who is about to die. (BNC) 
 
 In this sense the metonym is a person resembling someone else.  
 
thickness 
 This nominalization can refer to different types of qualities:  
 -the quality of being thick  
 -as great, heavy in form: 
 (264) Only five per cent of the staves were of the correct thickness but the rest were 
 nearly all less than nine-sixteenths of an inch thick. (BNC) 
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 -as dense (for solid state) 
 (265) Luke's shoulders strayed eagerly to the back of his neck and up into the 
 thickness of his dark hair. (BNC) 
 -as smoky, foul, or foggy (for gas state) 
 (266) He turned up his coat collar and gave his eyes time to adjust to the thickness of 
 the night fog. (BNC) 
 -as viscous, resistant to flow (for liquid state) 
 (267) Boiled to the thickness of honey (OD) 
 
 It can also be used metaphorically for person's speech in the meaning of incoherent 
speech:  
 -as inarticulate (for person's speech) 
 (268) Judging from the thickness of his speech he had been drinking heavily. 
 (VCB) 
 (269) The thickness of the actors’ regional accents may make “Toast” initially 
 incomprehensible to a New York theatergoer.  (New York Times, May 2, 2016) 
 
 Here we find SPEECH DIFFICULTY IS THICKNESS metaphor, within which there is 
SPEECH ORGAN (TONGUE) FOR SPEAKING metonymy. In order to produce articulate language, 
tongue needs to move freely and be flexible. In the case of drunkenness or some illnesses, 
tongue becomes stiff and thick and cannot move freely, which results in inarticulation.  
 
 Another metaphorical usage of thickness is found in the sense of stupidity and 
dullness: 
  
 -the quality of being slow to understand 
 (270) When I was at school, most children with dyslexia (...) were patronized and 
 considered to  be 'slow' or even referred to as 'thick' by their teachers, and were even 
 given a clip around the ear to encourage them to deal with their 'thickness' or 
 'stupidity.' (Prosser 2010: 67) 
 This sense emerges through STUPIDITY IS CLOSE TEXTURE metaphor. When person's 
mind (and mind is a metonymy for intelligence) is thick, it means the ideas cannot get in 
easily. The same is true for skull: when we cannot get through one's thick skull, it means that 
the person is not very clever and it takes time to explain something to them.  
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 When thickness is used as a count noun, its meaning is connected with the literal 
meaning describing a physical object:  
 -a layer, sheet, stratum, or ply:  
 (271) Each floor is a single thickness of concrete. (OD) 
 (272) Trent didn't expect the twelve thicknesses of cotton sheet to last (...) (BNC) 
 
 It refers to a physical object (a layer) which is thick.  
 
 
 
13.2.1.5. Other examples of A + ness in the meaning of manifestation or instance of a 
state in a certain time period 
 In this section we are dealing with nominalizations that cannot be treated the act of 
being A or the cause of A + ness, but rather only a display of the state in question in a certain 
time period.  
This group is relatively large and almost all our examples can be used in this sense. When 
used as instances they are often postmodified, which means it is a specific manifestation of 
the state. These are: aggressiveness, attractiveness, awareness, blackness, bitterness, 
brightness, calmness, carefulness, carelessness, casualness, cleverness, coldness, 
completeness, consciousness, darkness, eagerness, fitness, firmness, freshness, friendliness, 
fullness, gentleness, hardness, harshness, lightness, likeness, loneliness, openness, 
powerlessness, recklessness, responsiveness, restlessness, richness, sharpness, shyness, 
slowness, smoothness, softness, stiffness, stillness, sweetness, tenderness, tiredness, 
toughness, uniqueness, unwillingness, warmness, weariness, whiteness and willingness. 
 Here we can assume that the reason why we can use both definite and indefinite article 
lies in the GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy. Since the manifestation of a state is not a rich 
soil for further investigation, we will not discuss it in detail and give all the examples, 
especially since the meaning of all the given nominalizations is the same. They can be 
paraphrased as 'a kind of A + ness':  
 
awareness 
 -the state of being aware or conscious, the quality of having knowledge and perception 
 of a situation or a fact 
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 (273)  The town center bombings raised awareness of the need for a scanner in 
 Warrington (…) (BNC) 
 -a manifestation of the state 
 (274) There, an awareness exists that the critical attitude is fundamental to the growth 
 of academic knowledge. (BNC) 
 
carelessness 
 -the quality of not being careful 
 (275) Most road accidents are caused by carelessness on the part of motorists. (OD) 
 -a manifestation of the quality 
 (276) 'And none suspects?' asked Forest with a carelessness that in no measure 
 deceived the constable. (BNC) 
 
weariness 
 -tiredness, extreme fatigue  
 (277) Coach Luke Walton said it’s part of their goal to minimize travel weariness. 
 (Washington  Times, Jan 6, 2016) 
 -a manifestation of the quality 
 (278) Her hair was thin and fair and long, caught back with an elastic band, and her 
 face was thin and long too, wizened and pinched. A weariness that was as much 
 chronic boredom as physical tiredness seemed the most dominant thing about her. 
 (BNC) 
 
 
 
13.2.2. An activity one is engaged in 
 There are few nominalizations in our corpus that have action reading. Some of them 
are similar to act nominalizations, but we have decided to separate those nominalizations 
referring to the act of A + ness since those denote a single event and therefore can be seen as 
examples or instances of the state. This group is different since the nominalizations belonging 
here denote a process or an unbounded activity.  
 One of the most frequent examples of nominalizations ending in -ness in general is 
business, and its central meaning is the activity one is engaged in, but it will not be included 
in our study due to the simple reason of being replaced by busyness as 'state of being busy'. 
Diachronically looking, the origin of the word is Old English bisignes meaning 'care, anxiety, 
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occupation' from bisig 'careful, anxious, busy, occupied, diligent', but since the sense 'state of 
being much occupied or engaged' was abondened in the Middle English period, we feel it 
does not serve our purposes to be included in our analysis.  
 Other examples in this group are cleanliness, drunkenness, fitness and forgiveness. 
They are caused by the STATE FOR ACTION metonymy. 
 
cleanliness 
 -the state of being clean 
 (279) Mr Dinkins expressed an envy of Tokyo's cleanliness and low crime rate, but 
 said conditions in his city were improving (...) (BNC)  
 (280) Washing and shaving ensure outward cleanliness.  (BNC) 
 -the quality of keeping something clean 
 (281) Wombles are fictitious animals from a TV series noted for their cleanliness, and 
 for cleaning up litter and putting it to good use. (BNC) 
 -the habit or the process of keeping something clean 
 (282) In the U.S., the company is also trying cleanliness and service. (Los Angeles 
 Times, Nov 17, 2015) 
 (283) Need an economic booster? Try cleanliness.  
 (http://www.cleaneuropenetwork.eu)18  
 
 In the last two examples we are dealing with services that do the job of keeping 
something clean. It is the activity they perform in order to achieve the state of being clean. 
This is the case of the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy.  
 
drunkenness 
 -a temporary state of being drunk resulting from excessive consumption of alcohol 
 (284) Possibly there are similarities between the neurological state in sleep and 
 drunkenness  which provide the substrate for this experience. (BNC) 
 (285) One of the factors, according to investigators, was that the pilot became 
 disorientated as a result of his drunkenness. (Seattle Times, Aug 30, 2016) 
 -habitual intoxication; prolonged and excessive intake of alcoholic drinks 
 Due to the verbal origin of the base, drunkenness can also denote the process of 
consuming alcoholic drinks, which leads to the state of being drunk.  
 
 
                                                 
18  litter prevention organization 
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 (286) In 1850 drunkenness was a huge problem in Darlington town center. (BNC) 
 (287) A post-Games review found a "toxic culture" had been allowed to develop in the 
 team and reported allegations of bullying and drunkenness among other  problems. 
 (Reuters, Jun 21, 2016) 
 
 In this sense, it often collocates with public, meaning drinking alcoholic beverages in 
public places: 
 
 (288) Over the years, people complained about traffic congestion, trash, noise and 
 public  drunkenness. (Los Angeles Times, Jul 11, 2016) 
 
fitness 
 Fitness as state or quality can have several meanings:   
 -the state of being fit and healthy, attractive or fanciable 
 (289) The aim of exercise is to achieve a beneficial level of fitness and health, 
 physically and mentally. (OD) 
 -the quality of being suitable: suitability, appropriateness 
 (290) To gain an idea of the overall fitness for work, a physiotherapist needs to 
 evaluate the employee's job (…) (BNC) 
 -an organism’s ability to survive and reproduce in a particular environment: 
 (291) Successful light harvest is probably one of the major determinants of plant 
 fitness, and other plants are likely the most important impediment to light-foraging 
 success. (BNC) 
 
 As an action nominalization, it is used as a premodifier and in expressions connected 
to healthy life and sports (a fitness center, fitness equipment, fitness training): 
             -the cultivation of an attractive and/or healthy physique 
 (292) There's even a fitness center and two gyms. (BNC) 
  (293)  Amenities include health and fitness center with squash courts and indoor pool.  
 (BNC) 
 
 In this sense, action that is denoted by -ness nominalization is such that is causes the 
state due to the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy: fitness is a state, effect or result brought about 
by doing certain activities. 
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forgiveness  
 This nominalization is made up of participle + ness and is actually contracted from 
forgiven + ness. Due to its verbal origin, its meaning is also more 'active' and denotes both the 
process of forgiving and of being forgiven.  
 -the readiness to forgive (a quality) 
 (294) We need to create a culture of tolerance and forgiveness and join hands together 
 as one  nation. (OD) 
 -the action or process of forgiving  
 (295) This isn’t a person who deserves your forgiveness or your friendship. (Slate, 
 April 27, 2016) 
 Here the subject /agent is the person who does the forgiving. 
 -the action or process of being forgiven 
 (296) Politicians seem able to gain forgiveness from the public and come back after 
 just about anything. (WD) 
 (297) 'I want to ask for forgiveness to the family of the woman who lost her family,' 
 Sanchez said.  (Washington Post, May 9, 2016) 
 
 In these examples forgiving is 'performed' on the patient.  
 
 
 
13.2.3. A period of time during which one is in the state of A + ness  
 Nouns ending in suffix -ness can also denote period of time during which one is in the 
certain state. The metonymy STATE OF BEING A FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE 
IS A is responsible for such a reading. The central meaning of state has already been 
exemplified so only examples for the meaning of a period will be provided. This group 
inludes darkness, illness and sickness. 
 
darkness 
 -night, period of time containing no daylight 
 (298) (...) so that all or part of the backdown procedure is carried out during 
 darkness. (BNC) 
 (299) (...) and passing it on to other parts of the plant during darkness (...) (BNC) 
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illness 
 -the time period during which one is ill 
 (300) I wish to thank all my friends for the lovely flowers, cards and letters sent to me 
 during  my illness. (BNC) 
 (301) In a state of health, individuals will be self-caring, but during illness, injury or 
 disease, additional self-care needs may be present. (BNC)  
sickness 
 -the time period during which one is sick 
 (302) Selenium is believed to help combat oxidative stress during sickness.  (COCA) 
 (303) Parents needed children to work farms and fields and to support them during 
 sickness and old age. (COCA) 
 
 
 
13.2.4. An area characterized by being A 
 There are few nominalizations belonging to this group that denote space or area which 
is characterized by the state of being A. We believe that STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor 
enables such a reading. For the nominalizations already mentioned above only the extended 
sense of area will be given. This group includes blackness, darkness, emptiness, lightness, 
whiteness and wilderness.  
 
blackness 
 This nominalization denotes following states and qualities:  
 -the quality of being black in colour 
 (304) The disparity seems further exaggerated by the size and blackness of the 
 soldier's hat. (OD) 
 -the state of complete darkness, absence of light 
 (305) Clouds which made the blackness all the more impenetrable. (BNC) 
 -the state of belonging to any human group with dark-coloured skin 
 (306) Black kids, at a stage during their latter secondary-school years, begin to feel 
 different because of their blackness. (BNC) 
 
This nominalization also has a metaphorical meaning: 
 -the state characterized with depression and despair 
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 (307) As their words evoke the McCarthy era, we are reminded of the blackness of the 
 postwar period. (OD) 
 
 Through metaphor, BADNESS IS BLACK, blackness denotes something negative. Black 
is often associated with something immoral, often found in expressions such as black market, 
black economy or black-souled. The reason why black denotes depression and feelings of 
sadness can be also be found in the humoral theory, according to which the four chief fluids of 
the body (blood, phlegm, yellow bile (choler), and black bile (melancholy)) determine 
person's physical and mental qualities by the relative proportions in which they were present 
(as stated in Oxford Living English Dictionary). Even the origin of the word melancholy is the 
following: 
 
 c. 1300, "condition characterized by sullenness, gloom, irritability," from Old French 
melancolie "black bile, ill disposition, anger, annoyance" (13c.), from Late Latin melancholia, 
from Greek melankholia "sadness," literally (excess of) "black bile," from melas (genitive 
melanos) "black" + khole "bile". Medieval physiology attributed depression to excess of 
"black bile," a secretion of the spleen and one of the body's four "humors."  
(http://www.etymonline.com/). 
 
 Therefore, within this metaphor (BADNESS IS BLACK) we find BADNESS FOR 
DEPRESSION metonymy.   
 The locative meaning of it is derived through the literal meaning of blackness as 
having a black colour:  
 -place or area of little or no light 
 (308) She looked down it: all she could see was blackness. (BNC) 
 (309) Dust showers from the ceiling. You don't see it in the blackness, but feel it on the 
 face. (BNC) 
 
darkness 
 -an unilluminated area or a place with no or very little light 
 (310) The bottomless pit is the earth in total darkness with no light from the sun, every 
 island  destroyed, the earth's surface broken up. (OD) 
 (311) Then the train roared away into the darkness, and was gone.  (VCB) 
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emptiness 
 -an empty area or space 
 (312) I drove for a while across this fearsome emptiness. (CCED)  
 (313) There's an emptiness there. An unfilled, unfulfilled space deep inside them. 
 (BNC) 
 
lightness 
 Like many other nominalizations, this one can denote several types of states of 
qualities due to the polysemy of the base adjective light. It is a physical property of things, 
objects or people. 
 -the quality of having a light colour 
 (314) Mid-century modern interiors tend to explore darker hues and work just fine in 
 low light, whereas Scandinavian interiors aim to maximize lightness in a room. 
 (Washington Post, Jan 25, 2016) 
 -the quality of having little weight 
 (315) We've long passed the point of diminishing returns with thinness and lightness of 
 personal tech devices, but we can't resist pushing further. (The Verge, Jan 6, 2016) 
 -of food: lacking density or richness (as opposed to spicy) 
 (316) In the glass this wine is pristine, bright and almost translucent in its lightness, 
 with aromas to match: light, high-toned and savory. (Los Angeles Times, Feb 19, 
 2016) 
 -of a person or animal: the gracefulness of movement 
 (317) 'Work on the lightness,' he said, as she practiced a pirouette at the far end of the 
 barn. (The New Yorker, Aug 1, 2016) 
 
 It can also have other meanings, metaphorically conditioned: 
 -lack of depth and seriousness, requiring little mental effort to comprehend or to do 
 (318) Last month, BirthMoviesDeath reported that reshoots on Suicide Squad were 
 happening in an effort to add “more humor and lightness to the film.” (Time, Apr 11, 
 2016) 
 (319) While “Strolling” is a serious show, it does have moments of lightness. (The 
 New Yorker, Mar 11, 2016) 
 (320) The lightness of Courtney's sentence is obvious when it is compared to other 
 recent  sentences. (BNC) 
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 IMPORTANT IS WEIGHT and DIFFICULTY IS HEAVINESS metaphor are combined here 
and enable lightness to be a property of ideas, tasks and mental products. 
 
 -joy, pride and cheerfulness, freedom from worry or trouble 
 (321) And a sudden lightness of heart took her. (BNC) 
 (322) Her mood had changed, it seemed, and she was all lightness and joy. (BNC) 
 
 This is the case of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT metaphor.  
 
 Metaphorically, the state of being light can stand for the illuminated area, but this is 
not very frequent: 
 (323) Two minutes is the most time they spend in the lightness, and four to six minutes 
 in the darkness. (BNC) 
 
whiteness 
 Similar to its antonym blackness, this nominalization has more than one literal 
reading: 
 -the quality of having a white colour 
 (324) The structure which gives the beetle Cyphochilus its extraordinary whiteness is 
 contributing to the development of a type of super light white paper. (BBC, Jul 8, 
 2014) 
 -the quality of being pale 
 (325) The whiteness of her face was intensified by crimson lipstick and heavy eyeliner. 
 (The New Yorker, May 23, 2016) 
 
 Metonymically the meaning of whiteness is extended to mean cleanliness and purity:  
 -the quality of being clean and pure, innocence 
 (326) In private life and public station there is not a shadow to stain the whiteness of 
 his fame. (VCB) 
 
 The metonymic chain WHITENESS FOR PURITY and PURITY FOR INNOCENCE allow this 
nominalization to be used with notions other than physical objects.  
 
 Whiteness is also found in the meaning other than a state of being white: 
 -an area of light surface 
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 (327) We were surrounded by a whiteness as vast as a frozen ocean. (Wall Street 
 Journal, Jan 7, 2016) 
 In this case it is used as a count noun.  
 
wilderness 
 The most frequent meaning of this nominalization is area, uncultivated and 
uninhabited by human beings. It can refer to a forest, a barren plain or a desert. 
Etymologically, however, it used to denote a state and there are still some examples of it 
found in present day English.  
 
 -wildness, the state of being uncultivated, uncivilized or lacking moral restraint 
 (328) Moore’s only guiding principle is, as Costello told me, 'the wilderness of her 
 mind.' (The New Yorker, Apr 2016) 
 (329) Her credit should be good. Her wilderness years were over. She wasn't 
 hallucinating any more, she knew. (BNC) 
 
 Another meaning of state, found more frequently, is commonly used in a political 
context: 
 -the state of disfavor or decline 
 (330) He led the Democratic party back from the wilderness. (OD) 
 (331) Serious infighting resulted, and the Democratic Party entered a wilderness 
 period that it hasn't recovered from. (OD) 
 
 In politics, the expression that is used to denote lack of influence and state of inactivity 
is in the wilderness:  
 
 (332) ..a party released from 12 years in the wilderness. (CCED) 
 
 Another meaning of wilderness is a great amount of something, often a confusing one: 
 (333) The duties of citizenship are lost sight of in the wilderness of interests of 
 individuals and groups. (VCB) 
 (334) 'a wilderness of masts in the harbor' (VCB) 
 
 However, most frequently it denotes an area: 
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 -a wild and uninhabited area left in its natural condition 
 (335) Mrs. Bush, do you and your husband ever get out into the wilderness for a hike 
 or a picnic? (Time, May 10, 2016) 
 (336) The city is surrounded by wilderness, and there are essentially only two ways 
 out via road. (US News, May 7, 2016) 
 
 
 
13.2.5. A group of animals 
 Three nominalizations we have encountered in our corpus denote collective nouns, 
namely a group of animals. A busyness is a group of ferrets, an unkindness is a group of 
ravens and a whiteness is a flock of swans. For the last two nominalizations we have already 
given the example of state or quality of being A, therefore only the example for the group 
meaning: 
 
busyness  
 -the state of being or appearing to be actively engaged in an activity 
 (337) Busyness increases stress and tension, and errors and accidents are more likely 
 to occur. (BNC) 
 
 -a group of ferrets  
 (338) A group of ferrets is called 'a busyness' of ferrets. Spend some time playing with 
 ferrets  and you'll soon understand where the word 'busyness' came from! 
 (http://sciencemattersnow.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/SS_Writing-
 Exciting_Nonfiction_Handout.pdf) 
 
unkindness 
 (339) A skull rests on the threshold as a reminder of the wages of sin, and, above, an 
 unkindness of ravens presides. (OD) 
 
whiteness 
 (340) We stopped by the river, as we had spotted a whiteness of swans waddling 
 ashore to be fed by delighted tourists. (http://nesling.blogspot.hr) 
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 Busyness as group name associated with the characteristics of the animal. Ferrets tend 
to live in groups and when awake, they are very lively and active. They were also used in 
hunting, due to their build and nature and are very skillful at hunting rodents and rabbits.  
 While the reason for the group reading in whiteness is more obvious and lies in the 
white color of swans, unkindness is, like many other collective nouns in English, a bit more 
peculiar. Many interesting examples of collective naming were discussed by Chloe Rhodes in 
her book The Unkindness of Ravens: A Book of Collective Nouns (2014). She claims that the 
reason for this, and many other labellings, has origins in the Middle Ages, the period of poor 
health and diseases, superstition and legends. Ravens were connected to death or were 
believed to be the mediators between life and death because they often circle around animals 
that are about to die. “As carrion birds, ravens often circled when an animal was close to its 
end. This behaviour, combined with their black feathers, gave them a sinister reputation.” 
(2014: 137). Rhodes also gives further reasons found in other studies of animals and their 
names: ravens expel their youngs too early from the nest and leave them to take care of 
themselves. When they are older, they die of famine, often attacked by their young ones. This 
behaviour is thought to be unkind and unkindness became a personality trait associated with 
ravens. Therefore the name used to denote a group of them is based on the personality trait 
they hold.  
 
 Again we hold metonymy responsible for this phenomenon of using a property typical 
of an animal to refer to the whole group of animals. DEFINING QUALITY OF ONE MEMBER FOR 
THE WHOLE CATEGORY OF MEMBERS WITH THE SAME QUALITY within Category-and-Property 
ICM. That is, the quality of one member is understood as the whole category or a group of 
members. It is worth mentioning that, at least in the examples we have extracted, all 
nominalizations are postmodified with the exact name of the animal they denote. 
 
 
 
13.2.6. Extensions from the prototypical sense 
 All the nominalizations ending in suffix -ness we have analyzed here have more than 
one meaning. Apart from the prototypical meaning of 'the state or quality of being A', they can 
denote the following: an act of being A; an event, a person or a situation that brings about A + 
ness; a specific type of A + ness; an object exemplifying A + ness; a manifestation or an 
instance of a state in a certain time period; an activity one is engaged in; a period of time 
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during which one is in the state of A + ness; an area characterized by being A and a group of 
animals. 
 Most of them denote a state or quality of being A and a manifestation or an instance of 
the state or quality in a certain time period, which enables them to be used with the indefinite 
article (an agressiveness, a toughness).  
 We will give a list of those nominalizations that have more than one extended 
meaning. Two extended meanings are found with the following: 
blackness: an area characterized by being A + an instance of a state in a certain time period 
emptiness: an object exemplifying A + ness + an area characterized by being A 
fitness:  an instance of a state in a certain time period + an activity one is engaged in  
foolishness:  an act of being A + an object exemplifying A + ness 
illness: a specific type of A + ness + a period of time  
lightness: an instance of a state a certain time period + an area characterized by being A 
likeness: an object exemplifying A + ness + an instance of a state a certain time period  
sickness: a specific type of A + ness + a period of time  
ugliness: an act of being A + an event, a person or a situation that brings about A + ness 
unkindness: an act of being A + a group of animals. 
 
 This is shown in the following example sentences:  
 
blackness 
 state 
 (341) But not necessarily in a negative way: he had used his blackness to become a 
 better boxer. (BNC)  
 area 
 (342) They have another sense to help them find their way through the blackness. 
 (BNC)  
 manifestation of a state in a certain time period 
 (343) The abortion industry is trying to make it sound like abortion is a joyful 
 experience,” he said. “But even women who say it was necessary say it was not joyful. 
 It is a grief and a blackness, and it changes you. (New York Times, Feb 29, 2016)  
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emptiness 
 quality/state 
 (344) The emptiness of the big shimmering pool in the artificial light galled her. 
 (BNC)  
 object exemplifying A + ness 
 (244) Despite Leon's words, despite my certain knowledge that the spirit of Francis 
 had sailed after its living son away, down the drive, out of Sleet to freedom, I 
 entered Leon's room  determined to winnow some vestige of that poor ghost, Francis's 
 ghost, from what I would find in there; and, having found it, perhaps my intention 
 was to sit with it awhile uttering such emptinesses as, I'm sorry and, Forgive me. 
 (BNC) 
 area 
 (345) On my left, there are several yards of emptiness, then trees. (OD) 
 
fitness 
 state 
 (346) I like watching doubles but believed singles was the superior game, requiring 
 more fitness, skill and strategy. (New York Times, Aug 6, 2016) 
 an instance of a state in a certain time period or a specific situation  
 (347) Moreover, fitness too is a phenotype and varies from environment to 
 environment, both because other aspects of the phenotype develop differently in 
 different environments, and because a given shape or behaviour or physiology will 
 confer different fitnesses in different environments. (Bendall: 1986: 227) 
 an activity one is engaged in  
 (348) If you’re an exercise newbie, fall — crisp and finally free of summer’s humidity 
 — is the perfect time to start a fitness routine. (Seattle Times, Sep 6, 2017) 
 
foolishness 
  state 
 (349) But that doesn't mean I'm going to add to your foolishness by tying that filthy 
 rag over the wound. (BNC) 
  an act of being foolish 
 (350) After one of Ralph's more painful foolishnesses, she had once persuaded a lover 
 to telephone Grunte pretending he had a message from Downing Street. (BNC)  
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 an object exemplifying A + ness 
 (351) Why'd I have to go up there, listen to all that foolishness, get excited about it 
 like a little kid? (VCB) 
 
illness 
 state 
 (352) When in July of that year Rockingham gave place to Chatham, Conway retained 
 his office; and when Chatham became incapacitated by illness he tamely acquiesced 
 in Townshend's reversal of the American policy which he himself had so actively 
 furthered in the previous administration. (YD) 
 a specific type of A + ness  
 (353) With 300 people each day dying from tobacco-related illness insurance firms 
 know a risk when they see one. (BNC)  
 a period of time  
 (354) There were two other letters that she thought might interest John, one on the 
 subject of salary being paid during illness, and suggesting a code of employment, 
 and the other about National Health Insurance. (BNC) 
 
lightness 
 quality 
 (355) The noticeable interior lightness is thanks to the Teflon panels of the movable 
 roof structure. (OD) 
 an instance of a state a certain time period  
 (356) The translucent polycarbonate ceiling gives the corridor a lightness it would not 
 otherwise have. (OD) 
 an area characterized by being A 
 (323) Two minutes is the most time they spend in the lightness, and four to six minutes 
 in the darkness. (BNC) 
 
likeness 
 quality 
 (357) Her likeness to him was astonishing. (OD) 
 an object exemplifying A + ness  
 (358) He made a likeness of Helen of Troy which convinced all who came to sacrifice 
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 there that the Trojan War had been well fought; and for this famous portrait, 
 Zeuxis had lined up the young women of Croton, and taking an ear from one, the 
 set of chin from another, the legs, the arms and stomach and so forth of others, he 
 had assembled his divine beauty. (BNC)  
  an instance of a quality in a certain time period  
 (359) Breeze studied it anew, trying to trace a likeness to the fierce old invalid. (BNC) 
 
sickness 
 state 
 (360) You have a severe headache with fever, sickness and possibly a rash. (OD) 
 a specific type of A + ness  
 (361) (…) contagious sicknesses like chickenpox, measles, and mumps, even 
 diphtheria, swept through the drafty filthy dormitories. (COCA) 
 a period of time  
 (362) John looked deep into Anne's eyes as he promised to remain true through 
 sickness and health. (OD) 
 
ugliness 
 quality 
 (363) Her spirits rose as they left the ugliness of London behind. (BNC)  
 an act of being A 
 (207) Mr. Trump’s latest ugliness was to mock the disability of a newspaper reporter 
 who had displeased him. (Washington Post, Nov 27, 2015) 
  an event, a person or a situation that brings about A + ness 
 (364) The ugliness that followed culminated in a weeklong teachers strike. (Chicago 
 Tribune, Aug 30, 2014) 
 
unkindness 
 quality 
 (365) In 2009, he threatened to leave the site because there was "too much aggression 
 and unkindness around". (BBC, Mar 30, 2015) 
 an act of being A 
 (366) And never a reproach to me, never an unkindness, never an angry word! (VCB) 
 a group of animals 
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 (367) The unkindness of ravens at the Tower of London is about to enjoy the kindness 
 of taxpayers, in a move designed to improve the birds' accommodation. (OD) 
 
 Whiteness has even three extended meanings: an instance of a state in a certain time 
period + an area characterized by being A + a group of animals, and darkness even four: an 
act of being A + an instance of a state in a certain time period + a period of time + an area 
characterized by being A. 
The examples are as follows:  
 
whiteness 
 quality 
 (368) The unremitting whiteness of the walls is anchored by a black marble floor. 
 (OD) 
 an instance of a quality in a certain time period  
 (369) He was fighting savagely: his blade had a whiteness about it I couldn’t 
 understand. (Bartlett 2007: 533) 
 an area characterized by being A  
 (370) I should have been worried for them, but instead I watched the ambulance fade 
 into whiteness, until all I could see were the red lights, spinning, and after a while, not 
 even them. (COCA) 
  a group of animals 
 (340) We stopped by the river, as we had spotted a whiteness of swans waddling 
 ashore to be fed by delighted tourists. (http://nesling.blogspot.hr) 
 
darkness 
 quality/ state 
 (371) The darkness of her skin betrayed her Mediterranean heritage. (WS) 
 an act of being A  
 (174) Corruption in working units and other darknesses are major barriers which 
 constrain directly people's initiatives. (COCA) 
 an instance of a state in a certain time period  
 (372) There's a darkness in his palette in the stares of the people he paints. (BNC) 
 a period of time  
 (373) Melatonin increases during darkness and decreases during periods of light (...) 
 (COCA) 
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 an area characterized by being A 
 (374) An hour later, the building plunged into darkness, causing many people to gasp. 
 (Washington Post, Sep 10, 2017) 
 
 The meaning of 'area characterized by being A' is derived via STATES ARE LOCATIONS 
metaphor. Some nominalizations denote an instance of a state in a certain time period or 
specific situations, which is enabled by the GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy. The same 
metonymy is found in the meaning of  'a specific type of A + ness'. 'An object exemplifying 
certain state or quality' is another extended meaning metonymically derived via STATE FOR 
OBJECT EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE. 'An activity one is engaged in' as one of the meanings of -
ness nominalizations is made possible via STATE FOR ACTION metonymy. STATE OR QUALITY 
FOR EVENT DEMONSTRATING THAT STATE OR QUALITY operates on nominalizations that 
denote 'an act of being A'. The metonymy STATE OF BEING A FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME 
DURING WHICH ONE IS A is responsible for the reading of 'a period of time during which one is 
in the state of A + ness'. The metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE produces the meaning of an event, 
a person or a situation that brings about A + ness. Finally, some nominalizations denote a 
group of animals via DEFINING QUALITY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY OF 
MEMBERS WITH THE SAME QUALITY metonymy.  
 
 
 
13.2.7. Concluding remarks on the suffix -ness  
The analysis of the suffix -ness has shown that it can have the following meanings, again, 
some of which were introduced in the theoretical part and some have appeared during our 
investigation:  
1. The state or quality of being A. This is the prototypical meaning of the suffix, found in all 
examples.   
 
2. An instance or example of the quality or state denoted by the adjectival root (by A). 
Many nominalizations denote a manifestation of the state or quality in question. We have 
subdivided this group into following: 
 2.1. An act of being A. This meaning is derived via STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  
DEMONSTRATING THAT STATE OR QUALITY metonymy and here state or quality 
metonymically represents behaviour via QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy. It is found in 
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the following nominalizations: blindness, darkness, foolishness, kindness, madness, 
meanness, politeness, reasonableness, righteousness, rudeness, selfishness, ugliness, 
unfairness, unkindness and wickedness. 
Within this subgroup there are three examples in which metaphors create basis for the reading 
of 'an act' (blindness, darkness and ugliness). For blindness it is UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING 
metaphor (BEING IGNORANT IS BEING UNABLE TO SEE), for darkness BADNESS IS DARKNESS 
metaphor and in ugliness the metaphor MENTAL CHARACTERISTICS IS PHYSICAL APPEARANCE 
is activated.  
  2.2. An event, a person or a situation that brings about A + ness. Nominalizations from 
this group denote the cause of the state, that which has brought certain state via EFFECT FOR 
CAUSE metonymy: happiness, sadness, ugliness, unpleasantness and weakness. 
 2.3. A specific type of A + ness: illness and sickness. These two nominalizations 
represent specific instances of the state via GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy. 
 2.4. An object exemplifying A + ness. The state or quality in question is represented as 
object (a person, a situation or an idea) in emptiness, foolishness, goodness, highness, 
holiness, likeness and  thickness via STATE FOR OBJECT EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE metonymy. 
In this group the example is highness is a bit different: it is necessary to have the metaphorical 
reading of highness via HIGH STATUS IS UP first in order to be able to interpret it as a person.  
 2.5. Other examples of  A + ness in the meaning of manifestation or instance of a state 
in a certain time period. This is a relatively large group of nominalizations. Their appearance 
with the indefinite article makes their meaning a bit different from simply being 'state' or 
'quality'. Rather they are representation of it in a certain time period and in specific situations, 
which is why they are often postmodified: aggressiveness, attractiveness, awareness, 
blackness, bitterness, brightness, calmness, carefulness, carelessness, casualness, cleverness, 
coldness, completeness, consciousness, darkness, eagerness, fitness, firmness, freshness, 
friendliness, fullness, gentleness, hardness, harshness, lightness, likeness, loneliness, 
openness, powerlessness, recklessness, responsiveness, restlessness, richness, sharpness, 
shyness, slowness, smoothness, softness, stiffness, stillness, sweetness, tenderness, tiredness, 
toughness, uniqueness, unwillingness, warmness, weariness, whiteness and willingness. 
Metonymy GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC enables such a reading. 
 
3. An activity one is engaged in. STATE FOR ACTION metonymy allows 'action' reading in the 
following nominalizations: cleanliness, drunkenness, fitness and forgiveness. 
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4. A period of time during which one is in the state of A + ness. We have encoutered three 
nominalizations with the meaning 'period of time', namely darkness, illness and sickness. 
STATE OF BEING A FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE IS A metonymy operates on 
them. 
5. An area characterized by being A. Nominalizations ending in -ness can also denote area 
or space that is characterized by being in a certain state, as in blackness, darkness, emptiness, 
lightness, whiteness and wilderness. Since states are viewed as locations, we hold STATES ARE 
LOCATIONS metaphor responsible for such a reading.  
 
6. A group of animals. Marginally, the suffix -ness can express a group of animals with the 
characteristics of being A via DEFINING QUALITY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE 
CATEGORY OF MEMBERS WITH THE SAME QUALITY metonymy in busyness, unkindness and 
whiteness. 
 
 
 
14. THE PLACEMENT OF METAPHORICAL AND/ OR METONYMIC PROCESSES 
 Our next goal is to determine the placement of metaphorical and metonymic 
operations that are responsible for making nominalizations ending in -ness and -hood 
polysemous, that is, to investigate whether they operate on the base word prior to suffixation, 
or on the output. The possibility for metaphor and metonymy to work simultaneously with the 
process of suffixation is also left open. Discussing examples from other authors, Brdar and 
Brdar-Szabó (2013) claim that metonymic processes that are involved in the word-formation 
are lexical in nature and that metonymic shifts in the majority of cases occur either prior to, or 
after word-formation, and not in the course of word-formation. As examples of metonymy 
operating on the output, they give Croatian nominalizations ending in suffixes -ina, -etina and 
-evina/-ovina ('puretina' meaning 'turkey meat' and 'dish made with turkey meat') and other 
examples where different metonymic senses occur after the word has been formed. Cases of 
metonymy operating prior to word-formation are found in compounds such as 'concentration 
camp' and suffixations such as 'Wall Streeter'. They also suggest that metonymic shifts occur 
simultaneously with word-formation processes only in non-concatenative morphology, that is, 
processes such as conversion, blending, reduplication, clipping and shortening.  
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 We will start with the suffix -hood and the extension from the 'state' sense into 
'collectivity' sense. The following nominalizations belong here:  
 animalhood, aunthood, beggarhood, boyhood, childhood,  cousinhood, cubhood, fatherhood, 
girlhood, ladyhood, manhood, motherhood, neighbourhood, sainthood, womanhood, 
brotherhood, sisterhood, monkhood, priesthood, prophethood and knighthood. 
 As already discussed, some of them have bases that are highly polysemous, but we 
will argue that this polysemy does not produce polysemy of the whole nominalization in the 
sense of the extension from the prototypical meaning. Let us again turn to the example of 
'fatherhood' to clarify this. If we take 'father' to mean 'a man in relation to his child' then the 
group meaning of 'fatherhood' is 'men in relation to their children'; if we take it to mean 
'priest' then the collective sense is 'a group of priests' etc. This does not mean, however, that 
the polysemy of the base produces 'collectivity' sense from the 'state' sense in nominazations. 
Collectivity sense is derived via DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy that operates on the whole nominalization after 
suffixation.  
 There are, however, two exceptions in this group, as already discussed in the analytical 
part. Brotherhood and sisterhood are not group of Ns connected by bloodline, but rather a 
group of Ns gathered for specific purposes, Ns having metonymically and metaphorically 
extended meanings. In both cases we are dealing with BLOOD LINE FOR PHYSICAL CLOSENESS 
and MENTAL CLOSENESS FOR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOUR/SIMILARITY metonymies within MENTAL 
(CLOSENESS) IS PHYSICAL (CLOSENESS) metaphor operating on the base. 
 Another meaning of -hood nominalizations in the period of time during which one is N 
and is found in the following examples: adulthood, babyhood, bachelorhood, boyhood, 
childhood, cubhood, girlhood, grandparenthood, maidenhood, manhood, priesthood, 
puppyhood, queenhood, spinsterhood, toddlerhood, widowhood, widowerhood and 
womanhood. We will again claim that THE CONDITION (OR STATE) OF BEING N FOR THE 
PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE IS N metonymy operates on the whole noun, that is on 
the output of word formation process. There are, again, cases where metaphors operate on the 
base nouns, as in cubhood and puppyhood and therefore produce the meaning of 'a period of 
being young and inexperienced', with the metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, but it is the above 
mentioned metonymy that extends the prototypical meaning of the suffix -hood.  
 Locative sense of 'area of the thing referred to by N' is found in one example only, but 
is important due to the frequency of usage. Neighbourhood as 'area in town or city where 
people live' and 'area surrounding someone or something' is found more frequently than 
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'neighbourly feeling' and 'state of being a neighbor', but as already stated this extended, 
locative sense is derived from a collective one and not vice versa. We will claim that 
metonymy PEOPLE LIVING IN A PARTICULAR PLACE FOR PLACE operates again on the output. 
The group meaning of 'people' is enabled by DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER 
FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy. Further metaphorization is found in the 
expression 'in the neighborhood of' meaning 'about' or 'approximately' with the help of 
SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY metaphor, in which SIMILARITY IS SPATIAL CLOSENESS AND 
DIFFERENCE IS SPATIAL DISTANCE metaphors appear.  
 The meaning 'state of being N' is extended in two nominalizations into 'part of the 
body', namely in manhood and womanhood. STATE OF THE WHOLE PERSON FOR PART OF THE 
BODY metonymy operates on the whole nominalization, making this reading possible. After 
establishing this sense, another sense appears in manhood, namely 'potency' (INSTRUMENT 
FOR RESULT (INSTRUMENT USED TO PREFORM A CERTAIN ACTION FOR ABILITY TO PERFORM 
IT metonymy being responsible for it)). 
 When -hood nominalizations are formed on adjectives, the prototypical sense is still 
'state of being A'. Apart from this stative meaning, one example has active reading, found very 
frequently during our analysis. Falsehood in the meaning of 'deliberately deceiving someone 
by lying' is understood as action that repeats itself in the course of time. Again, we believe 
that metonymy STATE (OF BEING FALSE) FOR ACTION (OF MAKING USE OF THAT STATE) works 
after the word has been formed. This action reading produces another meaning, the one of the 
result of lying, via ACTION FOR RESULT.  
 To conclude this discussion on the placement of the metaphorical/ metonymic 
operations, we follow the above mentioned observations in claiming that these operations 
work posterior to suffixation, that is, they take place after the nominalization has been formed.   
 
 Observing -ness nominalizations, our analysis has shown that they can denote not only 
the state or quality of being A (since we are interested in the adjectives as basis), but also an 
example or an instance of the that quality or state: some of them denote an act of being A (e.g. 
kindness), some can be used as events, persons or a situation that cause A + ness (e.g. 
happiness), sometimes they refer to objects that are exemplifying the state or quality (e.g. 
highness), some are specific instances of the state (e.g. sickness) and many of them are used 
as count nouns since they denote the appearance of the quality or state in a certain time period 
(e.g. awareness). These are all the meanings that are extended from the prototypical meaning 
via metonymies.  
202 
 STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT DEMONSTRATING THAT STATE OR QUALITY metonymy 
operates on all these nominalizations where the whole noun is taken to denote an actual act in 
which this quality is exemplified. The following nominalizations belong here: blindness, 
darkness, foolishness, kindness, madness, meanness, politeness, reasonableness, 
righteousness, rudeness, selfishness, ugliness, unfairness, unkindness and wickedness. Since 
acts are situations in which one demonstrates certain type of behaviour, the quality in question 
stands for that behaviour via QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy. Nominalizations that 
usually have stative reading, become active here.  
 EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy is also found after suffixation has taken place on those 
nouns that denote someone or something that causes a certain state: happiness, sadness, 
ugliness, unpleasantness and weakness. 
 GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy on illness and sickness produce specific instances 
of poor health from the state of being unhealthy.  
 Instances of specific qualities or states can also be seen as objects, again someone or 
something that exemplifies the quality. Metonymy STATE FOR OBJECT (PERSON) 
EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE operates on these nominalizations: emptiness, foolishness, 
goodness, highness, holiness, likeness and  thickness. 
 In many cases nominalizations ending in -ness are used as count nouns since they 
denote an instance of the state or quality in a certain time period and in specific situations and 
they are often postmodified. GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy is responsible for such a 
reading and again appears posterior to word formation in the following examples from our 
corpus: aggressiveness, attractiveness, awareness, blackness, bitterness, brightness, calmness, 
carefulness, carelessness, casualness, cleverness, coldness, completeness, consciousness, 
darkness, eagerness, fitness, firmness, freshness, friendliness, fullness, gentleness, hardness, 
harshness, lightness, likeness, loneliness, openness, powerlessness, recklessness, 
responsiveness, restlessness, richness, sharpness, shyness, slowness, smoothness, softness, 
stiffness, stillness, sweetness, tenderness, tiredness, toughness, uniqueness, unwillingness, 
warmness, weariness, whiteness and willingness. 
 
 Apart from the extension in the meaning 'example of the state or quality' 
nominalizations ending in -ness can also denote an activity one is engaged in over a larger 
period of time. In comparison to he meaning 'the act of being A', they refer to the repeated 
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behavioural patterns a person does. STATE FOR ACTION metonymy enables such a reading in 
cleanliness, drunkenness, fitness and forgiveness. This metonymy operates on the whole 
nominalization. 
 Occasionally state denoted by -ness nominalization can refer to a period of time during 
which one is in the given state. The expression 'during + ness nominalization' as in  
 (375) (...) Nowadays nurses are faced with complex situations, not only to take 
 account of psychological and sociocultural factors during illness but also as 
 promoters of health, and in  helping patients and families to become involved in their 
 own health care. (...) (BNC) 
  
signals that we are dealing with a time period, which is enabled by the STATE OF BEING A FOR 
THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE IS A metonymy operating on the whole 
nominalization. Other examples belonging to this group are darkness and sickness.  
 Not only metonymies but also metaphors activate different readings in -ness 
nominalizations. STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor provides 'area' and 'location' reading in 
blackness, darkness, emptiness, lightness, whiteness and wilderness since it operates on the 
whole. 
 Marginally, -ness indicates a group of animals. The DEFINING QUALITY OF ONE 
MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY OF MEMBERS WITH THE SAME QUALITY metonymy 
activates this reading in busyness, unkindness and whiteness. These three are group of animals 
that have this property of being busy, unkind and white, as already explained in the analysis.  
 As a conclusion, we can state the polysemy of -hood and -ness nominalization can be 
explained by various metaphorical and metonymic processes that operate post suffixation. 
There are, of course, cases where metaphors and metonymies work prior to word formation, 
that is, on the bases, but in these cases there is no extension of base meaning from 'state' into 
something else and this is not the topics of our analysis (e.g. blackness as a property of being 
black in color and as a state of despair and depression). 
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15. OVERVIEW OF NOMINALIZATIONS AND THEIR METAPHORICAL 
AND METONYMIC EXTENSIONS 
suffix -hood 
adulthood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N+  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
angelhood state 
animalhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy 
aunthood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy 
babyhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy+  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
bachelorhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy+  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
beggarhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy+  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy 
boyhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy +  
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THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
brotherhood  state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy+ 
BLOOD LINE FOR PHYSICAL CLOSENESS and MENTAL 
CLOSENESS FOR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOUR/ 
SIMILARITY metonymies within MENTAL (CLOSENESS) IS 
PHYSICAL (CLOSENESS) metaphor 
childhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy +  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
cousinhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy 
creaturehood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy 
cubhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy +  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
 
daughterhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N  metonymy 
falsehood state 
STATE (OF BEING FALSE) FOR ACTION (OF MAKING USE OF 
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THAT STATE) metonymy + ACTION FOR RESULT 
metonymy  
fatherhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy 
girlhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy + 
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
godhood state 
grandparenthood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
 
hardihood state 
humanhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy 
husbandhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy 
kinghood state 
STATE FOR RANK metonymy  
knighthood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy + 
STATE FOR RANK metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy 
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ladyhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy 
likelihood state 
livelihood state 
lustihood state 
maidenhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N  metonymy +  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
manhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy +  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy +  STATE OF THE WHOLE 
PERSON FOR PART OF THE BODY metonymy +  
INSTRUMENT FOR RESULT (INSTRUMENT USED TO 
PREFORM A CERTAIN ACTION FOR ABILITY TO PERFORM 
IT) metonymy 
monkhood state 
STATE FOR RANK metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy + 
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
motherhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy+ 
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY  (GROUP)  metonymy 
nationhood state 
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neighbourhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy +  
PEOPLE LIVING IN A PARTICULAR PLACE FOR PLACE 
metonymy 
orphanhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy 
 
parenthood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy 
 
peoplehood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy 
 
personhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy 
priesthood state 
STATE FOR RANK metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy + 
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
prophethood state 
STATE FOR RANK metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY  (GROUP) metonymy 
puppyhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy + 
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
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queenhood state 
STATE FOR RANK metonymy + 
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
sainthood state 
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy 
selfhood state 
STATE OF THE PERSON (THING) FOR BEHAVIOUR  TYPICAL 
OF THAT PERSON (OR A THING) metonymy 
servanthood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF  N metonymy 
sisterhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy + 
BLOOD LINE FOR PHYSICAL CLOSENESS and MENTAL 
CLOSENESS FOR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOUR/ SIMILARITY 
Metonymies within MENTAL (CLOSENESS) IS PHYSICAL 
(CLOSENESS) metaphor 
sonhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy 
 
spinsterhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
spousehood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy  
 
statehood state 
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toddlerhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy + 
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
unlikelihood state 
victimhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy 
widowhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
widowerhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy 
wifehood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy  
womanhood state 
STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N metonymy +  
DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE 
WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy + 
THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS N metonymy + 
STATE OF THE WHOLE PERSON FOR PART OF THE BODY 
metonymy  
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suffix -ness 
aggressiveness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
attractiveness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
awareness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
bitterness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
blackness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy +  
STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor  + 
BADNESS IS BLACK metaphor 
blindness state 
BEING IGNORANT IS BEING UNABLE TO SEE metaphor + 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy +  
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy  
brightness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
busyness quality 
DEFINING QUALITY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE 
CATEGORY OF MEMBERS WITH THE SAME QUALITY 
metonymy 
calmness state 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
carefulness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
carelessness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
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casualness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
cleanliness quality 
STATE FOR ACTION metonymy + 
EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy 
cleverness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
coldness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
completeness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
consciousness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
darkness state 
BADNESS IS DARKNESS metaphor + 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy + 
STATE OF BEING A FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS A metonymy + 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor +  
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
 
drunkenness state 
STATE FOR ACTION metonymy 
eagerness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
emptiness state 
STATE FOR OBJECT EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE metonymy 
+  
STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor  
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firmness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
fitness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy + 
STATE FOR ACTION metonymy + 
EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy 
foolishness quality 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy +  
 QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy + 
STATE FOR OBJECT EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE metonymy 
forgiveness quality 
STATE FOR ACTION metonymy 
freshness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
friendliness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
fullness state 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
gentleness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
goodness  quality 
STATE FOR OBJECT (PERSON) EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE 
metonymy 
happiness state 
EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy 
hardness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
harshness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
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highness state 
HIGH STATUS IS UP metaphor + 
STATE FOR OBJECT (PERSON) EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE 
metonymy  
holiness state 
STATE FOR OBJECT (PERSON) EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE 
metonymy  
illness state 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy + 
 STATE OF BEING A FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS A  metonymy 
kindness quality 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy  
lightness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy + 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor  
likeness quality 
STATE FOR OBJECT EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE metonymy 
+ 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
loneliness state 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
madness state 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy 
meanness quality 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy  
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openness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
politeness quality 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy  
powerlessness state 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
reasonableness quality 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy + 
recklessness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
responsiveness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
restlessness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
richness state 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
righteousness quality 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy  
rudeness quality 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy  
 
sadness state 
EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy 
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selfishness quality 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy  
sharpness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
shyness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
sickness state 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy +  
STATE OF BEING A FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING 
WHICH ONE IS A metonymy 
slowness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
smoothness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
softness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
stiffness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
stillness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
sweetness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
tenderness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
thickness quality 
STATE FOR OBJECT EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE metonymy 
tiredness state 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
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toughness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
ugliness quality 
MENTAL CHARACTERISTICS IS PHYSICAL APPEARANCE 
metaphor + 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy  
EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy 
unfairness state 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy 
uniqueness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
unkindness quality 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy + 
DEFINING QUALITY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE 
CATEGORY OF MEMBERS WITH THE SAME QUALITY 
metonymy 
unpleasantness quality 
EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy 
unwillingness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
warmness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
weakness state 
EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy 
weariness state 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
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whiteness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy + 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor + 
DEFINING QUALITY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE 
CATEGORY OF MEMBERS WITH THE SAME QUALITY 
metonymy 
wickedness quality 
STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT 
STATE OR QUALITY metonymy + 
QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR metonymy  
wilderness state 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS Metaphor  
willingness quality 
GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy 
 
 
 
16. CONCLUSION 
 The aim of our paper was to determine whether the suffixes -hood and -ness have 
other meanings apart from the central meaning, to specify those other meanings and to 
investigate which mechanisms are responsible for them. Our corpus has confirmed that the 
central meaning of both suffixes is 'the state or quality of being N/ A', as it is given in the 
grammars and dictionaries we used (Webster's New World College Dictionary, Oxford 
Advanced Learner's Dictionary, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, Longman 
Grammar of Spoken and Written English, Collins COBUILD English Dictionary for 
Advanced Learners, Dictionary.com and The Free Dictionary). The same meaning is taken in 
Hamawand (2008) as central. 
 The examples we extracted have confirmed other meanings provided by some of the 
above mentioned sources and for the suffix -hood these are the following: 
- a group of people sharing the thing referred to by N 
- a  period of time during which one is N 
- an instance of the quality referred to by the adjectival base 
- an area of the thing referred to by N.  
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 We have, however, found some meanings that are not mentioned in our sources and 
that do appear with the analyzed examples, namely: 
- a part of the body (as in manhood or womanhood) and 
- and an action of making something A, as found in falsehood. 
 The suffix -ness, apart from having the meaning of 'the state or quality of being A' as a 
prototypical meaning, exhibits other meanings as well, one of them being 'an instance or 
example of the quality or state denoted by the adjectival root'. These two meanings are given 
in the above mentioned grammars and dictionaries, but our corpus has shown that the suffix -
ness produces more meanings: 
-an activity one is engaged in 
-a period of time during which one is in the state of A + ness 
-an area characterized by being A and   
-a group of animals. 
 This shows that the suffix is by far richer than described in the literature.  
  
 Our next goal was to determine what conditiones such a rich polysemy of these two 
suffixes. Guided by the cognitive linguistics assumption that “Cognitive Grammar, as 
developed by Langacker, does not distinguish between lexical and grammatical units in the 
traditional sense of the term” (Ungerer 2007: 652), we assumed that metaphoric and/ or 
metonymyc processes operate on the grammatical units (traditionally speaking), just as they 
do on the lexical ones. We therefore agree with Booij (2005: 225) in stating that 
  
 Polysemy of affixes and of individual complex words is a pervasive phenomenon in 
the realm of complex words. It is the effect of semantic extension mechanisms such as 
metaphor and metonymy, and can be understood more generally in terms of domain shift 
chains. 
 
 Metonymyic extensions from the protypical sense of the -hood suffix is found far more 
frequently than metaphorical ones. STATE OF N FOR BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF N is a very 
frequent metonymy found in nominalizations with family members (fatherhood, sisterhood) 
or animals (cubhood, puppyhood) as bases, or those that denote general notions of being 
human (maidenhood, orphanhood). Here metonymy is used as a means for social 
stereotyping.  
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 The metonymy that produces the collective meaning of the suffix, which is the one 
given in grammars and dictionaries, is DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR 
THE WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP). This is exemplified in animalhood, manhood, sainthood and 
other nominalizations that simply represent a body of Ns, but also in nominalizations that 
denote a group of Ns gathered for specific goals or purposes, such as monkhood or 
priesthood. Here a state of one member metonymyically represents the whole group with the 
same state, which again produces the effect of making conclusions about the whole group 
based on the knowledge about one member of it, that is, stereotyping is also present here.  
 18 nominalizations from our corpus, the most representative example being childhood, 
can also denote a period of time during which one is in the state of N (childhood is a time in 
person's life during which they are a child). This meaning is also metonimically conditioned 
via THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE IS N.  
 
 PEOPLE LIVING IN A PARTICULAR PLACE FOR PLACE metonymy is found in one 
example only, namely neighbourhood, but the sense of 'area' or 'place' is a central one for this 
nominalization and found more frequently than other senses. DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY 
OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy has produced the collective 
sense as basis for the metonymy mentioned above.  
  STATE OF THE WHOLE PERSON FOR PART OF THE BODY metonymy, as a subcase of 
WHOLE FOR PART operates on manhood and womanhood producing the meaning of 'part of the 
body'.  
  The suffix -hood, when attached to adjectives, can produce active meaning. STATE (OF 
BEING FALSE) FOR ACTION (OF MAKING USE OF THAT STATE) is found in the example of 
falsehood where it produces the meaning of deliberate making of false statements. From this, 
the sense 'the result of telling lies' is produced via ACTION FOR RESULT metonymy. 
 
 Metaphors can operate on both base nouns and nominalizations as a whole, but they 
usually do not extend the prototypical meaning of the suffix and to detect them all is not the 
topics of our discussion. Here we will mention MENTAL (CLOSENESS) IS PHYSICAL 
(CLOSENESS) metaphor, which operates on the base nouns in brotherhood and sisterhood. 
These two examples have the meaning of 'people engaged in a particular occupation' or 
'woman who are brought together by a common religion, trade or interest', and not 'a group of 
siblings, that is, a group of Ns (with the protoypical meaning of N being a person connected 
by bloodline'). The 'group' sense, however, is caused by metonymy in these examples. 
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 Metonymic extensions are also found in the nominalizations ending in suffix -ness. An 
instance of the state or quality denoted by the adjectival root is the meaning of the suffix 
found very frequently, but we believe that the term 'instance' or 'example' is too vague to 
describe the rich semantics of the suffix. Therefore we have tried to specify this meaning a bit 
more precisely. We have termed examples such as foolishness or kindness as 'an act of being 
A'. Here we are dealing with actual events in which one displays a certain quality. This is 
made possible by STATE OR QUALITY FOR EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT STATE OR QUALITY 
metonymy. Within this metonymy we find QUALITY FOR BEHAVIOUR since acts are by 
definition situations in which one behaves in a certain way (e.g. kindly or foolishly).  
 Some nominalizations represent physical and nonphysical causes of the state, that is, 
someone or something that has brought about certain state. EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy 
enables such a reading, with example of this being happiness (someone or something that 
makes you happy).  
 Specific instances of the quality are illness and sickness. Simply speaking, their 
dictionary definitions are 'instances of N' and their grammatical decription defines them as 
count nouns, which is not the case with many other examples. Metonymy GENERIC FOR 
SPECIFIC makes them specific instances of the state.  
 The same metonymy is responsible for the meaning of 'manifestation of the state or 
quality in a certain time period and specific situations', such as recklessness or tiredness. The 
grammatical behaviour of these examples is such that they are used as count nouns (which, 
again, is not given in dictionaries) and they are often postmodified: 
 
 (376) (...) and she made no protest when his arms went round her and he kissed her 
 with a force and a recklessness that she met with equal need. (BNC) 
 
 The state or quality of being A can also be extended to mean 'object exemplifying the 
state or quality' via STATE FOR OBJECT EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE. What is meant under 
'object' is a person or idea. Thus likeness can denote both the quality of being alike, but also a 
portrait a graphical or pictorial representation of someone.  
 Just as it is the case with the suffix -hood, the sufix -ness can also have 'active' 
reading. Metonymy  STATE FOR ACTION operates on examples such as drunkenness or 
forgiveness. 
 Occasionally we encounter the meaning of 'a period of time during which one is in the 
state of A' (as in darkness or illness). This reading is enabled by STATE OF BEING A FOR THE 
PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE IS A metonymy. 
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 DEFINING QUALITY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY OF MEMBERS WITH 
THE SAME QUALITY metonymy is found with the examples that denote a group of animals, as 
is unkindness.  
 During our investigation we have found that metaphors can also produce extended 
meanings: darkness is a quality of having dark colour, but also an area without light. The 
location sense is found in other nominalizations, such as whiteness and wilderness. We 
believe this to be the case of STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor.  
 Metaphors BADNESS IS BLACK (in blackness), BEING IGNORANT IS BEING UNABLE TO 
SEE (in darkness), HIGH STATUS IS UP (in highness) and MENTAL CHARACTERISTICS IS 
PHYSICAL APPEARANCE (in ugliness) produce meanings that serve as basis for the 
metonymically derived meaning of 'an act in which one displays the quality in question' and 'a 
person of a high rank'. 
 There are many examples that lend themselves to metaphorical interpretation. For 
example, lightness can have several meanings and if we take it to mean 'the state of lacking 
depth or seriousness', we are dealing with IMPORTANT IS WEIGHT and DIFFICULTY IS 
HEAVINESS metaphors. They enable lightness to be not only a physical property, but rather a 
mental one. But as already stated, the investigation of metaphors operating on 
nominalizations, but producing no extended meanings was not the aim of this study and that is 
why we have given only a limited amount of examples like this one.  
  
 Our examples show that metaphors and to a greater extent, metonymies 'have the 
ability' to turn inherently mass nouns into count ones (especially with the suffix -ness), as well 
as to produce the  features 'concrete', 'perceivable' and 'physical' in inherently abstract nouns.   
  
 The last aim of our analysis was to determine the placement of metaphoric and 
metonymic operations. Metaphors and metonymies can work prior to or posterior to the 
derivational processes and sometimes it is even possible to have them operate simultaneously 
with word formation processes, as discussed above. Our analysis has shown that, when it 
comes to the suffixes under study, they create the new meanings after the suffixation has taken 
place. Only the metaphor MENTAL (CLOSENESS) IS PHYSICAL (CLOSENESS) operates on the 
base nouns in brotherhood and sisterhood, which can then be defined as 'a group of Ns'.  
 
 Taking into account cognitive linguistics' assumption that grammar and lexicon form a 
continnum, we can conclude that suffixes can be described and analyzed in a way any other 
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lexical item can. Following prototype theory, the meanings of suffixes -hood and -ness can be 
viewed as categories with a protoype (central meaning) and peripheral members (with some 
meanings being closer to the center than the others). These other meanings are extensions 
from the prototype and they are not arbitrary, but highly motivated. The motivation can be 
explained through metonymic and occasionally metaphorical processes. We hope that this 
paper would be a small, but noticable contribution to the field of cognitive approaches to 
word formation. 
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19. ABSTRACT 
 The aim of this paper is to give the overview and analysis of English nominalizations 
ending in suffixes -hood and -ness within the framework of cognitive linguistics. Cognitive 
approaches to word formation treat the meaning of affixes as a category with a prototype and 
its extensions. We have assumed that cognitive processes of metaphors and metonymies are 
responsible for the extensions. 
 Our corpus consists of examples that display the central meaning (the state or quality 
of being A/ N) and of those showing other senses. For the suffix -hood these are: a group of 
people sharing the thing referred to by N; a period of time during which one is N; an instance 
of the quality referred to by the adjectival base; an area of the thing referred to by N; a part of 
the body and an action of making something A. These meanings are metonymically and 
metaphorically derived. DEFINING STATE OR PROPERTY OF ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE 
CATEGORY (GROUP) metonymy creates the 'group' meaning; from this metonymy the 
activation of PEOPLE LIVING IN A PARTICULAR PLACE FOR PLACE  metonymy produces 'area' 
meaning; the sense 'period of time' can be explained via THE STATE OF BEING N FOR THE 
PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE IS N; the meaning of 'part of the body' is enabled by 
STATE OF THE WHOLE PERSON FOR PART OF THE BODY; STATE FOR ACTION metonymy is 
found in the example where we percieve state as an action in which one makes use of that 
state. This metonymy produces ACTION FOR RESULT metonymy which creates the meaning of 
'an instance or example of being A'.  
 A great number of nominalizations ending in -ness have the meaning of an instance or 
example of the quality or state denoted by the adjectival root. Within this meaning the 
following metonymies and metaphors create the following meanings: STATE OR QUALITY FOR 
EVENT  DEMONSTRATING THAT STATE OR QUALITY metonymy produces the meaning of an act 
of being A; EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy enables us to see certain state as a cause of that 
state (an event, a person or a situation that brings about A + ness); GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC 
metonymy allows nominalizations to be used with the indefinite article and become pluralized 
when they denote 'a manifestation or an instance of a state in a certain time period' or 'a 
specific type of A + ness'; STATE FOR OBJECT EXEMPLIFYING THE STATE metonymy can even 
produce the meanings that can be characterized as physical objects. The suffix -ness can have 
'action' reading via STATE FOR ACTION and 'a period of time' meaning via STATE OF BEING A 
FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ONE IS A. Metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS creates 
locative meaning of some -ness nominalizations. Finally, similar to the suffix -hood, -ness can 
also denote 'a collectivity', to be more precise, 'a group of animals', via DEFINING QUALITY OF 
ONE MEMBER FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY OF MEMBERS WITH THE SAME QUALITY metonymy. 
 The mentioned metonymies and metaphors operate posterior to suffixation and can 
serve to show that the richness of suffixal meanings is not random, but highly motivated.  
 This paper can be used as a study of other affixes within cognitive linguistics 
paradigm. The better understanding of connection between word formation processes and 
cognitive operations such as metaphors and metonymies is also possible.  
 KEY WORDS: word formation, suffixation, cognitive linguistics, metaphor, 
metonymy. 
 
 
 
20. SAŽETAK 
 Cilj je ovog rada dati prikaz i analizu nominalizacije u engleskom jeziku koje 
završavaju sufiksima -hood i -ness u okviru kognitivne lingvistike. Kognitivni pristupi tvorbi 
riječi značenja sufikasa promatraju kao kategoriju koja ima prototipno značenje i proširenja. 
Pretpostavili smo da su proširenja uvjetovana metaforama i metonimijama. 
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 Naš se korpus sastoji od primjera koji pokazuju središnje značenje (stanje ili svojstvo) 
i ostala značenja. Za suffix -hood to su: skupina ljudi koja dijeli svojstvo na koje upućuje 
osnova; vremenski period u kojem netko posjeduje svojstvo; primjer svojstva na koje upućuje 
pridjevska osnova; mjesto koje se odnosi na osnovu; dio tijela i radnja. Ova su značenja 
izvedena metaforama i metonimijama.  
 Metonimija STANJE ILI SVOJSTVO JEDNOG ČLANA ZA CIJELU KATEGORIJU (GRUPU) 
donosi značnje 'skupina'; iz ove metonimije aktivira se metonimija LJUDI KOJI ŽIVE NA 
ODREĐENOM MJESTU ZA MJESTO koja proizvodi značenje 'mjesto'; značenje 'vrijeme' 
objašnjava se metonimijom STANJE ZA VRIJEME TIJEKOM KOJEG JE NETKO U ODREĐENOM 
STANJU; 'dio tijela' omogućuje metonimija STANJE  (SVOJSTVO) CIJELE OSOBE ZA DIO TIJELA; 
metonimiju STANJE ZA RADNJU nalazimo u primjeru u kojem stanje promatramo kao radnju u 
kojoj se koristi to stanje. Ova metonimija proizvodi metonimiju RADNJA ZA REZULTAT 
odgovornu za značenje 'primjer svojstva'.  
 
 Veliki broj nominalizacija koje završavaju sufiksom -ness imaju značenje 'primjer 
svojstva ili stanja kojega označuje pridjevska osnova'. Unutar tog značenja pronalazimo 
sljedeće metonimije i metafore koje proizvode ova značenja: metonimija STANJE ILI 
SVOJSTVO ZA ČIN KOJI PRIKAZUJE TO STANJE ILI SVOJSTVO proizvodi značenje 'čin'; 
metonimija POSLJEDICA ZA UZROK omogućuje promatranje nekog stanja kao uzroka za to isto 
stanje (događaj, osoba ili situacija koja uzrokuje određeno stanje); metonimija OPĆENITO ZA 
SPECIFIČNO omogućuje upotrebu neodređenog člana i množine kod nominalizacija u 
slučajevima kada one imaju značenje 'pojava ili primjer stanja u određenom vremenskom 
razdoblju' ili 'specifična vrsta stanja'; metonimija STANJE ZA PREDMET KOJI SLUŽI KAO 
PRIMJER STANJA može proizvesti značenja koja mogu biti opisana kao fizički predmeti. Sufiks 
-ness može imati i 'aktivno' značenje kroz metonimiju STANJE ZA RADNJU, a može značiti i 
'vremenski period' kroz STANJE ZA VREMENSKI PERIOD U KOJEM JE NETKO U ODREĐENOM 
STANJU. Metafora STANJE JE LOKACIJA stvara značenje mjesta kod nekih nominalizacija. 
Konačno, kao i sufiks -hood, sufiks -ness može imati značenje 'skupina', odnosno preciznije 
'skupina životinja' uz pomoć metonimije SVOJSTVO JEDNOG ČLANA ZA CIJELU KATEGORIJU 
ČLANOVA S ISTIM SVOJSTVOM. 
 Spomenute metonimije i metafore djeluju nakon sufiksacije i pokazuju da bogatsvo 
sufiksalnih značenja nije proizvoljno, već velikim dijelom motivirano.  
 Ovaj rad može poslužiti u proučavanju ostalih afikasa u okviru kognitivne lingvistike. 
Također je moguće ostvariti bolje razumijevanje povezanosti procesa tvorbe riječi i 
kognitivnih operacija poput metafore i metonimije. 
  
 KLJUČNE RIJEČI: tvorba riječi, sufiksacija, kognitivna lingvistika, metafora, 
metonimija. 
